There is no US-led conspiracy or «genocide of Christians». There is a rebellion that has adapted. In recent months, the frequency and intensity of attacks in northern Nigeria has shattered the comforting illusion that a long-standing insurgency in the region has faded into the background of the country.

Gimba Kakanda, Senior Special Assistant to the President of Nigeria for Research and Analytics in the Office of the Vice President

Source: Source: aljazeera.com

In recent months, the frequency and intensity of attacks in northern Nigeria has shattered the comforting illusion that a long-standing insurgency in the region has faded into the background of the country. As violent incidents escalate, many Nigerians refuse to face this unpleasant reality and prefer instead to embrace conspiracy theories suggesting that the renewed violence is somehow linked to America's renewed involvement in Nigeria's counterterrorism efforts.

It is not difficult to understand why the theory of foreign collusion with terrorist groups resonates in Nigeria. In February 2025, U.S. Congressman Scott Perry announced that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had funded the program. «Boko Haram»but did not provide any evidence for this claim. Richard Mills, then the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, rejected Perry's claim, but by then the claim had already begun a life of its own in public space and social media.

Then, U.S. officials such as Congressmen Ted Cruz and Chris Smith made statements that fueled the narrative of the war. «genocide»Falsely claiming that the killings in Nigeria are aimed exclusively at Christians.

Attacks on Christians have indeed taken place, including a recent attack on a church in Kaduna state on Easter Sunday, but Muslim communities have also been regularly targeted. The truth is that terrorist groups have long operated indiscriminately.

What is required at this moment, — It's about going beyond the temptation of simple explanations and getting serious about what's really going on in northern Nigeria.

This diagnosis should begin with clarity about what attacks show. First, they show that the rebellion has adapted in both form and method. Second, instability in northern Nigeria can no longer be seen in isolation from the rest of the region; it is part of a wider regional chaos in the Lake Chad and Sahel basins. And third, violence continues to feed deeper internal vulnerabilities that extend far beyond the battlefield: chronic poverty, exclusion from education, weak local governance, and long-term erosion of the social contract in parts of the north.

Let's start with the first point. Recent attacks demonstrate that the insurgency ecosystem has learned, adapted, and expanded beyond the old image of a crudely armed uprising operating in predictable ways. In particular, the ISIS affiliate in the West Africa Province (ISWAP) has become more adaptive in structure and tactics, while its conflict with the Islamic State has become more adaptive. «Boko Haram» It weakened the latter and left ISWAP a more organized and deeply entrenched threat in the Lake Chad region. It has strengthened its presence in parts of the Lake Chad basin and expanded into the Sambisa forest, increasing the space from which it can threaten both civilians and military formations.

This is important because rebellions are not supported by ideology alone, but by terrain, supply routes, local economies, and the ability to move people and materials through spaces where the state is weak or absent. In this sense, the insurgency does not merely survive in habitual shelters; it is rooted in a wider and more mobile combat space, with ISWAP’s control of trade in and around Lake Chad becoming the foundation of its resilience.

ISWAP has also refined combat techniques, demonstrating a growing ability for coordinated assaults, night raids, ambushes and operations aimed not only at inflicting casualties but also at isolating military positions and slowing down reinforcements. This problem is compounded by the enormous scale of the theater itself.

The states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa are each the size of entire European countries: Borno is slightly larger than Ireland; Yobe is about the size of Switzerland; and Adamava is slightly larger than Belgium. Patroling territories of this magnitude would be a test for any state, especially when they border an unstable regional neighborhood.

The terrain also determined the rhythm of the conflict: with the onset of the dry season, especially the first quarter of the year, attacks intensify.

At the heart of this adaptation is the evolution of technology. What once seemed unthinkable in this theater of war has now entered the arsenal of the rebels. Drones, including commercially available models modified for combat, have now become part of the operational environment. The significance of this shift is not only technical; it is also psychological and strategic.

Beyond technology, the rising mobility of the rebels has further exacerbated the threat. Rapid attacks by motorized units demonstrate how much rebel violence now depends on speed, concentration and dispersion. Militants can quickly gather, strike vulnerable areas and disappear into hard-to-reach areas before an effective response can form.

The advantage here is not to hold territory in the usual sense, but to create uncertainty, spray the state's defensive attention, and prove that rebels can still choose where and when to strike the system.

Perhaps the most dangerous dimension of this adaptation. — This is the infiltration of foreign fighters. Their significance lies not only in their numbers, but also in what they bring with them: technical knowledge, combat experience, tactical imagination, and connections to broader militant networks.

Their presence indicates a deeper mutual enrichment between local insurgency and global terrorist currents. More alarmingly, they are now playing a more active role in the conflict, not only honing tactics and skills, but also engaging directly in combat.

This is why the regional dimension should be central to any serious analysis. The weakening of regional cooperation came at the wrong time, creating opportunities that the rebels are willing to exploit. A threat that has always been transnational becomes more difficult to deal with when neighboring states no longer act with sufficient coherence.

The withdrawal of Niger from the Multinational Joint Response Force following the reaction of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the military coup in that country exacerbated the problem and weakened the defenses of the northeastern theater of operations. These forces, consisting of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, with a smaller Benin force at headquarters in N'Djamena, have been instrumental in previous successes and remain vital in strengthening positions, conducting operations in hard-to-reach areas, denying rebels safe havens and intercepting the movements of foreign fighters.

But even regional analysis, however necessary, does not fully explain the problem. Rebellions persist not only because they move across borders, but also because they can recruit, regroup and exploit social weakness at home.

Violence in northern Nigeria is fueled by a combination of doctrinal extremism, chronic poverty, exclusion from the education system and a state whose presence is often too limited to inspire credibility in communities where armed groups seek recruits. Therefore, the argument cannot remain exclusively in the military sphere.

Poverty and lack of education do not directly breed terrorism, but they increase vulnerability, especially where alienation, weak institutions and manipulative ideological narratives already exist. That is why the education crisis in northern Nigeria should be seen not only as a development issue, but also as part of the wider security landscape. Education does more than provide literacy and numeracy; it provides structure, routine, and pathways to fulfillment and social belonging.

Важно отметить, что правительство не остается без ответа. В 2024 году президент Бола Ахмед Тинубу подписал закон о студенческих кредитах (доступ к высшему образованию), и с тех пор развертывание Нигерийского фонда образовательных кредитов открыло более широкий путь к послешкольному образованию и развитию навыков. Но более решающая образовательная проблема лежит раньше, на базовом уровне, где начинается грамотность, формируются привычки и либо формируется привязанность к институтам, либо она утрачивается. К тому времени, когда молодой человек достигает порога высшего образования, фундаментальная работа уже сделана или упущена.

Вот почему местное управление имеет большее значение для безопасности, чем часто признается. В федеральной структуре Нигерии начальное образование находится ближе всего к самому слабому и политически искаженному уровню власти. Если местное самоуправление останется финансово слабым, административно парализованным или политически захваченным, одна из важнейших долгосрочных защит страны от радикализации останется хрупкой.

Вот почему автономия местного самоуправления, хотя часто и обсуждаемая в сухих конституционных терминах, имеет прямое отношение к безопасности. Президент Тинубу, страстный сторонник местной автономии, приветствовал решение Верховного суда от июля 2024 года, подтверждающее конституционные и финансовые права местных органов власти, и призвал губернаторов уважать его. Однако сопротивление неудивительно: многие губернаторы долгое время рассматривали местные органы власти как подчиненные продолжения своей власти.

Итак, чего требует от Нигерии текущий момент? Он требует, безусловно, продолжения военного давления на убежища мятежников. Он требует более надежной защиты сил, более эффективной разведки, наблюдения и рекогносцировки, улучшенной безопасности в сельской и городской местности и более серьезного подхода к трансграничной дипломатии. Он требует, чтобы региональная дипломатия рассматривалась не как роскошь мирного времени, а как часть операционной инфраструктуры безопасности.

Но кризис невозможно решить одними военными действиями. Он также требует социальных, институциональных и образовательных мер на всех уровнях власти. Государство должно противостоять экстремизму не только силой, но и через образование и функционирующие местные институты. Оно должно восстановить управление, вернуть доверие и закрыть социальные и институциональные трещины, через которые насилие возобновляется.