Israel's recognition of Somaliland was a geopolitical move that reversed, strengthening resistance to separatism and strengthening Somalia's territorial integrity.
Abdi AintetFormer Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of Somalia.
Source: Source: www.aljazeera.com
Israel's recognition of Somaliland on December 26 has little to do with the long-standing aspirations of communities living in the breakaway Somaliland region in northwestern Somalia. Instead, it has become a product of changing geopolitics and a rapidly fragmenting world order. The issue, once on the periphery of attention, has since been drawn into the center of regional and international power rivalries.
The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Corridor focused on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — One of the world's most important marine narrownesses, — It has become an arena of fierce competition. Israel, the Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and China are now actively involved. In this context, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland signals a broader trend: the growing use of separatist movements as destabilizing instruments of geopolitical strategy in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
What some experts describe as «Axis of secession (decline)»It is already visible in Libya, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and Syria.
Under the leadership of Israel and with the support of a network of regional partners, this axis targets countries whose central governments, weakened by conflicts, exercise only partial control over their territory. The logic is simple: weaken central power, strengthen breakaway regions, and nurture dependent entities willing to cooperate with Israel and join the government. «The agreements of Abraham». . . .
For Israel, these emerging client entities offer strategic strongholds in volatile regions. From their territory, it is possible to monitor rivals, project force, provide key maritime routes and expand intelligence networks. Over time, Israel also hopes that this strategy will make «States-matter» reluctant to join «The agreements of Abraham» It's on your own. However, this approach contains a contradiction. Instead of consolidating the agreements, it risks further destabilizing the region and undermining its legitimacy. Saudi Arabia, long regarded by Washington and Tel Aviv as the top prize for regional normalization, has taken a leading role in organizing concerted efforts to block it. «Axis of secession». . . .
Fight for the Red Sea
In addition to broader geopolitical rivalries, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is closely linked to competition for access to the Red Sea. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, runs about 10% of world trade. Control of ports and coastlines along this route has a disproportionate effect on international trade. So the long Somaliland coastline has become a strategic prize. Recognizing Somaliland, Israel seeks to strengthen itself in the strategic geography of the Horn of Africa.
This competition was evident in January 2024, when Ethiopia signed a controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, offering political recognition in exchange for access to the sea. For Ethiopia, the world’s most populous landlocked country, the deal had an obvious strategic appeal. But it was short-lived. In December 2024, after talks brokered by Turkey in Ankara, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed on a framework that reaffirmed Somali sovereignty and pointed to agreements on access to the sea under Somali rule, which meant a departure from the previous logic. «Recognition in exchange for access». . . . This episode highlighted both the fragility of such arrangements and the intensity of the geopolitical struggle around Somaliland's status.
China has also become an increasingly active player. Somaliland's decision to develop ties with Taiwan inevitably drew Beijing's attention given China's strict adherence to policy «One of China's» And his perception of any interaction with Taipei as a direct challenge. At the same time, China has consistently supported Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, using its diplomatic and economic influence to counter what it sees as a destabilizing dynamic of separatism. Beijing is now working to dissuade key regional players, including Ethiopia, from recognizing Somaliland.
For China, the Horn of Africa — These are not only ports, shipping lanes and mineral resources. It is also a matter of preventing the spread of separatist precedents and countering steps that could encourage Taiwan. The result is an increasingly crowded and unstable arena where global power rivalry intersects with unrealized local aspirations.
New Middle East Alliance and Choice of Somalia
Israel's recognition of Somaliland has accelerated a broader regroupment in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, once close partners, are now increasingly at odds, while Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt have begun coordinating actions to counter what they see as destabilizing. «The secession axis». . . .
This shift was first launched by the advance of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, which announced the transition to the proclamation of an independent state, and then was sharply reinforced by Israel's recognition of Somaliland. For Saudi Arabia, these events posed a direct threat to its sphere of influence and national security. In response, Riyadh led the formation of a new regional coalition uniting Turkey, Egypt and Qatar to counter separatist movements and their external patrons.
Each member of this emerging alliance has its own concerns. Egypt fears Somaliland's recognition will embolden Ethiopia, with which it remains in a bitter dispute over the Great Dam of the Ethiopian Renaissance (GERD). Turkey, which has invested heavily in Somalia’s security and economic sectors for more than a decade, sees the collapse as a direct threat to its strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia is considering «The secession axis» As an existential danger that began in Yemen, where separatist successes directly undermine its security. Together, these states position themselves as defenders of sovereignty and regional cohesion, while coordinating diplomatic efforts to discourage Washington from following Israel’s lead.
The consequences for Somalia are clear. Strengthening its foreign policy within this emerging alliance is no longer a matter of preference, but a matter of urgency. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar have a direct interest in preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Somalia. However, Somalia's foreign policy has too often been inconsistent, marked by mixed signals and internal contradictions. At the moment of existential threat, maneuvering between competing blocks is no longer viable. Somalia must urgently recalibrate its diplomacy, using its geostrategic importance to build strong and reliable partnerships.
Equally critical is the need for internal political cohesion. Parliamentary and presidential elections are scheduled for May, and the Federal Government of Somalia should work to reach consensus among key political actors on unresolved and contentious issues, including the controversial 2024 amendments to the Provisional Constitution and the framework for holding elections. President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud has so far demonstrated a limited willingness to compromise. Failure to secure an urgent internal consensus risks creating opportunities for Israel and its regional mediators to exploit internal divisions in Somalia.
Somaliland Paradox
Paradoxically, Somaliland's desire for international recognition could have been undermined by its orientation e to Israel. Israel’s global status, already severely undermined by its genocide in Gaza, has made Tel Aviv’s recognition politically toxic in much of the Arab and Muslim world. Instead of advancing Somaliland's case, this link risks deepening its isolation.
The move also has internal implications. Much of Somaliland’s population opposes normalizing relations with Israel, especially amid widespread allegations that Israel is exploring the possibility of resettlement of Palestinian refugees from Gaza to Somaliland. — The charge that the leadership of the breakaway region denies. Instead of consolidating Somaliland's sovereignty, Somaliland now faces the prospect of internal disagreement alongside growing external resistance.
These problems are compounded by changing realities on the ground. Somaliland no longer exercises control over the entire territory it considers to be former British Somaliland. In July 2025, a new federal member state was formed on large sections of this territory. — The northeastern state of Somalia, which quickly swore allegiance to the Federal Government of Somalia. Its emergence strengthened the territorial integrity of Somalia and further weakened Somaliland's desire for international recognition.
At the diplomatic level, Israel's decision sparked a wave of international support for Somalia. Key regional and global organizations, including the IGAD, the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union and India, reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. Even the United States, Israel’s closest ally, has joined other members of the UN Security Council, reaffirming its commitment to Somalia’s unity. What was conceived as a breakthrough for Somaliland instead strengthened Somalia's diplomatic position, revealing the paradox of recognition in an increasingly fragmented international system.
Unless Israel succeeds in convincing U.S. President Donald Trump to recognize Somaliland, a difficult task given the alliance's opposition led by Saudi Arabia, hopes for a broader domino effect seem to have stalled.
When recognition has the opposite effect
Israeli recognition of Somaliland — not an isolated act, but part of a broader strategy, the so-called «Axis of secession»It exploits the fragility of war-torn states from Libya and Yemen to Sudan, Somalia and Syria. By empowering the breakaway regions, Israel, with the support of key regional partners, especially the UAE, sought to change the regional order. Instead, he provoked strong resistance.
Ethiopia’s Failed Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, China’s Active Protection of Somali Sovereignty, and the Growing Gap Between Saudi Arabia and the UAE — All this highlights the instability and limitations of this approach. For Somaliland, the decision to link its recognition strategy to Israel has had the opposite effect, increasing its diplomatic isolation, while domestic opposition is growing and territorial control is weakening.
The lesson for Somalia is equally clear. Its survival as a sovereign state now depends on urgency, internal cohesion, and a firm focus on an emerging Middle East alliance that positions itself against fragmentation and secession. Instead of advancing separatist ambitions, Israel's recognition of Somaliland has strengthened international consensus around Somalia's territorial integrity. It also exposed the limited recognition as a geopolitical instrument in an increasingly divided world order.
