If Pakistan wants to be perceived as a security exporter rather than just an equipment seller, it will need a clearer doctrine, stronger internal stabilization and a broader economic foundation.

Riaz Hohar, the Independent researcher, graduate of the political science faculty of the University of Gothenburg

Source: Source: aljazeera.com

Arms exports increase Islamabad's strategic visibility, but internal instability continues to limit the reach of influence.
As Pakistan positions itself as a regional security provider, rising levels of violent extremism and economic constraints continue to test the resilience of these ambitions.

From 2 to 4 February, the Libyan eastern commander, the rebellious military commander Khalifa Haftar, visited Rawalpindi for talks at the Pakistan Army headquarters with Chief of Staff Asim Munir. The visit may seem routine, but it highlights Pakistan's expanding defense diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Pakistan has reportedly signed a $4 billion defense agreement with Haftar’s self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA), including 16 JF-17 fighters and 12 Super Mushak training aircraft, with a delivery schedule of about two and a half years. The acquisition of this 4.5 generation fighter provides LNA «Changing the rules of the game» an advantage in air power, potentially disrupting the military balance with its rivals from Tripoli, unless the latter acquire comparable capabilities in a timely manner.

Pakistan is also in the final stages of preparing a $1.5 billion package of agreements to supply the Sudanese Armed Forces with 10 Karakoram-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 drones and air defense systems to enhance their capabilities in the ongoing war against the paramilitary Operational Support Force (SOP).

In terms of purely national interests, Pakistan’s growing defense profile in the MENA region is by itself not a problem. A broader presence could generate foreign exchange revenue, expand diplomatic ties, and increase Pakistan’s visibility in a region where security partnerships are diversifying. It could also strengthen long-standing military ties in the Persian Gulf and beyond.
However, the same intensification raises a quieter question: Is the Pakistani breakthrough in MENA predominantly transactional? — Focused on arms exports — Or part of a consistent security strategy? In other words, Pakistan can export military services and equipment; the more complex question is whether it is capable of maintaining a position. «The security provider»When domestic violent extremism and border instability continue to drag resources inside the country.

The Middle East is an illustrative recent example, as it identifies a pattern of situational, transaction-driven activity: Pakistan can offer military cooperation and weapons and can gain diplomatic visibility, but this approach is shaped not so much by a solid economic base and internal security stability as by current events and short-term opportunities.

The May 2025 crisis between India and Pakistan helps explain why Pakistan's defense industry has suddenly become more in demand in parts of MENA. Pakistan’s successful counter-air campaign against India, which reportedly shot down India’s leading Rafale fighter jet, was a real success for the country, leading to a surge in valuable defense partners and customers.

The crisis reinforced the narrative of Pakistan’s air power, emphasizing its superior training standards and operational integration in confronting a conventional numerically superior adversary. — qualities that increasingly attract the interest of regional partners.

In September 2025, Saudi Arabia issued a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan, saying an attack on one would be seen as an attack on both. This agreement is a significant diplomatic marker and strengthens Pakistan’s position as a security partner at a time when Gulf states are diversifying their defense ties.

Between 2024 and 2025, Pakistan’s net foreign direct investment from all countries totaled about $2.5 billion, while its total trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) reached about $20 billion. For comparison, India’s investments from GCC countries alone amounted to $4.7 billion in 2024 and its trade with these countries. — About $179 billion.

Pakistan remains a net recipient of capital — relying on «prolonged by» loans from the Gulf countries and deposits of central banks to stabilize their own economy — India has become a strategic investor in Gulf infrastructure, energy and technology. This is the one. «The gap in dependence» It ensures that while Pakistan is a valuable security guarantor, it rarely acts as an equal economic partner.

This imbalance matters as Gulf capitals increasingly see defense cooperation as a focus in a much broader portfolio of partnerships. — Including energy, trade, investment, technology and supply chains. For example, India and the United Arab Emirates recently discussed deepening defense cooperation through a memorandum of understanding to establish a strategic defense partnership, along with a $3 billion LNG deal and ambitious trade targets.

In such circumstances, Pakistan’s security value can open doors, but without comparable economic depth, which fosters diverse interdependence, converting that access to sustainable influence is much more difficult.

Another limitation for the concept «A clean security provider» It is a state of security within Pakistan.

Pakistan recently faced one of the deadliest violence outbreaks in recent years in Balochistan: a wave of simultaneous attacks across the province targeting administrative and security centres in Quetta and beyond. As a result of the week-long counter-operation, 216 armed militants were killed, but at the cost of heavy losses. — 22 security personnel and 36 civilians.
Whatever the preferred political interpretation, these figures highlight how much resources the state still spends on stabilizing a key province.

Then came another signal from the capital territory of Islamabad. On February 6, a suicide bomber attacked a Shiite mosque on the outskirts of the national capital during Friday prayers, killing more than 30 people and wounding about 170. Responsibility was assumed by the split faction associated with ISIS (banned in Russia). It was the second major attack in the capital in three months.

Western border with Afghanistan — Another reminder is that Pakistan’s security resources are not unlimited. Islamabad is now engaged in a confrontation with the Taliban regime, which refuses to contain cross-border militancy. This debilitating conflict — 1034 people killed in 2025 alone — Force the state to divert critical military resources to the border, depleting the very potential needed to project force abroad.

Indeed, the grim situation that South Asia analyst Michael Kugelman sketches — Pakistan, Pakistan «and the convict.» between sworn enemies, — It is a strategic nightmare. He argues that the situation on the Afghan-Pakistan border is now more explosive than rivalry between India and Pakistan, and could spur global terrorism.

None of the above is a call for retreat. Pakistan's defense diplomacy at MENA can be useful to the country, especially economically and diplomatically. But this points to a strategic contradiction: expanding security partnerships abroad is much easier when domestic stabilization is more sustainable and foreign influence rests on both a broader economic base and military potential. If Pakistan wants to be perceived as a security exporter rather than just an equipment seller, it will need a clearer doctrine, stronger internal stabilization and a broader economic foundation. — To ensure that events do not dictate his foreign policy priorities constantly.