There is no US-led conspiracy or «genocide of Christians». There is a rebellion that has adapted. In recent months, the frequency and intensity of attacks in northern Nigeria has shattered the comforting illusion that a long-standing insurgency in the region has faded into the background of the country.

Gimba Kakanda, Senior Special Assistant to the President of Nigeria for Research and Analytics in the Office of the Vice President

Source: Source: aljazeera.com

In recent months, the frequency and intensity of attacks in northern Nigeria has shattered the comforting illusion that a long-standing insurgency in the region has faded into the background of the country. As violent incidents escalate, many Nigerians refuse to face this unpleasant reality and prefer instead to embrace conspiracy theories suggesting that the renewed violence is somehow linked to America's renewed involvement in Nigeria's counterterrorism efforts.

It is not difficult to understand why the theory of foreign collusion with terrorist groups resonates in Nigeria. In February 2025, U.S. Congressman Scott Perry announced that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had funded the program. «Boko Haram»but did not provide any evidence for this claim. Richard Mills, then the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, rejected Perry's claim, but by then the claim had already begun a life of its own in public space and social media.

Then, U.S. officials such as Congressmen Ted Cruz and Chris Smith made statements that fueled the narrative of the war. «genocide»Falsely claiming that the killings in Nigeria are aimed exclusively at Christians.

Attacks on Christians have indeed taken place, including a recent attack on a church in Kaduna state on Easter Sunday, but Muslim communities have also been regularly targeted. The truth is that terrorist groups have long operated indiscriminately.

What is required at this moment, — It's about going beyond the temptation of simple explanations and getting serious about what's really going on in northern Nigeria.

This diagnosis should begin with clarity about what attacks show. First, they show that the rebellion has adapted in both form and method. Second, instability in northern Nigeria can no longer be seen in isolation from the rest of the region; it is part of a wider regional chaos in the Lake Chad and Sahel basins. And third, violence continues to feed deeper internal vulnerabilities that extend far beyond the battlefield: chronic poverty, exclusion from education, weak local governance, and long-term erosion of the social contract in parts of the north.

Let's start with the first point. Recent attacks demonstrate that the insurgency ecosystem has learned, adapted, and expanded beyond the old image of a crudely armed uprising operating in predictable ways. In particular, the ISIS affiliate in the West Africa Province (ISWAP) has become more adaptive in structure and tactics, while its conflict with the Islamic State has become more adaptive. «Boko Haram» It weakened the latter and left ISWAP a more organized and deeply entrenched threat in the Lake Chad region. It has strengthened its presence in parts of the Lake Chad basin and expanded into the Sambisa forest, increasing the space from which it can threaten both civilians and military formations.

This is important because rebellions are not supported by ideology alone, but by terrain, supply routes, local economies, and the ability to move people and materials through spaces where the state is weak or absent. In this sense, the insurgency does not merely survive in habitual shelters; it is rooted in a wider and more mobile combat space, with ISWAP’s control of trade in and around Lake Chad becoming the foundation of its resilience.

ISWAP has also refined combat techniques, demonstrating a growing ability for coordinated assaults, night raids, ambushes and operations aimed not only at inflicting casualties but also at isolating military positions and slowing down reinforcements. This problem is compounded by the enormous scale of the theater itself.

The states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa are each the size of entire European countries: Borno is slightly larger than Ireland; Yobe is about the size of Switzerland; and Adamava is slightly larger than Belgium. Patroling territories of this magnitude would be a test for any state, especially when they border an unstable regional neighborhood.

The terrain also determined the rhythm of the conflict: with the onset of the dry season, especially the first quarter of the year, attacks intensify.

At the heart of this adaptation is the evolution of technology. What once seemed unthinkable in this theater of war has now entered the arsenal of the rebels. Drones, including commercially available models modified for combat, have now become part of the operational environment. The significance of this shift is not only technical; it is also psychological and strategic.

Beyond technology, the rising mobility of the rebels has further exacerbated the threat. Rapid attacks by motorized units demonstrate how much rebel violence now depends on speed, concentration and dispersion. Militants can quickly gather, strike vulnerable areas and disappear into hard-to-reach areas before an effective response can form.

The advantage here is not to hold territory in the usual sense, but to create uncertainty, spray the state's defensive attention, and prove that rebels can still choose where and when to strike the system.

Perhaps the most dangerous dimension of this adaptation. — This is the infiltration of foreign fighters. Their significance lies not only in their numbers, but also in what they bring with them: technical knowledge, combat experience, tactical imagination, and connections to broader militant networks.

Their presence indicates a deeper mutual enrichment between local insurgency and global terrorist currents. More alarmingly, they are now playing a more active role in the conflict, not only honing tactics and skills, but also engaging directly in combat.

This is why the regional dimension should be central to any serious analysis. The weakening of regional cooperation came at the wrong time, creating opportunities that the rebels are willing to exploit. A threat that has always been transnational becomes more difficult to deal with when neighboring states no longer act with sufficient coherence.

The withdrawal of Niger from the Multinational Joint Response Force following the reaction of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the military coup in that country exacerbated the problem and weakened the defenses of the northeastern theater of operations. These forces, consisting of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, with a smaller Benin force at headquarters in N'Djamena, have been instrumental in previous successes and remain vital in strengthening positions, conducting operations in hard-to-reach areas, denying rebels safe havens and intercepting the movements of foreign fighters.

But even regional analysis, however necessary, does not fully explain the problem. Rebellions persist not only because they move across borders, but also because they can recruit, regroup and exploit social weakness at home.

Violence in northern Nigeria is fueled by a combination of doctrinal extremism, chronic poverty, exclusion from the education system and a state whose presence is often too limited to inspire credibility in communities where armed groups seek recruits. Therefore, the argument cannot remain exclusively in the military sphere.

Poverty and lack of education do not directly breed terrorism, but they increase vulnerability, especially where alienation, weak institutions and manipulative ideological narratives already exist. That is why the education crisis in northern Nigeria should be seen not only as a development issue, but also as part of the wider security landscape. Education does more than provide literacy and numeracy; it provides structure, routine, and pathways to fulfillment and social belonging.

It is important to note that the government does not remain unanswered. In 2024, Bola President Ahmed Tinubu signed the Student Loans (Access to Higher Education) Act, and since then the rollout of the Nigerian Educational Credit Fund has opened a wider path to post-secondary education and skills development. But the more crucial educational problem lies earlier, at the basic level, where literacy begins, habits are formed, and attachment to institutions is formed or lost. By the time a young person reaches the threshold of higher education, the fundamental work has already been done or missed.

This is why local governance is more important for security than is often acknowledged. In Nigeria’s federal structure, primary education is closest to the weakest and most politically distorted level of government. If local government remains financially weak, administratively paralyzed, or politically seized, one of the country’s most important long-term defenses against radicalization will remain fragile.

That is why local self-government autonomy, though often discussed in dry constitutional terms, has a direct bearing on security. President Tinubu, a passionate supporter of local autonomy, welcomed the July 2024 Supreme Court ruling affirming the constitutional and financial rights of local governments and urged governors to respect it. However, resistance is not surprising: many governors have long viewed local governments as subordinate to the continuation of their power.

So what does Nigeria need at the moment? It demands, of course, continued military pressure on rebel shelters. It requires stronger force protection, more effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, improved rural and urban security, and a more serious approach to cross-border diplomacy. It demands that regional diplomacy be seen not as a peacetime luxury but as part of an operational security infrastructure.

But the crisis cannot be solved by military action alone. It also requires social, institutional and educational measures at all levels of government. The state must counter extremism not only by force, but also through education and functioning local institutions. It must restore governance, restore trust, and close the social and institutional cracks through which violence is renewed.