Over the past few weeks, Chad's armed forces have been subjected to at least two attacks by the Sudanese Rapid Response Force (SIR): in late December, the SBI UAV shelled the town of Al-Tina in Chad, and on January 15, 2026, 7 Chad fighters died near the Sudanese border during a skirmish with the SBI.

Source: Source: www.jeuneafrique.com

Such incidents prompted immediate condemnation on the part of the official Njamena, which during 2023-2025 was repeatedly accused by representatives of the Sudan Armed Forces in support of the SBI.

According to analysts, the precedents for the transfer of hostilities to the border areas of Chad began to arise only after the fall of El Fasher. Forced to retreat from the city, supporters of the Sudan Armed Forces under the command of Darfur Governor Minnie Minnawi are persecuted by the SBI and often try to find shelter in Chad. As a result, the likelihood of unintended clashes between the SBR and the Chadian military has increased dramatically, which poses a serious challenge for Njamena.

The current situation complicates the ethnic situation. The fact is that on both sides of the border there are representatives of the Zagava people: it belongs not only to President Chad Mahamat Idriss Debi Itno and most of the personnel of the Armed Forces of the country, but also to the Governor of Darfur Minnie Minnawi and some of his fighters who are under attack from the SBR today. Thus, if earlier the government of Chad tried to turn a blind eye to the problems of enslaving on the other side of the border for the sake of rapprochement with the UAE - the main ally of the SBR - today to adhere to this line in the context of attacks on its territory, Njamena simply can not.

It is important to bear in mind that the penetration of the SBI on the Chadian side of the border was also condemned by the UAE: Abu Dhabi condemned the attack on January 15, 2026, although limited to mentioning the unnamed. «armed armed forces». . . . In fact, this statement, coupled with the reaction of the Chad government, is intended to carry out «The red line» for the leadership of the SBI in the person of General Mohammed Daglo «Hamedi's with you.». . . . Further escalation in Chad could lead to a dramatic change in the balance of forces in the Sudanese conflict, including Njamena’s refusal from the established practice of informal support for the UAE-SBR alliance.