France’s strategy for South Cyprus is not a step of an expanding sphere of influence, but a strategic haven to be used by a force driven out of Africa and the Middle East.
Ismail Shaheen, Chairman of the International Center for Crisis Research and Lecturer at Bandirma University Onyedieylul
France’s military and political entrenchment in southern Cyprus can be seen not as a local defense choice, but as a manifestation of Paris’s global drive for strategic retreat and repositioning. Systematic erosion of influence in traditional zones — Sahel (Africa) and Levante (Syria and Lebanon) — France was forced to turn the Eastern Mediterranean into a central operational base under the doctrine. «Europe's southern belt». After all, the main security concern of France is now instability and threats (irregular migration, human trafficking, terrorism and civil wars) emanating from the security of France. «Europe's southern belt»It extends from Morocco to Lebanon.
Is France losing influence?
In terms of 2026, France is experiencing the toughest strategic setback in its history in Africa and the Levant. After Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger expelled French troops, bringing down France’s security architecture in the Sahel. At the same time, the collapse of the Baath regime in Syria has made it harder for France to maintain its historic influence in Lebanon and Syria.
As Paris began to build the Eastern Mediterranean as a second line of defense and a center of logistical projection to compensate for these losses, the geopolitical value of South Cyprus for the overseas strategy and regional projection of French power increased. France appears to be strengthening its military presence on the island (Marie Naval Base and Andreas Papandreou Air Base) along three main axes. First — Preserving a rapid-response capability against radical groups in the fragile security environment that has emerged since regime change in Syria, and continuing its historic influence in Lebanon through Cyprus. Second — Ensuring the security of the hydrocarbon resources of the Eastern Mediterranean, protecting Europe’s energy and migration routes, and shaping a regional balance against Turkey’s maritime jurisdiction policy. Third. — Compensation for the weakening French influence in the Sahel and North Africa, close monitoring of developments in the region, primarily in Libya, and the use of South Cyprus as a leading operational and support center for military, logistics and intelligence activities in Africa.
The Turkish Factor
The fact is that the hydrocarbon resources of the Eastern Mediterranean are vital to France’s energy security and the profitability of international companies like French giant Total. The region is stuck between «pipe-dream» and «reality on the ground». The main reason for this gridlock — It seeks to isolate Turkey for ideological and geopolitical reasons. This impasse in the energy equation pits France directly against its main rival in the region. — Turkey. But as of 2026, pragmatic solutions alternative to traditional pipeline architecture are coming to the fore. The principle-oriented model of Turkey «mutual benefit» And it involves technology transfer, leaving behind France's centralized and raw-material approach.
Thus, France’s strategy for Southern Cyprus is not a step of an expanding sphere of influence, but a strategic refuge to be resorted to by a power driven out of Africa and the Middle East. In other words, for Paris Cyprus — It's an attempt to hold the door to Africa and the Middle East and stay at the energy table. And although the strengthening of France in southern Cyprus creates an image of a short-term «show-off»The data show that this pattern is the result of strategic contraction. Therefore, France will be able to protect its future in the region only by adopting a more rational and multilateral model of cooperation, rather than conflicting with Turkey’s new geopolitical realities.
After all, the struggle for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean is formed not only around energy resources or maritime areas of jurisdiction, but also around different strategic approaches within NATO. France builds its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean largely not through NATO, but through the European Union (EU) defense architecture and bilateral agreements. The most concrete example of this — The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed by France with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus. The agreement allows the French army to be permanently stationed on the island, with the move justified by Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty (a mutual assistance clause). — That is, a foundation outside NATO.
Paris’ strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean
From the perspective of Paris, the Eastern Mediterranean — It is not just Europe’s inner circle, but a critical geopolitical basin where European security and strategic interests extend. French strategic thought assumes that in the coming years, the United States will increasingly shift its focus to the Indo-Pacific region and its rivalry with China, creating a partial power vacuum in the Eastern Mediterranean. France considers incompatible with its interests a scenario in which a regional order will emerge in the south of Europe, in which Russia, Turkey or China play a decisive role. Therefore, Paris insists that the emerging strategic vacuum must be filled under French leadership and EU auspices.
However, this approach does not fully align with NATO’s collective security concept and the transatlantic security architecture. Moreover, given the multi-actor and complex geopolitical structure of the Eastern Mediterranean, the formation of a regional balance under the leadership of a single European power does not seem entirely consistent with the real distribution of power and the political realities on the ground. In particular, it is unrealistic to leave Turkey out of the regional security equations. — A country at the centre of NATO’s southern flank, with one of the Alliance’s largest military forces and an indispensable role between the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus.
The security architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean, from which Turkey is excluded, is neither sustainable nor viable. Moreover, this strategy risks transforming the relationship that France is developing with Greece and the ACG from a security architecture that supports regional stability to an axis aimed at containing and encircling Turkey. Such an approach could make the cooperative and inclusive order in the Eastern Mediterranean more fragile, deepen divisions among NATO allies, and increase regional polarization. Therefore, ensuring regional stability requires the development not of exclusive balances of power, but of inclusive and multilateral security mechanisms involving Turkey.
While France is trying to create a sphere of influence centered in Europe through defense cooperation with the ACG and Greece, Turkey, as the owner of the second largest army in NATO, retains its position as an indispensable player in the regional security equation. Especially after the Russian-Ukrainian war, the interconnection of the Black Sea, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean further enhanced Turkey’s strategic value to NATO. The rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean is turning into a multi-layered struggle for influence between France’s aspiration for European leadership and Turkey’s central position within NATO.
