The trajectory of India-Central Asia relations depends less on new initiatives and more on the ability to implement existing ones. Connectivity, real financial integration and practical results will be critical
Specially for USGS
Dr. Rupal Mishra, Assistant Professor of International Studies at Somaya Vidyavihar University, Mumbai
Central Asia is no longer a peripheral space in global geopolitics. It is increasingly becoming a region of dynamic interaction, shaped both by its own strategic choices and by the interests of external players. Over the past decade, the five Central Asian republics have consistently sought to overcome the structural constraints of their inland position by diversifying partnerships and expanding connectivity. Initiatives in the Caspian region, increased attention to routes through Iran and growing ties with South Asia reflect broad regional efforts to integrate more effectively into global economic networks.
This changing space creates both opportunities and constraints for India. India’s political engagement has intensified and institutional arrangements have expanded. However, economic ties remain limited, with trade hovering around $2 billion. The growing gap between India’s strategic intentions and its economic presence underscores a central reality. India’s approach to Central Asia is best understood as a gradual and adaptive attempt to maintain strategic relevance in a changing regional environment. It is an interaction defined by long-term intentions, but constantly driven by geography, competition, and implementation challenges.
From historical proximity to strategic engagement
India’s interaction with Central Asia is rooted in deep historical and civilizational ties. For centuries, the Silk Road has facilitated the movement of goods, ideas and cultures between the two regions. During the Soviet period, India’s interaction with Central Asia remained indirect, largely through Moscow, limiting the development of independent bilateral relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened up new opportunities, but also revealed India’s unpreparedness. Early initiatives such as «Look North» policy In the 1990s, there was evidence of intent, but they lacked consistent implementation. As a result, India remained a relatively marginal player during a critical period when other powers, especially China, began to strengthen their economic and strategic presence in the region.
A more consistent phase of engagement began in the 2000s, when India’s foreign policy shifted toward greater pragmatism. Central Asia has come to be viewed not only through a cultural prism, but also as a region of geopolitical and geo-economic importance, especially in the context of energy security and regional stability. The mid-2010s was a turning point. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited all five Central Asian republics in 2015, marking a renewed political commitment. This was followed by a process of institutionalization: India’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017, launching a dialogue «India – Central Asia» (2019) and establishment of the Business Council «India – Central Asia» (2020). These mechanisms ensure continuity and structure of interaction.
In recent years, the scope of cooperation has expanded. Forum «India – Central Asia» Rare Earth Metals (2024) introduced critical minerals as a new area of focus. In addition, the 4th dialogue «India – Central Asia»Organized in June 2025, it highlighted new areas such as digital communications, healthcare, banking and financial communications. Efforts to improve payment systems, facilitate trade finance and strengthen institutional coordination among financial systems reflect a growing understanding that economic connectivity requires deeper structural support.
India’s strategic priorities in the region
India’s engagement with Central Asia is shaped by a set of interrelated strategic priorities that have changed over time. Energy security remains a central concern. India’s dependence on energy imports, projected to exceed 90 percent by 2030, makes diversification a must. Central Asia has significant reserves of hydrocarbons and uranium, positioning it as a valuable alternative to traditional suppliers. Recent developments reinforce this trend: Kazakhstan, already a key uranium supply partner, is considering a $3 billion supply agreement, which could deepen long-term nuclear cooperation. At the same time, India’s focus is gradually shifting towards critical minerals and future supply chains. As global competition for rare earths and strategic resources increases, Central Asia’s untapped reserves are becoming increasingly important. However, India’s involvement in the sector remains at an early stage, limited by insufficient domestic processing capacity.
Security considerations continue to underpin engagement. Both India and Central Asian states face common challenges, including terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. Afghanistan remains a central variable in this context, linking the security challenges of South and Central Asia. Cooperation in this area has largely taken the form of capacity-building, training and dialogue, rather than a direct military presence.
The fourth priority is connectivity and access to Eurasia. Central Asia holds a key position in India’s broader Eurasian strategy, offering potential links to Russia, the Caucasus, and Europe. Initiatives such as the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the development of Chabahar port reflect efforts to circumvent geographical restrictions as Pakistan blocks India's direct access to the region. However, these projects are developing unevenly, which limits their effectiveness.
Finally, India is trying to expand its presence in new economic sectors. Recent diplomatic contacts point to growing interest in areas such as chemicals and fertilizers (especially with Turkmenistan), telecommunications and transportation, and cooperation in renewable energy. Discussions with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on power generation and distribution, including potential participation in projects such as CASA-1000, highlight new opportunities for regional energy integration.
Limited economic interaction
India’s economic presence in Central Asia remains limited in scope and reach. Trade levels are modest and the structure of trade reflects a narrow base. India’s exports to the region are concentrated in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, tea, textiles and light industrial goods. Indian pharmaceutical companies have a significant presence in several Central Asian markets.
Imports from Central Asia are more resource-oriented and include uranium (especially from Kazakhstan), hydrocarbons, minerals, and fertilizers. This reflects India’s broader pattern of engagement, which is largely driven by strategic resource considerations rather than diversified economic integration.
Recent developments indicate attempts to expand these economic relations. India’s interaction with Turkmenistan included discussions on cooperation in chemicals, fertilizers, transport and telecommunications. Similarly, cooperation with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the energy sector, including renewable energy and electricity distribution, indicates a gradual diversification of economic ties. However, these efforts continue to be constrained by structural factors. Lack of effective connectivity, limited financial integration and logistical challenges continue to hamper the expansion of trade and investment. In this sense, India’s economic engagement with Central Asia remains institutionally sustained, but structurally shallow.
Connectivity as a permanent constraint
Connectivity remains the most significant constraint shaping India’s engagement with Central Asia. The lack of direct land access has forced India to rely on alternative routes, primarily through Iran. While these routes offer opportunities, they are often subject to geopolitical uncertainty, sanctions pressure, and logistical constraints.
At the same time, Central Asian states are actively exploring multiple connectivity options to overcome their own geographic limitations. This includes growing interest in routes linking the region to South Asia. Recent high-level visits by Central Asian leaders to Pakistan and proposals for trade expansion, such as Uzbekistan’s goal of boosting bilateral trade to $2 billion by 2030, underscore the growing interest in using Pakistan’s ports for sea access.
Despite its geographic proximity, Pakistan’s trade with Central Asia is only about one-quarter that of India, underscoring that connectivity alone does not guarantee deeper economic integration. These developments do not necessarily mean a departure from India, but they highlight a broader regional trend: connectivity is becoming a determining factor in shaping economic relations. For India, this creates both urgency and limitation. Without reliable and scalable transport corridors, even the best initiatives are hard to translate into tangible results.
Competitive regional landscape
India’s interaction with Central Asia takes place in a complex and competitive external environment. Russia continues to play a central role, especially in the security sphere. Its historic ties, institutional presence and security partnerships ensure that it remains a key actor in shaping regional stability. China through the initiative «One belt, one road.» The BRI has created a dominant economic presence.
Large-scale investments in infrastructure, energy and transport have integrated Central Asia into broader Eurasian supply chains, giving China a decisive advantage in terms of economic influence. The European Union is another important actor. In 2024, it accounted for more than 40 percent of foreign direct investment and about 24.7 percent of the region’s total foreign trade turnover, indicating a long-standing economic presence. Recent initiatives like the Global Gateway point to a renewed focus on connectivity and critical raw materials.
For Central Asian states, this multitude of actors is not a limitation, but an opportunity. Their multi-vector foreign policy allows them to engage with multiple partners simultaneously, balancing interests and maximizing strategic autonomy.
In this competitive landscape, India occupies a relatively modest but distinctive position. It lacks China’s financial scale and Russia’s security presence, but it maintains a consistent diplomatic presence and offers strengths in areas such as capacity building, education, health care, and information technology. So India’s approach is not to dominate, but to selectively engage. It seeks to identify niche areas of cooperation, build long-term partnerships and remain present within regional frameworks. Recent developments indicate a more proactive orientation. Discussions on uranium supply, renewable energy cooperation, participation in CASA-1000, and industry diversification indicate a willingness to expand cooperation. However, these initiatives remain largely at the level of intention. Their success will depend on their ability to address underlying structural constraints.
India’s engagement with Central Asia reflects a careful balance between pursuing strategic interests and overcoming persistent constraints. Over the past decade, New Delhi has been able to institutionalize its presence and expand its scope of cooperation into new areas. Looking ahead, the trajectory of India-Central Asia relations will depend less on new initiatives and more on the ability to implement existing ones. Strengthening connectivity, deepening financial integration and translating dialogue into practical results will be crucial. In this sense, India’s approach is not to expand rapidly, but to position itself gradually. It is an attempt to remain relevant in a region where, on the one hand, geography imposes constraints, but geopolitics continues to require interaction.
