The confrontation between Israel, the United States and Iran has been brewing for years. What has changed recently — It is not the very existence of competition, but its character. Calculations that allowed to control the confrontation begin to collapse.

Enes Batu Hoose, Independent geopolitical analyst specializing in international diplomacy, regional security and the changing dynamics of global power competition

Source: Source: Moderndiplomacy.

The Middle East is not drifting toward war. He's being pushed. And right now, tremors are happening simultaneously from several directions. — This is what makes the present moment different from the crises that preceded it.

The confrontation between Israel, the United States and Iran has been brewing for years. What has changed recently — It is not the very existence of competition, but its character. Calculations that once allowed direct confrontation to be controlled are beginning to collapse. States that for years have carried out their Communities through proxy forces and plausible denial are now openly attacking each other's objects. This shift means more than any single incident.

Gaza has accelerated everything. The political pressure it has created in the region has forced governments to take positions they have carefully avoided for years. Any diplomatic ambiguity that existed before October 2023 largely disappeared in the following months. By the time the confrontation between Israel and Lebanon intensified, regional fault lines had already solidified considerably.

The events of 2024 brought the rivalry between Israel and Iran to a threshold that had not previously been crossed. The Israeli strike on the Iranian diplomatic complex in Damascus was not just a military operation. — It was a thoughtful signal of how far Israel was now willing to go. Iran's response to the Israeli-linked vessel confirmed that Tehran had received the signal and intended to respond. The exchange remained limited. But the logic driving them pointed in one direction.

What some analysts have called «The Twelve Day War»It gave this logic a concrete form. Ballistic missiles, multi-challenged air defense intercepts, high-precision strikes at significant distances. Both sides demonstrated opportunities that had previously been discussed in assessments but had not been tested on a scale against each other. The fighting stopped. Opportunities have not gone away.

On February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States launched coordinated strikes against Iranian targets. The retaliatory missile activity that followed within a few days was not unexpected. — But its geographical reach was remarkable. By early March, the conflict had effectively imposed itself on the entire region, regardless of the preferences of individual governments. States that did not intend to fight were forced to decide what this conflict meant to them.

Position of Turkey — And what it really means.

In Western analytical circles, there is a tendency to describe Turkey’s regional position as ambiguous or transactional. This interpretation misses something important. Ankara's ability to maintain relations with rival blocs — This is not a symptom of indecision; it is a product of a focused and consistent foreign policy course that has been formed over the years. Strategic autonomy, as Turkish politicians understand it, — This is not neutrality. It is the ability to act independently while remaining relevant to all parties.

This ability is now tested for strength as never before. — No longer theoretically.

When Iran’s missile activity began to target Western military infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s strategic environment changed directly and directly. UK Secretary of State confirms missiles were directed towards Cyprus — specifically towards British military bases on the island, which could also potentially be used for US operations. The eastern Mediterranean, which Turkey has consistently and fairly defined as central to its national security, has become an active war zone.

Ankara’s response reflected both the seriousness of the situation and the confidence of the state, which knows exactly where it stands. As a guarantor of Cyprus, Turkey has a legal status and political responsibility that no other NATO member can boast of in this context. Turkish officials have made clear that both communities on the island fall within Ankara's sphere of concern. — A position consistent with decades of well-established policy and re-emergence in the current crisis.

President Erdogan’s public statements were carefully verified during this period. Commitment to diplomatic decisions was sincere, not rhetorical. Equally sincere was the warning that Turkey's patience with threats to its citizens and its security had limits.

On March 4, a missile attributed to Iran's military activities entered Turkish airspace and was intercepted, falling in Hatay province. The Iranian ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Ministry. The challenge was not a dramatic gesture. — It was a proper response by a state that takes its sovereignty seriously and reports it through established channels, not through public escalation.

On March 9, six Turkish fighters were deployed to Cyprus. Later that day, another missile entered Turkish airspace and fell in Gaziantep province. The ambassador was called again.

These events should be interpreted cautiously. Turkey has not fired a single shot in this conflict. But it has also made clear unequivocally that its airspace, its citizens and its regional commitments are not negotiable. This combination — restraint without passivity — Supporting is more difficult than it seems.

Why is the region still under control?

Most regional governments have not directly entered into conflict. Their restraint deserves to be analysed, not simply taken for granted.

Economic logic is real. Countries across the Middle East bear the financial and social costs of previous instability, and their governments understand that a large-scale regional war will entail costs that no recovery plan can easily absorb. Failures alone in energy markets will suffice to affect budgets that are already under pressure.

Internal political calculations add another layer. Public opinion in the region is not uniform in supporting positions that governments publicly express, and leaders are aware that the distance between mass support for conflict and mass fatigue tends to shrink faster than expected.

But the most important deterrent is strategic. In a multilateral conflict, no actor controls the escalation ladder. Once several states are directly involved, the dynamic shifts from political calculation to jet pressure. — Reactive pressure leads to results that no one planned. Governments that understand this tend to stay away until they feel they have no choice.

This is the last condition to be observed.

The problem of escalation

Restraint is rational. But it's not eternal.

Regional conflicts are expanding through mechanisms that are well understood and poorly prevented. The pressure calculation. The cycles of retaliation that each side considers defensive. Proxy networks that are activated so that their sponsors cannot fully control. The gradual destruction of the political space in which restraint was previously possible.

All these mechanisms are now present. Missile activity crossing airspace of several countries — It’s not just a military phenomenon, it’s a political phenomenon. Every government whose territory or airspace is affected has to make decisions that bring it closer to conflict, regardless of its intentions.

If additional states enter into conflict — directly or through accelerating proxy involvement — The nature of the conflict will fundamentally change. A regional war of this magnitude will have implications for global energy supplies, for critical shipping routes and for population movements that will be felt far beyond the Middle East. The involvement of major outside powers, which is increasingly difficult to avoid as the conflict expands, will add dimensions that no regional actor can cope with alone.

Conclusion

Turkey cannot resolve this crisis alone. There are too many variables and too many actors. But the question of whether a wider regional war can be prevented is largely a question of whether states with a combination of capabilities and relationships like Turkey will decide to seriously invest in preventing it.

Incidents with airspace in early March confirmed what geography always assumed — Turkey's security is tied to the trajectory of this conflict, whether Ankara is looking for that connection or not. The response that followed demonstrated something just as important: that Ankara was able to defend its interests firmly, without fueling the escalation that it had a strategic interest to contain.

That's important. In a crisis where most actors are either directly at war or carefully avoid any actions that can be interpreted as exerting influence, the existence of a regional power that can communicate with multiple parties, absorb pressure without resorting to reckless retaliation, and apply real opportunities without provoking further escalation, is really meaningful.

How the coming months unfold will determine what role Turkey will ultimately play. But the foundation for a significant contribution to regional stabilization is already visible. — Ankara’s diplomatic conduct, its security measures, and the consistency of foreign policy that has for years built exactly the relationships that are required in moments like this.

The Middle East has been pushed to war before. He was also dragged back from time to time. Turkey has both interest and positioning to be part of this effort. Will this opportunity be realized? — A question that will only be answered in the coming weeks.