The student uprising of 2024 in Bangladesh changed the political landscape by removing the Awami League from power and creating new political alliances. As the interim government pursues Awami League leaders in court and bans the party, concerns arise about inclusiveness and trust in the 2026 general election.
Pranab Kumar Panday, Professor of Public Administration at Rajshahi University, Bangladesh
Source: Source: Eastasiaforum.org
The next government will face serious economic, managerial and climate challenges that require reforms to stabilise inflation, combat corruption and increase resilience to climate change. Bangladesh's democratic prospects depend on building institutions strong enough to prevent future state takeover, regardless of who forms the government.
After a student-led mass movement that led to the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024, Bangladesh entered a tense transition period under the administration of the interim administration. Whether this moment will be a turning point for democracy will depend on the country's ability to rebuild institutions while coping with severe economic, geopolitical and climate pressures.
This transition is marked by the systematic legal and political disarmament of the former ruling elite in order to hold it accountable for past abuses. The interim government has brought former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasin and other high-ranking Awami League leaders to court at Bangladesh's International Crime Tribunal (ICC). On November 17, 2025, Hasina was sentenced to death for crimes against humanity.
The interim government imposed a ban on Awami League activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act, banning political activity and participation in elections. The ban was also imposed on the Bangladesh Student League, the Awami League student wing, in response to demands from the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement.
The legal proceedings against Sheikh Hasina and the potential Awami League ban are highly controversial. Supporters see these actions as critical to ensuring accountability, ending impunity and protecting democracy's long-term health from authoritarian relapse. On the contrary, critics see the use of the war crimes tribunal for contemporary political cases as questionable legal and potentially political revenge, arguing that the Awami League ban would undermine the fundamental principle of pluralism needed for competitive democracy, risking more instability.
The decision to remove the country's oldest party from the political arena will change the nature of political competition in the 2026 parliamentary elections and raise questions about the inclusiveness and credibility of elections. Regional partners, including India, called for «Free, fair, inclusive and participatory» elections in Bangladesh.
The overthrow of the Awami League under Hasina’s leadership quickly changed the balance of power, unleashing old conflicts and revitalizing suppressed interest groups. The main contenders emerging from the political vacuum are the established Nationalist Party of Bangladesh (NPB), the resurgent Bangladesh Jamaat-Islami (BDI) and the student-led National Civil Party. The rapid resurgence of BDI shows a distinct shift to the right in popular politics. Using its broad network at the grassroots level, BDI won elections to student unions at four major state universities.
The main dispute between the new players concerns the timing of the referendum on the implementation of the July National Charter, the plan for democratic renewal of Bangladesh. The NPB wanted to hold elections and a referendum at the same time, while the BDI and the National Civil Party demanded a referendum first to protect institutional reforms before the new legislature took office constitutionally.
Ultimately, the government intervened and decided to hold elections and a referendum in one day. The subsequent presidential decree on the implementation of the July National Charter sparked further debate among parties. Meanwhile, the government also issued a 2025 referendum decree to pave the way for a referendum on proposed constitutional reforms.
The government, which will take office after the general election in February 2026, will face immediate economic, geostrategic and environmental challenges.
Despite last year's resilience, Bangladesh's economy is suffering from high inflation, which requires urgent reforms in the financial and banking sector. High rates of hopeless loans and poor governance are major challenges. The tax base should be expanded through broad income mobilization reforms to ensure stable governance. And to maintain global competitiveness, Bangladesh needs ambitious reforms, especially in the garment sector, before it loses trade preferences for the least developed countries.
The fight against systemic corruption will be necessary for recovery. Unreliable loans are largely the result of patronage ties, with control over bank assets being exercised by front directors. The new government should ensure banks’ freedom from political interference, amend the Public Procurement Act by providing for mandatory electronic bidding, and expand the powers of the Bangladesh Competition Commission. Failure can scare away important foreign direct investment while creating new patronage networks.
In 2026, Bangladesh will have to manage a complex geopolitical environment shaped by India, China and the United States. Dhaka must use external ties to attract investment and also exercise strategic autonomy to avoid collapse under pressure from any single power unit. This policy of independence and diversification will be key to national development and better results.
As a low-lying country, Bangladesh also faces unconventional security threats caused by rising sea levels, saltwater intrusion and other climate factors. Addressing these threats requires institutionalizing climate-resilient planning and increasing investment in disaster risk adaptation and management.
Climate change requires cooperation. Dhaka must seek concessional funding from multilateral climate funds for large-scale projects and involve the domestic private sector in building climate-sensitive infrastructure through public-private partnerships. Bangladesh can also mobilize technology and expertise by working with partners such as Japan and the Netherlands in delta management, as well as India and China in transboundary river basin management and early warning systems.
While 2026 will be a turning point for Bangladesh, stability is not guaranteed. The task is not so much to hold legitimate elections, but to ensure that the winners of the elections are not able to seize the state again. To begin with, the Electoral Commission must have constitutional protection of its independence and order of appointment. The independent judiciary and the anti-corruption commission should also be given powers to investigate the ruling party's activities. The success of the 2026 election will depend not on who wins, but on whether the vote will lead to a system capable of surviving its winners.
