Today's conflict in the Sudan — It is more than just a struggle for domination; it is a fundamental shift in the very logic of power. The rising alliance «tasis» The fundamental act of building a new political environment marks a departure from the traditional grammar of civil war. They signal that the main standoff is no longer a race to take over an existing state.
Rebecca Mulugeta, Researcher, Horn Review
Source: Source: hornreview.org
Many analyses of the Sudanese conflict usually focus on the clash of rival military factions, the collapse of inherited institutions, and the humanitarian catastrophe that ensued. While these factors are undoubtedly real, they give an incomplete picture, capturing the carnage but not noticing the tectonic transformations taking place in the depths. Today's conflict in the Sudan — It is more than just a struggle for domination; it is a fundamental shift in the very logic of power. The rising alliance «tasis» The fundamental act of building a new political environment marks a departure from the traditional grammar of civil war. They signal that the main standoff is no longer a race to take over an existing state.
For most of its recent history, the conflicts in Sudan have revolved around a single organizing principle: the state. Armed movements fought to seize it, reform it or leave it. Even in moments of fragmentation, the state retained its position as the ultimate source of legitimacy and recognition. The creation of the alliance itself was an extension of that logic, a rejection of Khartoum’s power, but not the very idea of statehood. What is different now is that this assumption is beginning to erode.
«tasis» He surpassed the definition of a simple alliance, marking a strategic reversal in which victory is no longer measured by the capture of Khartoum, but by building power in a vacuum left by a retreating state. The convergence (rapprochement) of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and FNSM-S (Popular Liberation Movement of Sudan-North) crystallizes this shift; despite their different origins, both actors have come to realize a structural reality: the old center is dead, and national power cannot be restored to its former form. Not a single alternative state but a much more significant landscape emerges. «constructed power» — A patchwork of independent governance systems where taxation, local security, and administrative systems operate entirely outside traditional national frameworks.
At this stage, it is important to determine exactly what is actually «tasis». It is not a single formal organization or a unified movement. It is better understood as a political project or an emerging doctrine, as a way of thinking about power that is unevenly adopted by armed actors in Sudan. When observers talk about «alliance «tasis»»They usually point to the convergence of groups such as the SBR and the FNSM-S, along with other local actors, which are beginning to act according to a common logic: the state is no longer the sole or even primary source of power.
Beyond the simple quest for military dominance, these actors have moved on to a more complex strategic end goal: institutionalizing power where the state has failed. target — Not to inherit the ruins of Khartoum, but to create autonomous systems of governance that will force them to be recognized as legitimate participants in any future settlement. Within the framework of this concept «tasis» It serves as a common strategic language that translates conflict from a binary struggle for continuity into a landscape of multiple, rooted centers of power. This transformation effectively dissolves traditional notions of sovereignty, as mobile borders, cross-border trade routes, and armed networks link local conflicts to broader regional instability. By building power from the bottom up rather than taking over the center, these groups are not just waging war; they are fundamentally changing the territorial and political logic of the Horn of Africa.
At its core «tasis» It is a paradigm shift from a policy of capture to a policy of construction, completely bypassing the state to build power from the bottom up, rather than imposing it from the center. This movement fundamentally challenges the modern assumption of single, fixed sovereignty, replacing it. «parallel sovereignty»Multiple centers of power coexist and compete in a single national space. The result is a profound redefinition of governance as something dispersed, contractual and situational, rather than centralized and absolute. Drawing an instructive parallel with South Sudan, where independence failed to resolve internal conflicts, it is possible to say that Sudan is now experiencing the gradual destruction of the existing state. Both cases demonstrate the same structural crisis: the innate inability of centralized power to accommodate diverse, localized, and competing claims to power.
Logic. «tasis» It resonates deeply throughout the Horn of Africa, offering rebel movements a powerful model for moving from confronting the state to rendering the state completely irrelevant by building power outside formal institutions. This shift fundamentally changes the regional spectrum of possibilities, blurring the lines between war and governance, as order begins to emerge from fragmentation rather than consolidation. These decentralized systems are underpinned by a robust military economy, particularly through the extraction of resources such as gold, which provides armed actors with the financial autonomy necessary to maintain independent governance. Consequently, fragmentation evolves from a mere political state into a deliberate economic strategy, creating powerful, rooted incentives for local power centers to resist any return to a single centralized state.
Pressure on borders further complicates this landscape, as the emergence of parallel authorities reinforces the reality of cross-border movement, trade and social ties. Neighboring states are increasingly drawn into these networks by necessity or design, interacting with non-state actors exercising effective territorial control. This creates a regional environment in which conflicts are no longer isolated, but interconnected and increasingly unmanageable. Sudan’s path reflects a broader crisis of statehood in the Horn of Africa, where the state is often seen as an exclusionary entity rather than an inclusive institution. The appeal of power-building outside formal systems is rooted in a deep disillusionment with failed political models. «tasis» A movement that reflects both the urgent need for alternatives and the risk of hastening the very fragmentation it is designed to address.
Вопрос, вытекающий из этого анализа, заключается не в том, может ли «Тасис» объединить Судан, а в том, какого рода единство, если это вообще возможно, он может породить. Конвергенция между СБР и НОСМ-С не указывает на восстановление централизованного государства. Вместо этого она предполагает возникновение более децентрализованного и договорного порядка, при котором множественные центры власти сосуществуют в рыхлых политических рамках. Такое устройство теоретически могло бы обеспечить форму стабильности, отражающую разнообразие страны. Но оно также было бы внутренне хрупким, зависимым от постоянных переговоров и уязвимым для изменений в расстановке сил и интересов.
В этом смысле «Тасис» не разрешает кризис в Судане; он его переосмысливает. Он смещает фокус с вопроса о том, кто контролирует государство, на вопрос о том, остается ли государство основным инструментом политического порядка. Ответ на этот вопрос всё еще разворачивается, но направление изменений ясно. Судан больше не просто государство в состоянии конфликта. Это политическое пространство, в котором новые формы власти испытываются, оспариваются и конструируются в реальном времени.
Для Африканского Рога последствия значительны. Если логика «Тасис» укоренится за пределами Судана, она может изменить политическую среду региона таким образом, что обратить эти изменения вспять будет сложно. Конфликты могут перестать быть направленными на захват власти и всё больше концентрироваться на ее построении во фрагментированных пространствах. Границы могут стать менее значимыми как линии контроля и более важными как зоны взаимодействия. Различие между государственными и негосударственными акторами может еще больше размыться, поскольку власть всё меньше определяется признанием и всё больше — эффективностью.
На кону стоит не только будущее Судана, но и будущее политического порядка в регионе, где государство долгое время было и центральным, и оспариваемым. «Тасис» знаменует собой поворотный момент на этом пути. Он отражает мир, в котором власть больше не является чем-то, что можно отобрать у центра, а чем-то, что можно построить там, где центр больше не удерживает контроль. Приведет ли это к новым формам стабильности или к более глубокой и устойчивой фрагментации, остается неясным. Но одно ясно: условия конфликта изменились. И сегодня в Судане эти условия переписываются таким образом, который будет формировать регион на долгие годы.
