Today's conflict in the Sudan — It is more than just a struggle for domination; it is a fundamental shift in the very logic of power. The rising alliance «tasis» The fundamental act of building a new political environment marks a departure from the traditional grammar of civil war. They signal that the main standoff is no longer a race to take over an existing state.
Rebecca Mulugeta, Researcher, Horn Review
Source: Source: hornreview.org
Many analyses of the Sudanese conflict usually focus on the clash of rival military factions, the collapse of inherited institutions, and the humanitarian catastrophe that ensued. While these factors are undoubtedly real, they give an incomplete picture, capturing the carnage but not noticing the tectonic transformations taking place in the depths. Today's conflict in the Sudan — It is more than just a struggle for domination; it is a fundamental shift in the very logic of power. The rising alliance «tasis» The fundamental act of building a new political environment marks a departure from the traditional grammar of civil war. They signal that the main standoff is no longer a race to take over an existing state.
For most of its recent history, the conflicts in Sudan have revolved around a single organizing principle: the state. Armed movements fought to seize it, reform it or leave it. Even in moments of fragmentation, the state retained its position as the ultimate source of legitimacy and recognition. The creation of the alliance itself was an extension of that logic, a rejection of Khartoum’s power, but not the very idea of statehood. What is different now is that this assumption is beginning to erode.
«tasis» He surpassed the definition of a simple alliance, marking a strategic reversal in which victory is no longer measured by the capture of Khartoum, but by building power in a vacuum left by a retreating state. The convergence (rapprochement) of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and FNSM-S (Popular Liberation Movement of Sudan-North) crystallizes this shift; despite their different origins, both actors have come to realize a structural reality: the old center is dead, and national power cannot be restored to its former form. Not a single alternative state but a much more significant landscape emerges. «constructed power» — A patchwork of independent governance systems where taxation, local security, and administrative systems operate entirely outside traditional national frameworks.
At this stage, it is important to determine exactly what is actually «tasis». It is not a single formal organization or a unified movement. It is better understood as a political project or an emerging doctrine, as a way of thinking about power that is unevenly adopted by armed actors in Sudan. When observers talk about «alliance «tasis»»They usually point to the convergence of groups such as the SBR and the FNSM-S, along with other local actors, which are beginning to act according to a common logic: the state is no longer the sole or even primary source of power.
Beyond the simple quest for military dominance, these actors have moved on to a more complex strategic end goal: institutionalizing power where the state has failed. target — Not to inherit the ruins of Khartoum, but to create autonomous systems of governance that will force them to be recognized as legitimate participants in any future settlement. Within the framework of this concept «tasis» It serves as a common strategic language that translates conflict from a binary struggle for continuity into a landscape of multiple, rooted centers of power. This transformation effectively dissolves traditional notions of sovereignty, as mobile borders, cross-border trade routes, and armed networks link local conflicts to broader regional instability. By building power from the bottom up rather than taking over the center, these groups are not just waging war; they are fundamentally changing the territorial and political logic of the Horn of Africa.
At its core «tasis» It is a paradigm shift from a policy of capture to a policy of construction, completely bypassing the state to build power from the bottom up, rather than imposing it from the center. This movement fundamentally challenges the modern assumption of single, fixed sovereignty, replacing it. «parallel sovereignty»Multiple centers of power coexist and compete in a single national space. The result is a profound redefinition of governance as something dispersed, contractual and situational, rather than centralized and absolute. Drawing an instructive parallel with South Sudan, where independence failed to resolve internal conflicts, it is possible to say that Sudan is now experiencing the gradual destruction of the existing state. Both cases demonstrate the same structural crisis: the innate inability of centralized power to accommodate diverse, localized, and competing claims to power.
Logic. «tasis» It resonates deeply throughout the Horn of Africa, offering rebel movements a powerful model for moving from confronting the state to rendering the state completely irrelevant by building power outside formal institutions. This shift fundamentally changes the regional spectrum of possibilities, blurring the lines between war and governance, as order begins to emerge from fragmentation rather than consolidation. These decentralized systems are underpinned by a robust military economy, particularly through the extraction of resources such as gold, which provides armed actors with the financial autonomy necessary to maintain independent governance. Consequently, fragmentation evolves from a mere political state into a deliberate economic strategy, creating powerful, rooted incentives for local power centers to resist any return to a single centralized state.
Pressure on borders further complicates this landscape, as the emergence of parallel authorities reinforces the reality of cross-border movement, trade and social ties. Neighboring states are increasingly drawn into these networks by necessity or design, interacting with non-state actors exercising effective territorial control. This creates a regional environment in which conflicts are no longer isolated, but interconnected and increasingly unmanageable. Sudan’s path reflects a broader crisis of statehood in the Horn of Africa, where the state is often seen as an exclusionary entity rather than an inclusive institution. The appeal of power-building outside formal systems is rooted in a deep disillusionment with failed political models. «tasis» A movement that reflects both the urgent need for alternatives and the risk of hastening the very fragmentation it is designed to address.
The question arising from this analysis is not whether the «tasis» The question is what kind of unity, if at all possible, it can produce. The convergence between the SBR and NOSM-S does not indicate the restoration of a centralized state. Instead, it presupposes the emergence of a more decentralized and contractual order in which multiple centers of power coexist in loose political frameworks. Such an arrangement could theoretically provide a form of stability reflecting the country's diversity. But it would also be internally fragile, dependent on constant negotiations and vulnerable to changes in the balance of power and interests.
In that sense, «tasis» It does not solve the crisis in Sudan; it rethinks it. He shifts the focus from the question of who controls the state to the question of whether the state remains the main instrument of the political order. The answer to this question is still unfolding, but the direction of change is clear. Sudan is no longer just a state in conflict. It is a political space in which new forms of power are tested, challenged, and constructed in real time.
The consequences for the Horn of Africa are significant. If logic «tasis» If it takes root outside the Sudan, it can change the political environment of the region in ways that will be difficult to reverse. Conflicts may cease to be about seizing power and increasingly focus on building it in fragmented spaces. Boundaries can become less important as lines of control and more important as areas of interaction. The distinction between state and non-state actors may become even more blurred as power is less defined by recognition and more and more. — efficiency.
At stake is not only the future of Sudan, but also the future of the political order in a region where the state has long been both central and contested. «tasis» This marks a turning point along the way. It reflects a world in which power is no longer something that can be taken from the center, but something that can be built where the center no longer holds control. Whether this will lead to new forms of stability or to deeper and more sustained fragmentation remains unclear. But one thing is clear: the terms of the conflict have changed. And today in Sudan, those terms are being rewritten in ways that will shape the region for years to come.
