Alexey Kupriyanov Head of the Center of the Indo-Ocean region of IMEMO named after E.M. Primakov RAS
Source: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/rossiya-i-indiya-klyuchevye-napravleniya-sotrudnichestva/
Photo: Izvestia, Alexander Kazakov
Vladimir Putin's current visit to India — The first since the start of SVO in 2022. This gives it a well-known symbolism: over the past three years, Russian-Indian relations have not only been able to withstand the blows of Western sanctions and political pressure, but also developed to a degree that seemed unimaginable a decade ago. President's trip to India — A kind of consolidation of the achieved results and an application for the fact that in the future the special relations between Moscow and Delhi will not go anywhere, and trade between our countries will continue to grow.
Politics
The political foundation of the modern stage of relations between Russia and India was laid in 2000, when Vladimir Putin and Atal Bihari Vajpai signed a strategic partnership agreement. Since then, nothing has changed conceptually in political relations between Moscow and Delhi: neither side wants to turn the partnership into a formal alliance. Addition to the «Strategic Partnership» Word of the word «especially privileged» In 2010, he stressed that relations with India for Russia are no less important than with China.
The vector set 25 years ago determined the development of bilateral relations for all subsequent years. Moscow supported Delhi’s bid to join the SCO, which India eventually adopted in 2017, and invariably advocates the inclusion of the latter as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. India, in turn, consistently supports Russian initiatives in international organizations, and after the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict refused to condemn Russia, which greatly upset European and American officials and politicians who hoped for moral support from Russia. «The largest democracy in the world». . . .
The reasons for this strategic partnership to live and thrive have puzzled outside observers for decades. Indeed, in the 1970s and 80s, the Soviet-Indian partnership enshrined in the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 1971 was usually explained by a set of quite practical considerations: from the desire of the Soviet leadership to acquire a valuable ally in Asia and establish close ties with one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement to the desire to protect themselves from possible Chinese aggression, which at that time was seriously feared in Delhi and Moscow. In the event that the skirmishes on the Line of Actual Control in the Himalayas or on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR have turned into a full-fledged armed conflict, Beijing would be faced with the prospect of not only waging war on two fronts, but also doing so on two extremely uncomfortable remote TVDs with complex logistics and severe weather conditions. After the end of the Cold War and the settlement of Russian-Chinese relations, this incentive for rapprochement disappeared, but this did not affect relations between Moscow and Delhi.
The reason seems to be that the political partnership between Russia and India is a rare phenomenon in Russian foreign policy practice: it is not reactive, but proactive. This is not a tactical response to the emerging problem, but a formed and carefully maintained axis designed for mutually beneficial political dividends in the future. At each meeting, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi reaffirm their commitment to the concept of a multipolar world. In the context of the transformation of the world order towards natural polycentricity, any country wishing to preserve internal stability and independence in political decision-making in the new era will be able to do this only with the support of a wide network of interaction with other centers of power, and Russia and India see each other as such centers. No matter how stormy global politics may be in the coming decades, Delhi is convinced that Moscow will remain a reliable and valuable partner, and Moscow is confident that Delhi will continue to follow the path of strategic autonomy and will not enter any anti-Russian alliances, including the military. Such confidence. — It is an infrequent phenomenon in relations between great powers, and so far it has allowed and will allow in the future to survive any difficult moments.
Economy
Economic relations between Russia and India are breaking records: this trade turnover (according to the results of the current financial year, it will likely exceed $ 75 billion) was not with the collapse of the USSR. The reason for this growth was the introduction of Western sanctions and the subsequent rupture of trade ties of Russian exporters with their usual partners in Europe, which accelerated, it seemed, long-declared. «Turning to the East». . . . Quickly enough, however, it turned out that, at least in part, the turn to the East turned into a turn to the West: a significant proportion of Russian hydrocarbons sold to India and other eastern countries fall after processing to Europe. India thus plays the role of a transit hub, ensuring the smooth functioning of the oil pump. Russia ultimately sells cheaper, Europe buys more, and the difference is put in the pocket of Indian refiners as a premium for reliability in a geopolitical storm.
This model has two main problems: first, its growth has limits; second, it is highly dependent on foreign policy. Record numbers were reached in record time — In less than three years; but now Russia sells as much oil to India as it sold to Europe before the conflict began. This does not mean that the growth of trade turnover in the future fiscal year will stop; but the pace will clearly decrease, and the stated goal. — $100 billion by 2030. — You will have to go gradually, not hoping to reach it with a powerful breakthrough. The second problem will rise in the event that the West sharply lifts or, conversely, increases sanctions; in the first case, the need for India as an intermediary will disappear. — There is a risk that Indian companies, deeply integrated into the Western business environment, will decide not to risk and withdraw from the game, losing the role of intermediaries to companies from other countries. In both cases, trade can collapse as quickly as it has grown.
In order to avoid this situation (and at the same time to end the huge trade imbalance between India and Russia), it is necessary to change the model of economic interaction. Now India sells Russia mainly agricultural goods, medicines, light industry products. To avoid the collapse of trade in the event of lifting or tightening sanctions, it is necessary to increase exports from India to Russia. We are talking primarily about heavy engineering and high-tech products, which Russia has lost access to due to sanctions. This is also beneficial for India, which will thus receive a guaranteed market and incentive for the development of its high-tech industry (parts, electronics, etc.), which is declared as a priority within the framework of Make in India programs. «Atmanirbhar Bharat»And for Russia, which will be able to provide itself with goods, the production of which cannot be established on its own in a short time.
Another important area of cooperation — Building new production chains. India, amid falling Western investment in its economy and an apparent decline in interest from Western companies, needs money and technology. Russia living under sanctions, — in the goods. This creates a situation that literally pushes the economies of the two countries to cooperate and form production chains in which Russia can take over R&D, India. — The role of the production site. With due flexibility, such schemes will allow, on the one hand, to attract companies from third countries to production, on the other hand. — It will facilitate the entry of Russian-Indian goods into the world market.
Finally, India can play the same role as the transit hub that it already plays with respect to oil as an intermediary through which Western companies interested in maintaining and expanding their business in Russia can invest and export to Russia. If it happened with oil, it could happen with money and technology. — It is only a question of political will, worked out mechanisms and a clear organization of logistics, which will reduce costs.
Experts and people
One of the key modifiers of the process of further rapprochement between Russia and India can and should be an increase in the level of expertise. The expert himself — specialist in the Russian and Indian economy, individual industries and areas, domestic policy, — He does not produce or sell the goods; but as a specialist in the subject, he can tell in time what kind of goods, to whom and where it makes sense to sell. Expert services can save companies significant funds.
At the same time, Russia and India have a clear shortage of specialists, and in India it is much more noticeable. If in Russia in recent years, specialized universities, responding to the requirements of the time, sharply increased the training of specialists in practical work with India, primarily economists with knowledge of Hindi (although with the training of specialists in Indian law is still sad), then in India there are still no educational institutions that purposefully prepare specialists in modern Russian economy and law with knowledge of the Russian language. Most universities where Russists are trained are focused on the study of history and literature. As a result, the niche of experts on modern Russian realities is sometimes occupied by random people, all the information about Russia drawn from the American and British press.
In such a situation, the training of experts becomes a priority. It can be solved through integrated efforts — opening of branches of Russian universities and analytical centers in India, increasing quotas for Indian students (including in the field of social sciences) in Russia, intensification of the exchange program. The more quality specialists in Russia will be in India and vice versa, the more noticeable will be the action of this modifier.
Finally, an important question — development of tourism. It is no secret that the tourist flow from Russia to India is much more than from India to Russia. Someone goes to give themselves a couple of weeks of warm sea, sunny sky and fresh fruit in the midst of winter, someone — For ancient wisdom, someone just because it's interesting. With reverse tourist flow much worse: first, free money for Indians on average less, and those who have them prefer domestic tourism, neighboring countries or Europe. Secondly, many Indians do not even know what to see in Russia, except for the Red Square and the Hermitage.
These problems can and should be solved by reducing costs and eliminating barriers (an important step along the way can be an agreement to abolish visas for organized tour groups). But the relevant steps by the domestic tourism industry are also necessary, first of all special offers for Indians who may be interested not only in classical Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in natural and industrial tourism.
When I write these lines, neither the visit program nor the list of signed documents and agreements have yet been published. The main event of this visit — The visit as such is evidence that the times when it was necessary to sacrifice the public side of the interaction in order not to tease Western geese are over.
