In the nuclear field, the threshold of sensitivity may change. As the political struggle is hardened, the sensitivity to damage is reduced, as the history of the twentieth century has shown well. The situation around Iran is hardly encouraging.

Ivan TimofeevPolit.n., Director General of the INF Treaty, Member of the INF Treaty

Source source: russiancouncil.ru

The massive Israeli and U.S. air strike on Iran was hardly a complete surprise. For several months, there was a concentration of a punch in the Persian Gulf zone. Tensions between Iran and the United States have stalled and are unlikely to have had a good chance. The death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his family members, and a number of Iranian military and political leaders has caused great resonance. Iran is launching retaliatory missile strikes against Israel and US infrastructure facilities in the region. The military operation has already disrupted the maritime transportation of oil in the Persian Gulf region, and has also caused a failure of the financial and transport infrastructure of economic hubs in the UAE and Qatar. Iran has a good chance of sustaining the attack. — ground operation is unlikely. However, the strikes will lead to a weakening of the country’s industrial potential, exacerbate the economic crisis, and become a cause of impoverishment of the population. Let’s say Iran will survive, but not far from the next round of military attacks. Unless the price of the current invasion is too high for everyone. The situation around Iran provides some lessons that are important to Russia.

Lesson 1. The use of military force follows sanctions

The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The country has endured economic pressures, although sanctions have caused significant damage. It grew as Washington expanded its coalition. — Initiators of sanctions, internationalize them on the basis of the UN Security Council, as well as influence third countries in the purchase of Iranian oil. The United States and its allies have consistently combined military sanctions (e.g. 1980, 1987, 2025) with special operations. — assassinations of nuclear engineers and heads of special services, cyber attacks, threats of military strikes. In general, the practice of combining sanctions and military force in the hands of the United States is widespread. Among the examples — Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, Venezuela.

For Russia, the direct use of military force is still difficult. The biggest obstacle here is the fear of nuclear escalation. However, the power component is compensated by large-scale assistance to Ukraine. Strikes by the APU on Russian territory are regular. Despite the defeat of the APU in the Kursk region, new military raids are possible. Military modernization of European NATO members increases the likelihood of using force in the areas of contact between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance. The most dangerous neighborhood in the Baltic region.
The deterrent role of the nuclear factor could be offset by the false belief that Russia would not risk using nuclear weapons for fear of a nuclear response from NATO. Military crises in relations between Russia and the West in one form or another — The real prospect.

Lesson two. Western pressure will be long-term

For many years, the tactics of gradual exhaustion have been used against Iran. If earlier it was dominated by an economic element in the form of sanctions, in the last year exhausting military strikes were used. They do not involve large-scale ground operations with the subsequent occupation of the country. It is about missile and bomb strikes, each of which increasingly weakens the military-industrial potential of the target state. What about that? — At every next round of military escalation, the country’s ability to resist diminishes. Today, Iran is delivering painful retaliatory strikes. But new rounds of escalation could drain it.

Russia should be prepared for long-term sanctions. It is not so much about years as about decades. Episodic easing of certain restrictions is unlikely to lead to their complete abolition, especially in areas related to export control of dual-use goods. The same applies to the military component. For a possible respite in hostilities in Ukraine or in other directions, a new military crisis will likely follow.

Lesson 3. Concessions do not work

During a long confrontation with the United States, Iran in some cases made concessions. The most striking event can be considered Iranian «The nuclear deal». . . . It was recorded by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in 2015. Iran agreed to a number of concessions on its nuclear program in exchange for lifting international sanctions under the UN Security Council and unilateral restrictive measures by the United States and its allies. Three years later, Donald Trump pulled the US out of the deal, making new demands to Iran. The compromises gave a brief respite, but ultimately did not remove from Iran the problem of long-term pressure from the United States.

In the current negotiations with the United States on Ukraine, Russia demonstrates marked persistence. It can draw criticism from anyone who is waiting for peace, because every day of hostilities is measured by human lives and material losses. But this persistence is natural given that the demands for new concessions will follow the compromise. What about that? — You cannot go to them, at least unilaterally. The level of trust in relations between Russia and the United States, as well as Russia and Ukraine, is extremely low. The Iranian lesson only reinforces the perception.

Lesson 4. Leaders under the Sight

The attack on Iran shows that legitimate leaders and key government officials are becoming priority targets. Earlier, the trend indicated the abduction of Venezuelan President Maduro. The destruction of leaders or their subsequent death occurred during military operations and before. Suffice it to recall the assault of Amina Palace by Soviet special forces in 1979 or the massacre of the leaders of Libya and Iraq, which occurred against the background of military interventions of their country by the United States and allies. But the hunt for leaders was not an end in itself. Their deaths were often the result of coincidences. In the Iranian case, we see the deliberate destruction of the supreme leader and a large number of officials, including along with their families.

Clearly, Russia is well aware of the danger to both the president and high-ranking government officials. Moreover, assassinations and assassinations on the military, managers of various units, journalists and public figures have been carried out by saboteurs on our territory for a long time. Iranian experience once again confirms that the security of the country’s leadership becomes not only the task of special services, but also the Armed Forces. Leaders can be an easy target, both as a result of counterintelligence and first-person security gaps, and as a result of air defense holes and other components of a military attack.

Lesson 5. Internal disturbances stimulate external invasion

Shortly before the air strikes, Iran experienced mass protests. They were largely the result of internal contradictions and accumulated economic problems. Clashes between protesters and the authorities have resulted in the deaths of a large number of people. The protests were politicized by Iran’s opponents. They could also serve as an indicator of the weakness of his political system and the belief that an effective military strike would lead to the collapse of a weakened power vertical. At least military strikes from outside have led to the collapse of political systems before. For example, in the case of Libya.

The experience of the collapse of the USSR suggests that internal problems in the economy and faults in society can lead to disaster and without external influence. Effective governance, timely reforms, feedback from the state and society, and trust between them are critical to maintaining internal sustainability. The divisions in society and the elite, as well as between them, are equivalent to an invitation to increase external pressure.

Lesson 6. «The Black Knights» That's important. But they don't solve all the problems.

Under comprehensive economic sanctions, Iran has managed to build trade ties with a number of countries. The academic literature on sanctions of such alternative trading partners is called «The Black Knights». . . . In the 1980s and 1990s, Iranian oil was willingly and at discounts bought in Western and Southern Europe, as well as Turkey, Syria, Japan, India, China and others. The U.S. has had to expend huge diplomatic efforts to force a number of these countries to cut or drop imports of Iranian goods. However, the US could not completely block trade with Iran. Tehran did not receive profit from exports, but retained income from foreign trade. Otherwise, there was a situation in the military-political sphere. Iran is left alone with its adversaries. Third countries do not help opponents. But they cannot or do not want to prevent military interventions. «The Black Knights» Effective in countering sanctions, but useless in countering military strikes.

Russia quickly reoriented its trade under sanctions. The turnover with China, India and other friendly countries has grown at times. Nevertheless, we have no mutual military and political obligations. Russia will have to confront its adversaries alone. The exception can be considered the participation of the DPRK military in countering the armed forces in the Kursk region. In addition, Russia itself ensures the security of its CSTO allies, which increases its burden and responsibility.

Lesson 7. Balance of forces demanded

Unlike many other targets, Iran is hardly a harmless target for military strikes. In 2025, Tehran was sprayed with volleys of missiles and drones of its own production. The same is happening today. It is too early to judge their effectiveness and accuracy. The U.S. and Israel seem to see the damage from Iran’s retaliatory strikes as acceptable. But Iran has taken actions that were previously believed to be extreme. These include a ban on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. It is likely that the U.S. Navy will be able to stop the Iranian ban and ensure the safety of navigation, but such actions will take time and effort. Their success is unequivocal, especially if Iran remains resilient to airstrikes.

Russia has more options to respond to strikes on its territory and balance of power. Even if we are distracted from the nuclear factor, Moscow has the technical capacity to cause considerable damage in different environments and in different geographical areas. However, the very existence of such an opportunity does not exclude the fact that the damage from its actions the opponent will perceive as painful, but acceptable. Strictly speaking, the threshold of sensitivity may change in the nuclear sphere. As the political struggle is hardened, the sensitivity to damage is reduced, as the history of the twentieth century has shown well.
The situation around Iran is hardly encouraging. Rather, it conveys a fatalistic determination to all sides on different barricades. Such a fatalistic determination risks becoming a spirit of time in the years to come.