The dynamics of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa are most determined by internal drivers. These include regional policies, activities of non-state actors, including armed groups, and other determinants. In this context, external influence plays an important but not decisive role.

Ivan Bocharov, INF program manager

Source source: russiancouncil.ru

Thus, in the cases of Libya, Syria and Yemen, internal but internationalized conflicts are involved [1] and the search for solutions is inextricably linked to the future of the state structure of these countries [2]. In other conflicts related to confrontation between States and non-State actors — Israeli-Palestinian and Western-Shark — The external factor plays a more prominent role, although the main problems are also related to internal causes. However, the importance of external actors remains visible, making it important to analyse their approaches to conflict in the region.

In April 2025, the INF held and in October 2025 clarified a series of deep semi-formalized interviews with Russian policy experts not directly involved in conflicts. The generalized evaluations of experts formed the basis of this section. The focus of the study is on key players, as a comprehensive study of the policies of all actors is not possible in a single work. It is important to consider both approaches to conflicts between regional actors and states outside the Middle East and North Africa. The purpose of the study is not so much to identify universal patterns in the approaches of external actors, but rather to determine those problematic subjects and issues to which they pay the greatest attention.
It is important to take into account that we are talking about the strategies of states that have different political culture, adhere to different logics in the implementation of foreign policy. The importance of conflicts for external actors is different. For example, the United States has demonstrated a high level of involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, with a marked impact on the regional security situation as a whole. For France, according to P.P. Timofeev, for historical reasons, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts play a special role, and in the formation of approaches to the West-Nosahar conflict in Paris, relations with Algeria and Morocco are taken into account [3]. For Germany, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is of great importance, given the historical context [4]. The extent to which external actors are involved in a conflict in the Middle East and North Africa varies depending on their complex interests in specific subregions and even countries. At the same time, the same external actor can demonstrate different levels of involvement in the conflict over time. This is especially evident in the case of Libya, Syria and Yemen, where the most notable changes in the positions of external players have taken place in recent years.

The interviews highlight three of the most significant aspects of external actors' policies on conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa: resource optimisation, threat management, and increased attention to the humanitarian dimension of conflicts.

Optimization of policy

First of all, it should be noted the increasing desire of external actors to optimize resources and focus their activities on certain areas. There is a tendency to minimize possible costs and limit direct involvement in conflicts while maintaining attempts to influence key processes. For some large states outside the Middle East and North Africa, the reason for such changes is a shift in focus to other regions. In general, the large-scale involvement of external actors in conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa is an exception rather than a rule.
This trend is particularly pronounced in United States politics. According to L.M. Sokolnikov, the region is becoming a direction in which the United States is involved rather forced. According to the expert, Washington is aware of the limited resources and the inability to maintain a high intensity of policy in all directions. Choosing between interventionism and isolationism in the implementation of the foreign policy [5], the US is increasingly inclined to favor pragmatically limited participation in the affairs of the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time, the country pays more attention to the Asia-Pacific region, where its strategic rival is located. — China [6]. L.M. Sokolschik notes that potential security risks and fears of growing tensions in a larger confrontation force Washington to maintain a military presence in the Middle East, primarily in the Arab Gulf countries. In addition, the United States maintains allied relations with most countries in the region, which also contributes to maintaining their presence.[7]

According to A.S. Evseenko, in recent years, a notable feature of the US approaches to conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa is the desire to create conditions under which regional actors would play a more prominent role in promoting the settlement formula, and Washington would not take full responsibility. That's the way it is. «Transfer of functions» It allows the United States to maintain political influence at no cost, including diplomatic costs.[8] The US is ready for direct military intervention. — This was manifested, for example, in the joint operation of the United States and Great Britain against Yemen. «The Ansaralle» January 2024.
U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025 may suggest some adjustment to Washington’s approach. For the first time in a long time, the United States, which sought to avoid direct involvement in military conflicts, struck not a non-state actor, but the armed forces of the state. However, Washington’s actions continue to be logical. «optimization»The direct military involvement of the United States in the Iran-Israel conflict occurred at a late stage of the active phase of the confrontation, and the operation was limited to the actions of the air force and navy.

Another major non-regional player, China, has taken a fundamentally different approach, reducing its activities in relation to conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa to a policy of non-interference and limiting itself to mediation and assistance in solving humanitarian problems. As noted by V.B. Kashin, Beijing is promoting its own Global Security Initiative, presented in 2022, which includes general approaches to conflict resolution. As part of this initiative, China has already united a significant number of countries, including countries in the Middle East and North Africa. China seeks to position itself as a responsible leader in global governance and stability [9].

Russia, according to Mammadov, supports the search for political solutions to conflicts in the region. If the crisis goes beyond a diplomatic settlement and escalates into an armed confrontation, Moscow is acting as part of a risk-based approach: identifying potential threats and trying to minimize their impact on Russian interests [10].
A number of major European actors follow similar approaches. The European Union stands for inclusive political processes and multilateral settlement mechanisms. As for individual countries, France, according to P.P. Timofeev, seeks to resolve conflicts by political methods, but allows the use of limited military means if necessary [11]. The UK, as noted by K.A. Godovanyuk, does not seek direct involvement in conflicts and significantly reduces participation in the post-conflict settlement in favor of solving its own foreign policy tasks, primarily aimed at ensuring economic growth [12]. Instead of directly interfering in the conflict, Germany prefers to pay attention to solving structural problems, in particular, weakness of state institutions, political instability and socio-economic preconditions of escalation [13].

The reaction of Muslim countries to the aggravations associated with Israel — including the situation in the Gaza Strip, the Iran-Israel conflict and the Israeli war «Hezbollah». . . . — She was very restrained. Thus, Turkey, reacting to the tightening of the regional policy of Israel, broke off economic relations with it [14]. But it happened almost two years after the start of the Gaza war.
As for the Arab countries, the events of October 7, 2023 and the ensuing war in the Gaza Strip caused strong emotional reaction and pressure. «Street street street» on governments. This included participants «The agreements of Abraham»Egypt and Jordan have normalized relations with Israel. Despite the toughening of rhetoric, real action was not so decisive. Most Arab states have limited themselves to official statements. Some have renegotiated economic relations with Israel, and a number of Arab states have sent humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, the level of involvement of Arab countries turned out to be incomparable with the situation in 1973, when they triggered a large-scale energy crisis through the oil embargo. The Arab world’s divided response to the Gaza Strip has allowed a number of other states, including India, to avoid having to openly declare their position and maintain good relations with Israel.

In this regard, the summits of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which were designed to develop a consolidated position on the actions of Israel both in the zone of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and beyond, are illustrative. However, the outcome of these meetings did not produce tangible results.
Egypt and Jordan have evaded involvement in the Gaza conflict beyond diplomatic instruments [15]. Both countries refused to accept refugees from the exclave [16], fearing an increase in domestic threats. For Jordan, this is because, by some estimates, up to 60% of the population is of Palestinian descent [17], and in September 1970. The Palestine Liberation Organization attempted a coup in the country. Egypt, in turn, faces a difficult socio-economic situation: 33.5% of the population lives below the poverty line [18]. The massive arrival of refugees from Gaza could destabilize the domestic situation in those countries and create increased social tensions.

Apparently, a number of Arab states are trying to avoid engaging in military conflicts even when there are direct threats to their security. Thus, in June 2025, the situation in the Persian Gulf zone sharply worsened due to the 12-day war between Israel and Iran with the participation of the United States. In response to U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) struck back at an American military base in Qatar. In September 2025, Israel struck Hamas headquarters in Doha for the first time, despite Qatar’s mediation role in negotiations between Israel and Palestinian structures. The US has limited itself to diplomatic statements, stressing the need to prevent further escalation. The reaction of Arab countries to both Israeli and Iranian strikes has also proved very restrained. Doha's response showed that she preferred the path of de-escalation, seeking «Keeping the Remain»But at the same time avoid being drawn into a military confrontation. This situation confirmed that Qatar is betting not on military, but on political and diplomatic instruments, complementing them by actively promoting its position in the media space.

Iran stands out against this background. From the first days after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the beginning of the Gaza war, Iran provided significant political and diplomatic support to the Hamas movement. Iran has helped the Lebanese group for years. «Hezbollah» Organizationally, and also supplied it with weapons and provided finances [19]. After the assassination of the Secretary-General by Israel «Hezbollah» Hassan Nasrallah Iran has launched drones and missiles toward Israel, launching a direct military strike on it for the first time.

The example of Pakistan illustrates the trend towards optimizing resources and limiting engagement. According to P.V. Topychanov, the Pakistani authorities directly linked distance from conflicts with the difficult economic situation. In this context, Islamabad adhered to politics. «cooperation with all»This avoids possible costs [20].

The situation for Pakistan is complicated by the fact that if earlier the problems of state security were concentrated around India, then in recent years tensions have increased in other areas. — Iran and Afghanistan. Sensing vulnerability, Pakistan pursues a cautious policy towards the Middle East, avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, but continuing to cooperate with the states of the region through joint exercises, advisory work and the development of military-technical cooperation. However, the increasingly difficult border situation and the internal challenges posed by terrorism, extremism and political and economic instability are forcing Pakistan to seek support outside its region to the detriment of the country. «Freedom of hand» [21].

In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a strategic defense agreement on mutual assistance in the event of an attack on one of these states [22], which changed the regional balance of power. The move cemented Riyadh-Islamabad’s military-political cooperation and signaled Pakistan’s readiness to revise its former cautious strategy. At the same time, the format of the agreement does not reflect the transition to an active military role, but rather creates a framework for the formation of new approaches of Pakistan to defense cooperation with Middle Eastern countries. The essence of the agreement is not made public, but according to incoming reports, it involves the involvement of the nuclear dimension in the context of the Pakistan-Saudi agreement [23]. The probable goals of Islamabad and Riyadh — To send a political signal by this agreement, but at the same time to maintain a high level of uncertainty, in order to preserve space for maneuver in crisis situations [24].

Transformation of approaches to a number «The old old old» Conflicts are seen in a wide range of regional actors, including those who have previously demonstrated high engagement. So, in previous years, Egypt, the UAE, Turkey and a number of other states have versatilely supported the opposing sides. During the active phase of the conflict, the support of the belligerents was not limited to the supply of weapons and fuel. Turkey sent regular units to support the Government of National Unity in Tripoli [25], while Egypt provided military assistance to the Libyan National Army [26], and its parliament officially approved the possibility of Egyptian troops entering Libya [27]. Extra-regional actors, including France, Russia and Italy, were also involved in the Libyan crisis. The UK has also shown interest in the Libyan track, seeing it as an opportunity to strengthen cooperation with the EU and join pan-European migration initiatives.

After the 2021 Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and the formation of a transitional government, the level of involvement of external actors in the Libyan conflict has significantly decreased. For regional players, this is due both to a certain stabilization of the situation in Libya and to a reorientation to solving problems related to domestic socio-economic challenges, structural reforms and modernization. Apparently, direct military involvement has become perceived as a factor hindering these processes, which led to a decrease in the level of military activity. External actors took a position «Active observer»Waiting for stabilization, and then perhaps re-invigorating participation, making the main bet on assistance in restoring the country's economy.

The Syrian case is also indicative of the policy of regional actors. In the early years of the Syrian civil war, Qatar and Saudi Arabia actively funded the armed opposition [28] and provided diplomatic support to it, seeking to legitimize opposition structures. However, soon enough, involvement was reduced mainly to humanitarian and economic activity, as well as to individual political contacts, including through informal channels. The involvement of another actor in the Syrian conflict — Turkey, Turkey — In addition to financial and diplomatic assistance, Ankara provided organizational, military-technical and other assistance to certain opposition structures [29]. Iran, in turn, provided significant support to the official government in Damascus and maintained a direct military presence in the country.[30] Israel has struck Iranian targets in Syria, seeking to limit Tehran’s activities in the country.
After the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, the rivalry between regional actors (including not only a number of Arab countries but also Turkey) was transformed. If earlier the object of the struggle was the superiority of various opposition groups, now the competition is unfolding around the influence on the Syrian government. Turkey provides not only financial but also military support to the new Syrian government [31]. The rate of Qatar and Saudi Arabia on solving economic and humanitarian problems has become even more noticeable. Riyadh and Doha agreed to provide $89 million in financial assistance to Damascus in 2025. [32] [English]

Damascus, in turn, pursues a diversified policy, building relations with both Turkey and Arab countries and with non-regional players. In this context, a special role is played by Russian military bases, which many regional actors (including Israel and the Arabian monarchies) see as a counterweight to Turkish influence. Turkey, on the contrary, seeks to strengthen its own position.

As for the Yemeni conflict, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have previously engaged in direct military intervention. However, the situation has changed in recent years, and the conflict is in a semi-frozen state. Following the signing in 2022 of an armistice agreement between Riyadh and Sana'a, which was also supported by Abu Dhabi, an armed confrontation between the Arab Coalition and the United States. «Ansaralloy» It actually stopped. This reflects, among other things, the shift of regional players’ emphasis from a military to a political and diplomatic one.
In general, it can be expected that extraregional actors will continue to seek to optimize resources and prioritize individual areas, while maintaining caution, pragmatism and reliance on multilateral mechanisms of interaction. At the same time, regional states will adapt their own strategies depending on the change in the balance of power, preferring political and economic instruments to direct military participation.

Conflicts through the prism of internal problems

A number of external actors are addressing the challenges posed by conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa in terms of their own challenges. One of the key areas is the elimination of security threats emanating from the region. Thus, according to R.S. Mammadov, Russia perceived the Syrian conflict, including through the prism of combating the flow of immigrants from the post-Soviet countries, going to Syria and Iraq to participate in hostilities on the side of terrorist organizations. The Russian strategy included aviation and advisory support for government forces, which was seen as a tool to counter terrorism and protect national security.[33]

For India, according to P.V. Topychanov, the Palestinian problem is also related to the fight against terrorism, but in the context of domestic policy. The Indian leadership sees it as a reflection of its own challenges related to radicalization and the activities of extremist groups. The Kurdish issue is perceived by Indian politicians as similar to the Kashmir issue, which pushes Delhi to maintain a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states [34].

For a number of external actors, especially the European Union and Turkey, the migration factor is of particular importance. European states view conflicts in the region as a source of migration challenges, so any transformation of any conflict or change in its dynamics inevitably provokes discussions about migration policy. Oganisyan draws attention to the fact that the change of political regime in Syria provoked in some EU countries a discussion of the possible return of Syrian refugees, although the humanitarian and economic situation in the country remains extremely difficult.[35] According to experts, this topic has become especially sensitive due to the strengthening of the positions of right-wing political movements in the European Parliament and individual EU countries.

Since 2023, polarization has increased in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Gaza. The EU's common position is to support the principle «Two of the two»However, significant differences remain in the specific aspects of the settlement. According to Oganisyan, Brussels is trying to maneuver, balancing the positions of the participating countries. For example, by using restrictions against Hamas and «Islamic Jihad in Palestine»At the same time, the European Union has introduced a number of restrictive measures against the so-called «Aggressive settlers»Violating Palestinian rights in the West Bank under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime [36]. However, deep divisions remain within the EU that hinder the adoption of more serious restrictions on Israel. While such measures are regularly discussed, internal political rifts and differences in national positions do not allow for consensus in unification.

In the context of the West-Nosahar conflict, European countries are focused on ensuring stability in the Maghreb and preventing the growth of migration flows. In 2025, the EU extended until 2027. «Irina and Irina» in Libya [37], which aims to promote the implementation of the UN arms embargo against Libya.
As for the Syrian conflict, the potential stabilization of the situation in Syria is beneficial for Turkey, as it allows to solve some of the migration problems. An important task for Ankara is the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland: according to 2024, Turkey had more than 3.1 million Syrians [38], whose presence created a tangible burden on the economy. In the first nine months after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, about 1 million refugees returned to Syria [39].

In the context of the Syrian conflict, it is noteworthy that some external regional actors seek to create a buffer zone in this country in the context of countering terrorist threats. This applies, in particular, to Turkey, which supports the pro-Turkish proxies, in which «Syrian National Army»Israel, which maintains a military presence in the border areas.

Another example is the Libyan conflict. Thus, for Egypt, involvement in the Libyan conflict, especially in 2020-2021, is explained by the desire to prevent the consolidation of power in Libya by forces close to the movement banned in Egypt. «The Muslim Brotherhood»*. . . . After the 2021 Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and the formation of a transitional government, the problem has become acute, but arms smuggling from Libya to Egypt continues to be a source of security threat.[40]

Protection of transport corridors and energy routes remains a significant area of involvement of external actors. Although the US is less dependent on Middle Eastern oil, fluctuations in global energy prices still affect the global economy. In this regard, the United States and the United Kingdom are involved in joint operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, where the activity of the movement. «Ansaralla» It threatens the safety of shipping routes. In February 2024, the EU launched the "Aspides" mission in the Red Sea to ensure the safety and protection of merchant vessels.[41] According to Kashin, China also perceives threats in the Red Sea, but avoids direct interference. Beijing considers the Yemeni crisis through the prism of bilateral ties with Tehran and tries not to aggravate the situation.[42]

In some Middle Eastern countries, involvement in conflicts is closely linked to a number of other domestic challenges. Saudi Arabia restored relations with Syria in the spring of 2023, and it was re-accepted in the Arab League. Perhaps one of the factors of convergence was the need to combat the illegal trafficking of captagon. According to UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), in 2012-2021, about 67% of the total seized in the world captagon accounted for Saudi Arabia [43]. In the spring of 2023, a meeting of foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan was held in Amman, at which the meeting was discussed. «The road map» The Syrian settlement. It was at this summit that the Syrian side pledged to facilitate the elimination of drug trafficking channels [44]. Thus, the agreements were reached before the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The new Syrian authorities have stepped up efforts to address the problem, resulting in an estimated 80% decrease in captagon production and turnover [45].

In general, external actors seek not only to prevent the escalation of conflicts, but also to minimize threats to their own interests. The main priorities remain countering radical Islamism, preventing the return of ISIS fighters.*Reducing migration flows and protecting economic interests, including the safety of transport corridors.

Mediational efforts and humanitarian dimension

In some cases, the interests of extra-regional actors in addressing conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa coincide. This concerns, for example, the settlement of the Iranian nuclear problem, which can reduce the level of conflict in the region. At the same time, approaches to solving certain issues often differ.

As the reaction to the killing of Alawites and Christians in Syria in March 2024 has shown, external actors are capable of collective action, including within the framework of the UN Security Council. At the same time, it is important to note that the reaction of some external actors (primarily the EU and a number of states) — Members of the association were ambiguous, and the responsibility for the outbreaks of violence rested with «Pro-Assad militias» [46] [See also] Thus, even with collective efforts, their effect is often limited not only by the lack of internal conditions for settlement, but also by differences in the positions of external players.

A.S. It's all right. Evseenko notes that the United States can identify three key approaches to resolving conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Force implies imposing favorable conditions for Washington through the use of military force. Another approach is to develop and promote their own settlement formulas. The Third Third — (c) creating conditions for direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict [47].

In March 2023. China played a key role in normalizing Iran-Saudi relations, which was Beijing’s biggest diplomatic success in the region. This was an important signal that China was able to influence the political situation in the region through diplomatic instruments.

As Smirnov notes, Russia, engaging in conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, focuses on diplomatic instruments taking into account the positions of regional states. According to him, Moscow proceeds from the fact that the UN remains a key instrument of settlement, although the effectiveness of decisions made within the framework of this organization is assessed as limited [48].

European states, in turn, rely on multilateral diplomatic formats, interacting with both non-regional and regional players and with international organizations, including the UN and the OSCE. Often, the participation of individual countries in such formats is declarative and reflects a desire to demonstrate a commitment to normalization rather than an active involvement in conflict resolution.

Against the background of some detachment of a number of extra-regional actors, individual regional players, on the contrary, take an active position, seeking to promote a settlement or at least reduce the level of confrontation. For example, Egypt and Qatar mediated the war between Israel and Hamas, facilitating the exchange of prisoners and providing venues for negotiations.[49] Turkey, which became one of the signatories of the agreement signed in October 2025 in Sharm el-Sheikh on the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip [50]. It is likely that Qatar also participated in the achievement of a truce between Israel and Iran in the summer of 2025.[51]

Oman’s mediation efforts remain significant, especially in the US-Iranian direction. Oman has repeatedly provided a venue for talks between Washington and Tehran. With the assistance of Oman, Qatar and Switzerland, an agreement was reached in 2023 to defrost the United States of Iran ($6 billion) in exchange for the release of American prisoners [52].

An important direction of the diplomatic activity of external actors remains the desire to change the internal situation in the conflict by promoting the development of more constructive and harmonious relations between individual actors, including non-state actors. Thus, Smirnov draws attention to the fact that Russia, China and Algeria continue to promote inter-Palestinian dialogue, based on the fact that the internal unity of the Palestinian side remains an important condition for promoting the negotiation process with Israel [53].

Financial assistance to conflict-affected countries is essential. By 2025, the EU approved €1.9 billion worth of humanitarian aid, of which €470 million was allocated to the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have pledged to pay Syrian debts of about $15 million to the World Bank [54]. This is particularly important for Syria, given that resolving the debt problem was a precondition for international financial assistance.

EU and the States — Members of the association are among UNRWA's largest donors. Arab monarchies are also actively involved in humanitarian initiatives for Palestinians. Saudi Arabia has allocated $40 million to Gaza. [55] Qatar sent more than 4.7 thousand tons of humanitarian aid [56] and at least 100 million dollars [57], and the amount of humanitarian aid to the UAE exceeded 4 thousand tons [58]. The EU’s assistance amounted to more than 450 million euros and 3.8 thousand tons of supplies [59], the US provided support through the Gaza Humanitarian Fund, which operated from May to October 2025 [60]

In conflicts such as Palestinian-Israeli, Syrian or Libyan, many actors seek not so much to support one side as to take a position. «over the battle» and act as facilitators of political dialogue. In this context, facilitators are seen not as neutral observers, but as active mediators, creating conditions for negotiations and humanitarian initiatives between the parties to the conflict.

Some countries (bright example) — China has shown interest in post-conflict reconstruction, but its willingness to directly finance such processes is limited. In the case of Syria, the adverse investment climate and weak property protection remain an obstacle.
The United States, in turn, lifted most of the sanctions imposed on Syria [61]. In addition, the United States excluded «Hayat Tahrir al-Sham»* from the list of terrorist organizations [62]. These actions can be seen as an attempt to strengthen their positions in Syria using humanitarian and diplomatic tools.

The Council of the European Union, in turn, adopted legal acts to lift sanctions against Syria [63]. By the example of Germany, Belov draws attention to how the humanitarian vector of foreign policy is implemented by individual EU countries in relation to the region. Germany is actively involved in UN initiatives and programs, and has become one of the first countries to open an embassy in Syria, which can be seen as an informal recognition of the legitimacy of the new government. Germany has sent significant amounts of assistance to stabilise border areas, in particular to protect refugees on the borders with Lebanon and Jordan [64]. K.A. Godovanyuk draws attention to the fact that the formal restoration of diplomatic relations of Great Britain with Syria took place in the summer of 2025, even before the exclusion of the group. «Hayat Tahrir al-Sham» * from the list of terrorist [65]. After removing this political and legal contradiction, Labour has taken the course of closer cooperation with the Syrian government, including on countering terrorism and illegal migration.[66]

Thus, a number of external actors are paying considerable attention to the humanitarian dimension of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to providing direct assistance to the countries of the region, there has been an increase in diplomatic efforts to help resolve conflicts.

Conclusions

Summing up, it is important to emphasize once again that the policy of external actors — both regional and outside the Middle East and North Africa — It is neither universal nor linear. Each actor builds his own approaches to conflicts in the region, combining long-term priorities with responses to conjuncture changes. That is why the purpose of this section was not to identify a universal pattern: each player is unique and acts independently in accordance with his own logic and interests.
Nevertheless, the policies of many external actors show common emphasis, which can be called trends. First of all, this desire for optimization — unwillingness to engage in conflicts through large-scale use of military force and preference for tools to protect interests at minimal cost. For different countries this «Optimization of optimization» takes different forms. As the events of 2024-2025 showed, the United States is ready for direct military intervention. At the same time, priority is maintained for the operations of the air force and navy. Many other major extra-regional actors, including China, have avoided military intervention altogether, betting on political and economic instruments.

Optimization is also noticeable in the policy of regional states, but there is a great heterogeneity. Turkey’s policy towards the Syrian conflict differed significantly from the approaches of Saudi Arabia and the UAE: Ankara showed a higher level of involvement. The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in December 2024 marked a new stage. External actors seek to influence new authorities in order to strengthen their positions and ensure their interests, including by providing economic and humanitarian assistance to the country. A number of outside actors have begun a gradual easing of the sanctions regime against Syria, linking it to the need to support post-conflict reconstruction processes.

At the same time, external actors' approaches to conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa are often driven by the desire to contain possible threats emanating from the region. This includes issues related to security in the broadest sense of the word: from deterring those forces that the actor considers terrorist, and protecting sea routes to solving migration and combating drug trafficking.

In addition, the emphasis on the humanitarian dimension of policy has become increasingly visible. External actors — both regional and non-regional — They are sending aid to the Gaza Strip, Yemen, Syria and other hotspots, both through multilateral formats and bilaterally. Diplomatic activity aimed at mediation and facilitation in peace negotiations has increased, and regional actors have shown themselves in a new way. If earlier the negotiation process around the Palestinian-Israeli track was largely monopolized by large non-regional players. — First the USSR and the USA, and then the Middle East «The Quartet». . . . — Regional mediators, especially Egypt and Qatar, are playing an increasingly prominent role. At the same time, the extra-regional actors did not come out of the process completely: an example is the diplomatic activity of the United States and their promotion in October 2025 of President Donald Trump’s peace plan to end the war in the Gaza Strip.

In general, the policy of external actors on conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa is characterized not only by the optimization of intervention, but also by the desire to adapt strategies to the new political and economic realities of the region. At the same time, it is the internal drivers and conditions of conflict that are still often decisive, and external players are forced to respond to them, seeking to limit threats, protect interests and strengthen their positions in the region.

* Organization whose activities are prohibited in Russia.

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[16] Egypt, Jordan leaders reject Trump's suggestion to take in Palestinians. 29.01.2025. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/29/egypts-el-sisi-rejects-trumps-suggestion-to-take-in-palestinians
[17] Jordan Country Report 2024 // BTI Transformation Index. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20250903062637/https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/JOR
[18] Arab Republic of Egypt Poverty and Equity Brief: October 2025 (English) // World Bank Group. 01.10.2025. URL: https://documents.worldbank.org/pt/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099558104212527926
[19] Akbarzadeh S. Hezbollah's Defeat and Iran's Strategic Depth Doctrine // Middle East Council on Global Affairs. 13.04.2025. URL: https://mecouncil.org/publication/hezbollahs-defeat-and-irans-strategic-depth-doctrine/
[20] Interview with P.V. Topychanov.
[21] [21] That's right there.
[22] Momand A. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia sign defense pact pledging joint response to aggression // DAWN.17.09.2025. URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/1942611/pakistan-and-saudi-arabia-sign-defence-pact-pledging-joint-response-to-aggression
[23] Shah S., El Dahan M. Saudi pact puts Pakistan's nuclear umbrella into Middle East security picture. 19.09.2025. URL: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/saudi-pact-puts-pakistans-nuclear-umbrella-into-middle-east-security-picture-2025-09-19/
[24] Interview with P.V. Topychanov. Clarified in October 2025.
[25] Erdogan says Turkey already send soldiers to Libya. 05.01.2020. URL: https://apnews.com/general-news-e165d2a372e9b4e03b2a9c11c7311211
[26] Increasing Egyptian military support for Haftar forces in the Battle of Tripoli. 25.04.2019. URL: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190425-increasing-egyptian-military-support-for-haftar-forces-in-the-battle-of-tripoli
[27] Egypt's parliament approves troop deployment to Libya. 20.07.2020. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/20/egypts-parliament-approves-troop-deployment-to-libya
[28] Saudi Arabia and Qatar funding Syrian rebels. 23.06.2012. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/saudi-arabia-and-qatar-funding-syrian-rebels-idUSBRE85M078
29 The State of the Syrian National Army. March 2022 The Carter Center URL: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/2022/state-of-the-syrian-national-army-march-2022.pdf
[30] Hassan M., Al-Ahmed S. Iran's growing presence in Syria's al-Hasakah poses a direct threat to US forces // Middle East Institute. 24.03.2022. URL: https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-growing-presence-syrias-al-hasakah-poses-direct-threat-us-forces
[31] Gumrukcu T. Turkey to help Syria with weapons systems, equipment under new accord, source says. 14.08.2025. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-help-syria-with-weapon-systems-equipment-under-new-accord-source-says-2025-08-14/
[32] Rahman F. Saudi Arabia and Qatar pledge $89 million to support Syria's public sector. 25.09.2025. URL: https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2025/09/25/saudi-arabia-and-qatar-pledge-89-million-to-support-syrias-public-sector
[33] Interview with R.S. Mammadov.
[34] Interview with P.V. Topychanov.
[35] Interview with L.D. Oganisyan.
[36] [English] That's right there.
[37] European Union Council extends the mandate of operation IRINI until 2027 // EUNAVFOR MED OPERATION IRINI. 13.03.2025. URL: https://www.operationirini.eu/european-union-council-extends-the-mandate-of-operation-irini-until-2027
[38] Türkiye. Fact Sheet September 2024// UNHCR. URL: https://www.unhcr.org/tr/media/bi-annual-fact-sheet-2024-09-turkiye-pdf
[39] A million Syrians have returned home, but more support needed so millions more can follow. 24.09.2025. URL: https://www.unhcr.ca/news/a-million-syrians-have-returned-home-but-more-support-needed-so-millions-more-can-follow
[40] Fadel I. Libya Seizes 'Dangerous' Weapons that Were to Be Smuggled to Egypt. 20.02.2023. URL: https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4168851/libya-seizes-'dangerous'-weapons-were-be-smuggled-egypt
[41] Security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea: Council launches EUNAVFOR ASPIDES. 19.02.2024. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/19/security-and-freedom-of-navigation-in-the-red-sea-council-launches-new-eu-defensive-/
[42] [English] Interview with V.B. Kashin.
[43] World Drug Report 2025 // United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. New York, 2025. P. 26, of course. URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf
[44] Al-Khalidi S. Syria agreed to curb drug trade at Arab ministers meeting. 01.05.2023. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-ministers-discuss-how-normalise-ties-with-syria-2023-05-01
[45] Jalabi R. Inside Syria's battle to close Assad's narco-state. 20.08.2020. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb
[46] Syria: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the recent wave of violence // Council of the EU. 11.03.2025. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/
[47] Evseenko A.S., Bocharov I.A. Today, American policy in the Gaza Strip — This is more a tactic than a strategy. 29.04.2025. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/segodnya-amerikanskaya-politika-v-sektore-gaza-eto-skoree-taktika-chem-strategiya/
[48] Interview with V.Y. Smirnov.
[49] Hanedar F., Keskin O. As part of the 6th round of the exchange of prisoners between Hamas and Israel, 369 Palestinians will be released. 14.02.2025. URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/peace/in the framework of the 6th round of inter-Hamas-i-Israeli prisoner exchange will be released 369-Palestinians/3482410
[50] Joint Egypt-Qatar-Turkiye-US statement on Gaza: The full text. 13.10.2025. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/13/joint-egypt-qatar-turkiye-us-statement-on-gaza-the-full-text
[51] Qatari prime minister secured Iran's agreement to US ceasefire proposal after call with Trump, official says. 24.06.2025. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-prime-minister-secured-irans-agreement-us-ceasefire-proposal-after-call-2025-06-23
[52] Fassihi F., Shear M.D. U.S. Reaches Deal With Iran to Free Americans for Jailed Iranians and Funds. 10.08.2023. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/10/us/politics/iran-us-prisoner-swap.html
[53] Interview with V.Y. Smirnov.
[54] Abdulrahim R. Saudi Arabia and Qatar to Pay Off Syria's Debt to the World Bank // The New York Times 28.04.2025. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/28/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-qatar-syria-debt.html
55 Saudi Arabia boosts funding to UNRWA by $40 million targeting Gaza relief. 20.03.2024. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-boosts-funding-unrwa-by-40-million-targeting-gaza-relief-2024-03-20/
[56] Qatar's 15-month humanitarian efforts in Gaza stepped up. 27.01.2025. URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/qatars-15-month-humanitarian-efforts-gaza-stepped-enar
[57] Qatar Announces Extra $100 Million Pledge in Response to Gaza Humanitarian Crisis / Ministry of Foreign Affairs - State of Qatar. 26.09.2024. URL: https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2024/09/26/qatar-announces-extra—100-million-pledge-in-response-to-gaza-humanitarian-crisis
[58] UAE carries out 80th airdrop of humanitarian aid under Birds of Goodness Operation to support Gaza. 25.08.2025. URL: https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bldgyim-uae-carries-out-80th-airdrop-humanitarian-aid
[59] EU announces new €120 million humanitarian aid package for Gaza. 16.01.2025. URL: https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-announces-new-eu120-million-humanitarian-aid-package-gaza-2025-01-16_en
[60] Nichols M., Farge E. What is the new US-backed Gaza aid plan and why does not the UN like it? // Reuters. 10.06.2025. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/new-us-backed-gaza-aid-plan-why-un-doesnt-like-it-2025-05-20/;
Odenheimer N., Rasgon A., Halbfinger D.M. Gaza Operations of Much-Criticized U.S. Aid Group Unravel. 20.10.2025. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/20/world/middleeast/gaza-humanitarian-foundation.html
[61] Termination of Syria Sanctions // U.S. Department of State. 30.06.2025. URL: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/termination-of-syria-sanctions
[62] Revoking the Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham // U.S. Department of State. 07.07.2025. URL: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/revoking-the-foreign-terrorist-organization-designation-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham
[63] Syria: EU adopts legal acts to lift economic sanctions on Syria, enacting recent political agreement // Council of the EU. 28.05.2025. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/28/syria-eu-adopts-legal-acts-to-lift-economic-sanctions-on-syria-enacting-recent-political-agreement/
[64] Belov V.B., Bocharov I.A. Mediation instead of intervention: Berlin’s approaches to conflicts in the Middle East. 23.04.2025. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/mediatsiya-vmesto-interventsii-podkhody-berlina-k-konfliktam-na-blizhnem-vostoke/
[65] UK removes Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham from terrorist organisation list // GOV.UK. 21.10.2025. URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-removes-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-from-terrorist-organisation-list
[66] Interview with K.A. Godovanyuk. Clarified in October 2025.