The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) remains one of the most influential bodies of global governance, whose mission is to maintain international peace and security. However, its structure and decision-making processes have long been criticized for being outdated and unrepresentative, especially for the exclusion of African permanent members.
Abraham Enam Minko, Senior Researcher and Political Analyst in Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution
Source: Source: Accord.org.org.
Photo by UN/Loey Felipe.
Although Africa has 54 states – the largest regional bloc in the UN – and makes a significant contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, it still has no permanent seat on the Council. This discrepancy raises fundamental questions about the justice, legitimacy and effectiveness of the multilateral system in addressing security concerns in an increasingly multipolar world. In recent years, calls for reform have grown louder, aided by Africa's growing political and economic influence and the continent's constant demand for a more inclusive world order.
The persistent demands of Security Council reform are not new. The debate has been ongoing for years, and various proposals have been made to expand the Council and to distribute power more fairly. African states, through the African Union (AU), have formulated their collective position in the Ezulvini Consensus, which provides for two permanent veto seats and additional non-permanent seats for Africa. This demand is rooted in the historic marginalization of African voices in global decision-making and the disproportionate impact of UNSC resolutions on the continent. However, the path to reform remains stifled with obstacles as permanent veto members continue to resist structural changes that could weaken their influence.
The challenge is rooted in a broader struggle for a more representative and effective multilateral system. While the continent has demonstrated its ability to make a significant contribution to international security, the lack of permanent African representation on the Security Council limits its ability to influence key decisions. The lack of African voices in high-level discussions perpetuates a system in which policies and interventions are often developed without the sufficient participation of those most affected.
This article examines the structural imbalances in the UN Security Council, the diplomatic strategies used by African states and the AU to promote reforms, and the geopolitical and institutional impediments to progress. Assessing Africa's desire for permanent representation and veto power, the study seeks to shed light on the implications of these reforms for global governance, multilateral diplomacy and Africa's future engagement with the international system. Ultimately, understanding the dynamics of Security Council reform is necessary to assess the prospects for a more equitable and responsive global security architecture.
Structural imbalance and representation deficit
The structural imbalance and the lack of representation in the UN Security Council are one of the most egregious examples of Africa's marginalization in global governance. Established in 1945, the UN Security Council remained largely unchanged, despite dramatic shifts in international relations, including the decolonization of Africa, the emergence of new world powers and the increasing importance of regional organizations. Africa, consisting of 54 member states and occupying a significant part of the UN agenda – especially in the field of peacekeeping and conflict resolution – remains excluded from the permanent mission, creating a governance system that inadequately reflects modern global balance of power.
The exclusion of Africa from the permanent membership of the UN Security Council has serious implications for the legitimacy and effectiveness of Council decisions, especially those that directly affect African states. A striking example is the Council's role in sanctioning interventions and sanctions in Libya, despite the fact that «The African Troika» (A3 – three non-permanent African members of the UN Security Council) abstained. The case of Libya in 2011 illustrates this imbalance. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizes military intervention in accordance with the principle «Responsibility for protection» (R2P), which led to NATO-led airstrikes and eventual overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Although the intervention was presented as a humanitarian measure, it led to the collapse of the state, protracted instability and the spread of armed groups throughout the Sahel region. The AU has offered a diplomatic solution to the crisis, advocating a ceasefire and negotiations, but its recommendations have been largely ignored by permanent members of the UN Security Council. Ignoring the regional African perspective in making such fateful decisions underscores the problematic nature of the Security Council, which pursues policies without the direct involvement of Africa.
Another example of the impact of Africa's lack of permanent representation is the approach to peacekeeping operations. Africa is the largest supplier of troops to UN peacekeeping missions, with countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda and Ghana constantly providing significant personnel for operations in conflict zones. However, these countries do not have a substantive voice in the strategic decisions governing these missions. The deployment of peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MINUSTAH) and South Sudan (MINUSTAH) has often been criticized for the lack of a clear, locally-specific mandate tailored to the needs of affected communities. Structural imbalances mean that decisions on financing, rules of use of force and withdrawal timelines are made by non-African powers who may not fully understand the complexity of the situation on the ground. The resulting inefficiencies and discontent among recipient countries further underscores why the exclusion of Africa from the permanent membership is not merely a symbolic issue, but a problem with tangible implications for security and governance on the continent.
In addition, the lack of representation extends to the right of veto, a privilege enjoyed exclusively by five permanent members, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The veto has historically been used to advance the strategic interests of these powers, often at the expense of resolving crises in Africa. For example, Russia and China have repeatedly vetoed resolutions aimed at addressing human rights violations and conflicts in Sudan and Syria, primarily because of their political and economic interests in those countries. At the same time, Western powers such as the US, Britain and France have been selective in their interventions, sometimes prioritizing economic and geopolitical gains over genuine peace efforts. Without a permanent African presence in the Council, the continent remains vulnerable to decisions shaped by external interests rather than regional priorities and prospects.
The demand for structural reforms, especially within the framework of the Ezulvini Consensus, reflects Africa’s long-standing call for a fairer distribution of power in the UN Security Council. The consensus, adopted by the AU in 2005, favors two permanent African veto seats, arguing that reforms should not only expand membership but also address the entrenched balance of power that continues to push African voices aside. But resistance from existing permanent members has blocked progress, as each veto-power fears reform could weaken its own influence. The failure to implement meaningful reforms, despite widespread recognition of the Council's outdated structure, underscores the deep-rooted challenges of global power politics and the survivability of post-colonial hierarchies in international institutions.
The structural imbalance and lack of representation in the UN Security Council perpetuate a system in which Africa remains an object, not an active participant in decision-making on issues affecting its security and political future. This exception not only weakens the legitimacy of the Council's decisions, but also undermines the principles of democracy and justice in global governance. Without meaningful reforms, the UN Security Council risks becoming increasingly disconnected from modern geopolitical realities, reinforcing the notion that it serves the interests of several powerful states rather than the wider international community.
AC proposals for reform and diplomatic strategies
The AU has consistently advocated a reformed and fairer UN Security Council reflecting the realities of the twenty-first century. At the heart of Africa's demands is the Ezulvini Consensus, which provides two permanent veto seats and additional non-permanent seats for Africa. This proposal is based on the principle of equitable geographical representation and the recognition that Africa, as a major player in global peace and security, deserves a meaningful voice in the Council's decision-making processes. The AU argues that the current structure of the UN Security Council is a continuation of the post-war order, which no longer corresponds to the modern global balance of power. Despite widespread international support for reform, Africa's proposals face constant obstacles, largely because of the resistance of existing permanent members and the complexity of global diplomatic negotiations.
Consensus Ezulvini was the cornerstone of Africa's diplomatic strategy, but its effectiveness was limited to the lack of a united African front and the realities of force policy at the UN. While the consensus reflects Africa's collective demand, individual African states have sometimes conducted separate diplomatic negotiations undermining a cohesive strategy. For example, countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt – often seen as contenders for potential permanent seats – have at times entered into bilateral talks with outside powers, raising concerns about whether Africa will be able to present a truly united front in the reform debate. This internal fragmentation has weakened the AU's negotiating position as permanent members of the UN Security Council used disagreements between African states to delay or blur reform proposals.
Diplomatically, the AU participated in various high-level negotiations and formed alliances to advance its reform agenda. African leaders have consistently raised the issue at the UN General Assembly, and the AU has sought support from other regional blocs, such as the United Nations. «Group of 77» BRICS to strengthen their demands. In recent years, Africa has received support from influential voices, including France, which has expressed support for a permanent location for Africa, although without specifying whether it should include a veto. However, such approvals were often symbolic and did not translate into concrete commitments at the Security Council level. The U.S., China and Russia have maintained ambiguity or direct resistance to any reforms that would change the balance of power in the Council, especially with respect to the veto system. This diplomatic deadlock illustrates the difficulty of achieving meaningful change in an institution that is inherently structured to protect the interests of its most powerful members.
An example of the AU’s advocacy of reform is the debate on the 75th anniversary of the UN in 2020, where African leaders reiterated their demands for a more inclusive Security Council. South Africa, during its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2019–2020), used its position to highlight the marginalization of Africa and achieve structural change. However, its efforts largely remained in the area of diplomatic rhetoric, rather than leading to significant policy changes. Similarly, Kenya, which held a non-permanent position in 2021-2022, sought to highlight Africa's security concerns, but its influence remained limited to the dominance of permanent members. These cases underscore the paradox: while African states participate in Council discussions, they lack institutional power to shape long-term policies for Africa.
The AU has also explored alternative diplomatic strategies, including the use of Africa's economic partnership and its contribution to regional security as instruments of bargaining in reform discussions.The growing role of African-led peacekeeping operations, such as the AU's Transitional Mission to Somalia (ATMIS) and the United Force «G5 The Sahel»It underscores Africa’s growing responsibility to maintain global security. African States argued that if they were to bear the burden of resolving conflicts on the continent, they should also have a permanent say in Council decisions on those conflicts. However, despite Africa’s strategic importance to global security, the existing power structure at the UN has largely kept the continent subordinate, limiting the effectiveness of these diplomatic approaches.
Africa's failure to support reform proposals reflects a broader challenge within the multilateral system: the difficulty of achieving institutional change in the absence of strong political will from the world's dominant powers. While the AU's diplomatic efforts have kept the reform agenda alive, they have not yet led to tangible changes in the Council's composition. Without closer coordination among African states, strategic alliances with reform-supporting countries, and sustained diplomatic pressure, Africa's desire for permanent representation and veto power risks remaining an unfulfilled ambition, rather than a concrete reality.
The AU’s reform proposals and diplomatic strategies reflect both the urgency and complexity of restructuring a global governance system deeply rooted in historical power imbalances. While Africa’s arguments for reform are compelling, the political realities of the UN system mean that meaningful change will require not only diplomatic perseverance, but also a fundamental shift in how world powers perceive Africa’s role in international decision-making. Until then, Africa remains a key but underrepresented player in the world's most powerful security institution.
Geopolitical and institutional barriers to reform
UNSC reform has long been a global governance issue, but remains one of the most politically complex and institutionally rigid processes due to entrenched geopolitical interests and systemic barriers. Existing permanent members have disproportionate power, especially through the veto, which allows them to unilaterally block any significant changes in the Council's structure. This institutional design, created immediately after World War II, was designed to ensure stability by concentrating decision-making in the hands of the great powers of the time. However, as the global balance of power evolves, the resistance of these states to any meaningful reform has become a serious obstacle to Africa's desire for permanent representation. The geopolitical calculations of these states, shaped by their national security, economic and strategic interests, have led to selective support or direct opposition, making the prospect of reform extremely difficult.
One of the main geopolitical barriers to reform is the different positions of the members. «The Big Five» (P5) on the expansion of the Council. While France and the UK have expressed conditional support for Africa's inclusion in the reformed UNSC, their support has often dwelled on the threshold of the veto, which is a key component of the Ezulvini Consensus. The U.S., while periodically involved in reform discussions, is reluctant to advocate changes that could reduce their own impact. China and Russia, for their part, are strategically using their positions to preserve the status quo, as any erosion of the existing power structure can challenge their ability to exert influence. This division between permanent members has led to a deadlock that prevents any meaningful restructuring of the Council.
India's application for permanent membership illustrates the wider resistance to reform and its implications for Africa. India, like Africa, is constantly seeking greater representation in the UN Security Council, especially through its participation in the G4 alliance with Brazil, Germany and Japan. However, despite growing economic and geopolitical influence, India has faced opposition from China, which sees a more powerful India as a threat to its regional dominance. This model of geopolitical rivalry is similarly reflected in the case of Africa, where some P5 members fear a stronger African presence could change the balance of power at the UN in ways that do not necessarily fit their strategic interests. As a result, Africa's demands for permanent representation are met with diplomatic maneuvers rather than concrete commitments, with P5 members often using procedural tactics to delay or reject discussions of meaningful reforms.
Beyond the resistance of permanent members, institutional barriers within the UN system itself further complicate the reform process.The amendment to the UN Charter governing the composition and functioning of the UN Security Council requires not only a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, but also ratification by all five permanent members. This means that even if the vast majority of UN member states support reform – a scenario that has been demonstrated in numerous General Assembly resolutions – the process can still be effectively blocked by one permanent member. This institutional mechanism was designed to prevent unilateral changes to the post-war security architecture, but instead strengthened a system in which power remains concentrated in the hands of a small group of states, making the reform process more symbolic than effective.
The AU's push for reform through the Ezulvini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration has also been hampered by intra-African divisions that have often been exploited by existing power structures. While the AU maintains a broad consensus on the need for two permanent veto seats, there was no agreement on which African states should take those seats. Countries such as Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt are seen as leading contenders, but regional rivalries and competing national interests have prevented Africa from presenting a single, unequivocal demand. This internal disunity has given P5 members the opportunity to justify inaction, pointing to the lack of consensus in Africa, effectively weakening the continent's negotiating positions.
The institutional rigidity of the UN Security Council is also evident in its decision-making processes, where informal practices and diplomatic alliances play a crucial role in shaping outcomes. The influence of major Western powers on African affairs, often through strategic alliances, economic dependencies and security partnerships, means that Africa’s diplomatic capabilities at the UN are often limited. The use of UNSC resolutions to authorize military interventions, impose sanctions or establish peacekeeping mandates in Africa without a permanent African mission illustrates the imbalance of forces. The 2011 intervention in Libya is a key example of a Security Council decision heavily influenced by France, the United Kingdom and the United States leading to the destabilization of Libya and greater instability in the Sahel region. African voices, including an alternative peace plan proposed by the AU, have been largely ignored, demonstrating the implications of removing Africa from the decision-making process.
The economic and strategic interests of powerful states also shape their unwillingness to support reforms. China, for example, has expanded its economic presence in Africa through large-scale infrastructure investment, debt diplomacy and resource extraction. Maintaining the current structure of the UN Security Council allows China to influence African states without facing an enhanced African group within the Council. Similarly, Western powers like the US and France have military bases and strategic partnerships across Africa, making them cautious about any structural changes that could limit their ability to shape security policies in the region. These geopolitical calculations mean that while African states can gain rhetorical support for reforms, real political commitment to change the status quo remains weak.
Persistent geopolitical and institutional barriers to reform illustrate the fundamental challenge of transforming a system that has been designed to be resilient to change. While Africa’s demand for permanent representation in the UN Security Council is based on legitimate claims for justice, historical correction and global equality, the entrenched interests of existing powers make meaningful reforms a tough battle. Without a major shift in the balance of power or a concerted effort by a broad coalition of states to change the current structure, Africa's drive for greater representation risks remaining unfulfilled, reinforcing the systemic inequality characterizing global governance today.
