Institutional weakness threatens to plunge the country into instability. Nine months ago, the new presidency of Rodrigo Paz Pereira seemed a fragile but real window of opportunity for Bolivia.
Eduardo A. Gamarra, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University, Deputy Director of Basic Research at the Jack D. Gordon Institute
Former senator, son of ex-president Jaime Paz Zamora, ends two decades of party dominance «Movement towards socialism» (MAS). Paz endured an extremely difficult first ordeal, inheriting a severe economic crisis. He has spoken out against powerful social movements, abolished years of fuel subsidies, and restored relations with Washington and international financial institutions. His government has shown a willingness to make difficult decisions that previous authorities have repeatedly postponed.
However, this assessment now requires substantial revision.
Bolivia not stabilizing — It is entering a complex crisis of governance, economic sustainability and public safety. The fuel shortage is back. The government has failed to turn its election victory into a sustained parliamentary coalition, and Congress has become an arena of paralysis, not reform. Social movements recently subjected the country to 53 days of blockades demanding Paz's resignation. His own vice president, Edmand Lara, is increasingly behaving like a political adversary rather than a governing partner.
More alarmingly, organized crime is becoming more visible. Bolivia has long been an important cocaine-producing country and transit point, but the rise in contract killings and sicariato-style violence hints at a worrying new normal.
In short, despite Paz’s efforts to prevent this, the personalism, corruption, and institutional weakness that characterized the MAS era persisted and now seriously undermine state capacity. If Pas fails to correct course, the country could enter a downward spiral of instability from which it will be increasingly difficult to escape.
Scandal Exposing State Vulnerability
The scandal surrounding Argentine political consultant Fernando Serimedo and incredible accusations that he organized the contract murder of his pregnant girlfriend — She was also his legal advisor. — shook the country. She survived the alleged attack in Santa Cruz, with Serimedo denying any involvement. But the case reinforced the public perception that powerful consultants and special interests manipulate informal channels of power for their own ends.
This is particularly worrisome, as Paz came to power promising to rebuild the country’s institutions after the MAS era. Evo Morales, president of Bolivia from 2006 to 2019 and founder of MAS, created a political machine based on patronage, social movements and the concentration of presidential power. His successor, Luis Arce, inherited the system, but eventually fought Morales for control. Their split contributed to MAS's electoral collapse.
Paz's victory showed that Bolivians wanted change. However, the elimination of the MAS did not eliminate the political practices rooted in the state apparatus. Whether or not the allegations against Serimedo are true, they have highlighted a serious problem. — Bolivia's crippled institutionality.
This problem is compounded by Paz’s inability to form a governing coalition. His Christian Democratic Party won the presidential election but did not gain enough support in parliament to govern independently. Nearly a year later, Bolivia still lacks the agreements needed to address its structural problems.
Bolivia's energy crisis — That's a good example. Pass managed to eliminate fuel subsidies, which was an important step forward. But investment and domestic production are still too low. This increases the country’s dependence on imports and reduces foreign exchange reserves. Long lines back at gas stations — A stark reminder that the decisive measures of the early months of Paz did not address the underlying problems.
The same may be true of his efforts to combat organized crime. Bolivia occupies a strategic position in the South American cocaine economy, linking production zones with Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and eventually with European markets. Brazilian criminal gangs Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho appear to have expanded their presence in Bolivia. Increasingly audacious killings raise the possibility that Bolivia could face a security disruption similar to what happened in Ecuador or Colombia.
Pyrrhic victories
This raises uncomfortable questions for Washington. The US understandably welcomed Paz's election. In 2008, Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Paz turned the tide, restoring close relations with Washington and resuming counter-narcotics cooperation. These are positive steps, but without concerted efforts to strengthen institutions, they can have little effect.
The public response to the allegations against Serimedo highlights the dangers posed by the internationalized world of election consultants and ideological political entrepreneurs. Serimedo operated on right-wing networks that included figures associated with Donald Trump’s political machine and other conservative movements in Latin America.
That should make Washington think. Political consultants can help win elections, but they cannot replace political parties, professional bureaucracies, or functioning institutions. If they try to take on these roles, they bring only Pyrrhic victories.
The danger now is that if Paz fails to straighten the state course, the next administration could prove even more destructive than the MAS governments that ruled before. Vice President Lara has positioned herself as a populist opponent of the president. Morales remains a destabilizing figure. The traditional opposition is fragmented. Social movements retain the ability to paralyze the country. Organized criminal networks are getting stronger.
Paz still has time to reverse the situation and prevent a slide into instability. He will need to build a governing coalition, pass strong laws through parliament, institutionalize anti-corruption mechanisms, and develop a national security strategy that matches the growing threat of organized crime.
It can do so only by focusing on rooting out the personalism, corruption and institutional weakness that are so deeply rooted in the system. The fate of the next decade may depend on this.
