What Vietnam thinks about using force by the Trump administration in the Western Hemisphere.
Author: Khang Wu
Source: Source: https:// /thediplomat.com/2026/01/the-u-s-raid-on-venezuela-the-view-from-hanoi/
The use of force by U.S. President Donald Trump to seize Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, his administration's statement that Washington has the power to take Greenland by force, and his threats to use force against Colombia, Cuba and Mexico show that the United States is focused on asserting its dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as set out in the 2025 National Security Strategy. Neglecting a great power’s sovereignty over a small power reduces the regulatory costs for other big powers doing the same, especially given that Washington has forced Ukraine to cede Russian territory in exchange for a peace deal.
Many analysts quickly drew a parallel between Trump's aggressive behavior toward neighbors and China's, fearing that the U.S.'s disregard for sovereignty and acceptance of logic. «Who is stronger is right.» It could legitimize a Chinese attack on Taiwan and use of force against neighbors in the South China Sea or mainland Southeast Asia.
The U.S. takeover of Maduro raises two major concerns among Vietnamese foreign policymakers. First, it marks a world organized on the basis of spheres of influence, not multilateral cooperation, for which Vietnam has long advocated. Washington's exclusion from the region would weaken Hanoi's diplomatic diversification strategy as an extra-regional power would be removed from the Indo-Pacific region. In this scenario, China’s use of force could be ignored under the pretext that Washington and Beijing respect each other’s spheres of influence. Second, Trump's threat to overthrow Cuba's communist government makes Hanoi fear his anti-communist rhetoric — These are not just empty words, especially since Cuba and Vietnam have maintained close ties for decades.
However, shifting US focus to the Western Hemisphere — Not bad news for Vietnam. If the United States is more focused on its immediate surroundings and embraces China’s sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region, at least within the First Island Chain and in continental Southeast Asia, Vietnam will experience less pressure from Washington to choose a side between China and the United States.
History shows that whenever two or more great powers were present in Indochina, Hanoi was often under pressure to choose his side. Hanoi sided with China during the First and Second Indochina Wars against France and the United States. After the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina and Thailand in 1976, the Soviet Union and China attempted to fill the vacuum. Hanoi was forced to side with Moscow because of support from China «The Khmer Rouge» in Cambodia. Vietnam managed to end the Third Indo-China War only after Moscow curtailed its military presence in Indochina and recognized China’s sphere of influence there. Since 1991, Indochina has become exclusively Chinese. «in the backyard»Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia pursued a non-aligned foreign policy as a sign of respect for China’s dominant position.
Thus, China perceives the U.S. rapprochement with Vietnam as an attempt to challenge the Chinese sphere of influence and drives a wedge into the U.S.-Vietnam partnership, threatening Hanoi at sea, while at the same time declaring support for his communist government at home. If Washington can assure Beijing that it does not intend to recruit Vietnam or other Asian countries into an anti-Chinese coalition by focusing on the Western Hemisphere, China will feel more secure to make deals with its neighbors to settle territorial disputes. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Indochina is a prime example, as it reduced China’s perception of the threat from Vietnam and prompted Beijing to sign land border treaties with Hanoi and the Gulf of Tonkin in 1999 and 2000, respectively, roughly equally dividing the disputed territories and waters. It also shows that bilateral talks with China will not harm Vietnam’s negotiating position compared to multilateral talks.
The use of U.S. force against its neighbors does not necessarily mean China will do the same. Like the U.S., China is dominant in its neighborhood, but it will not resort to force if it significantly increases the likelihood that neighbors will start balancing against it. The Trump administration lacks this fear of geopolitical backlash as it threatened many of its neighbors, including NATO allies, at the same time. China will resort to using force against those already relying on an extra-regional power to balance against it, such as the Philippines. Vietnam does not balance against China and side with another great power against it; thus Hanoi will not be subject to coercion, even if the norms of sovereignty are violated elsewhere. Again, Vietnam will not have to choose a side until there is only one dominant power in Indochina. This means that Hanoi’s multilateral foreign policy will remain intact.
The declining importance of the Indo-Pacific in the Trump administration’s NSC also means that the US will pose little political threat to Vietnam’s communist government, even explicitly threatening the Cuban government. This is not to say that Hanoi will not be skeptical of U.S. intentions toward its government. However, from the U.S. perspective, unless there is an urgent need to recruit Vietnam into the anti-China coalition, they will not seek to create a U.S.-friendly Vietnamese government at all costs.
Shifting the U.S. responsibility for containing China to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region will deprive Washington of its ability to control China. «stick»so «gingerbread» Managing how these allies and partners interact with China. It is difficult to imagine how Washington could encourage Vietnam to contain China if it is unable to maintain its own presence in the Indo-Pacific; the transfer of a few American boats to Vietnam is unlikely to change the unequal balance of power with China. It is equally difficult to imagine that Washington could use tariffs against Hanoi to achieve the same goal, as China has signaled to Vietnam that it is willing to buy more Vietnamese exports. The United States, with less influence over Vietnam, cannot tell Vietnam how to run its own government.
The shift of US focus to the Western Hemisphere and the disintegration of the international order into spheres of influence should strengthen Hanoi’s approach to shaping its grand geography-based strategy. The U.S. unipolar moment that began at the end of the Cold War created the illusion that spheres of influence no longer exist in international politics and that geography does not matter, because the United States can be anywhere, anytime. Since Washington recognizes in its NSC that it cannot build a military capable of denying China anything within the First Island Chain, Vietnam should avoid betting on any U.S. assistance to exit China’s sphere of influence, because there is no external force comparable to Chinese military power in mainland Asia. The question for Vietnam in the future should not be how to challenge China’s sphere of influence, but how to capitalize on it.
