At the same time, Prabovo remains committed to diversifying partnerships, rejecting unequivocal choices. His strategy — Balancing Trump's demands to retain the status of an influential player and defending principled positions on Palestine, the rejection of which threatens a domestic political crisis
Especially for USGS
Nikita Sergeevich Kuklin, Expert of the ASEAN MGIMO Center, Associate Professor of the Department of Oriental Studies MGIMO, East Science
Indonesia plans to deploy up to 8,000 troops in Gaza as part of international peacekeeping mission — This will be the largest contribution of the country to such operations in its history. About this thing He said he said Press Secretary of the National Army of Indonesia Brigadier General Donnie Pramono.
According to him, the first group of about 1,000 troops can be ready for shipment in early April 2026, and a full contingent of 8,000. — by the end of June. The final decision to deploy remains with Indonesian President Prabovo Subianto.
The statement was made on the eve of the first meeting of the Peace Council, initiated by US President Donald Trump, which will be held in Washington on February 19. Prabovo confirmed his participation in the meeting and already They'll fly out. in the United States. Foreign Ministry of Indonesia They insist on on the peacekeeping nature of such a mission, referring to the impossibility of participating in disarmament and combat operations. It is important for Indonesia to have a UN Security Council mandate for the International Stabilization Force (ISF), as Indonesia has historically adhered to the principles laid down in the UN Charter and strongly emphasizes the credibility and neutrality of this organization.
Indonesian delegation at Davos forum officially It's been announced. Accession to the Peace Council — An international organization led by US President Donald Trump that will oversee the restoration of Gaza. The decision was made public in a joint statement with seven other countries with a predominantly Muslim population: Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan and the UAE.
Potential deployment of peacekeeping contingent to Gaza Prabovo He said that he Since the beginning of the public discussion on the Comprehensive Plan to End the Conflict in Gaza by Donald Trump in September-November 2025, Indonesia, as a country with one of the largest international contingents of UN peacekeepers. «The Garuda of») received since 1957. Participation Multiple operations worldwide, including missions in Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Western Sahara. Indonesians are also leaders in women's peacemaking and humanitarian operations, relying on subtle perceptions of sociocultural problems in host countries, interfaith dialogue and psychological assistance to victims of conflict. Since 2013 in the town of Sentool near Jakarta It's working. A peacekeeping mission centre established to train peacekeepers from around the world and to transmit best practices.
Indonesia, as one of the leading ASEAN military powers, certainly has the necessary capacity to deploy such a significant contingent. However, the Prabovo administration faces a number of serious political challenges that cannot be ignored.
Prabovo’s foreign policy is based on long-established approaches to doctrine «Active and independent foreign policy» (Politik Luar Negeri Bebas-Aktif), while the nature of their implementation undergoes a transformation. If President Joko Widodo (2014-2024) interpreted Indonesia’s international role through the prism of a neutral regional actor with elements of a global presence, Prabovo would reformat this approach, putting forward the concept of preemptive diplomacy as a mechanism for adapting to the dynamics of the emerging world order. Hence Indonesia’s accession to all possible neutral and significant organizations and the ability to simultaneously be interested in joining the BRICS and the OECD, sign the FTA agreement with the EAEU and the EU and purchase fighter jets from several competing suppliers. From the perspective of the Indonesian worldview, Indonesia does not take sides, implements its interests, and respects all partners.
Participation in the Trump-initiated peace council puts Jakarta in the face of a complex dilemma: two key priorities of Indonesian foreign policy converge here. — Commitment to the Palestinian cause and the need to build a constructive dialogue with Washington, especially under the new Trump presidency. Balancing between the two will require exceptional diplomatic flexibility and political foresight.
This format definitely goes beyond the UN structure and, according to many, undermines it, but for Indonesia — It's just another organization, and moreover, a temporary, limited term in Trump's presidency, after which the Peace Council is likely to lose its effectiveness. If it helps advance national interests, resolve contradictions with the US, and strengthen Indonesia’s position in Palestine, Jakarta will not ignore it.
Indonesia and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
The Indonesian position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been formed for decades and represents a unique combination of pragmatism, ideological attitudes and internal political realities. Contrary to the common stereotype of purely religious motivation, the origins of Israel’s non-recognition were laid by Sukarno, who in 1948 justified this position with anti-colonial rhetoric and the need to combat Western imperialist influence. This made it possible to avoid the excessive politicization of Islamic forces within the country and to preserve the religious balance laid down by the philosophy of Pancha Force (on the basis of this ideology-philosophy Indonesia equally recognizes Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism by the official religions of Indonesia, which makes it the largest country in terms of the number of Muslim population, but does not recognize Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism). «Muslim country»Indonesia is often referred to as the media.
Anti-colonial rhetoric has gained recognition in Muslim circles, especially among moderate movements that did not criticize Judaism and the Jewish people, but opposed Zionism as an imperialist ideology. Even under Suharto, despite secret contacts with Israel in the field of intelligence and arms purchases, the official line remained unchanged. — Jakarta refrained from recognizing the Jewish state, considered it a neocolonial formation, a relic of imperialism, but also avoided sharp criticism.
The turning point was the Reformation and the early 2000s, when a wave of radicalism and terrorist attacks forced Indonesia to reconsider its role in the Muslim world. President of Megawati Sukarnoputri, leaning on major moderate religious organizations — Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah declared their commitment to moderate Indonesian Islam and positioned the country as an example of a democratic Muslim nation. Since then, the Palestinian issue has become a crucial tool for demonstrating Indonesian leadership in Ummah, but at the same time has become a highly sensitive topic of domestic politics.
The Palestinian Problem for Indonesia — This is primarily a matter of internal political balance. Any events in Gaza immediately cause mass The protestsSocial media activity and pressure on authorities from religious groups and populist politicians. The government is showing strong support for Palestine on international platforms, while controlling the borders of this solidarity within the country to prevent the destabilization and growth of radical sentiments and the exploitation of the Palestinian agenda by radical movements.
Under President Joko Widodo, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi It was believed that Indonesia's balanced approach to peacekeeping operations and promotion of its image as a reliable mediator in conflict resolution. Despite the general Successful progress Indonesia as chairman of the UN Security Council in 2020 and active work in the UNGA and a number of other organizations, such as the OIC, Indonesia could not «Integrating into» Middle East settlement as a significant player. Often, her active participation was openly opposed, including by her traditional partners, such as Turkey. Indonesia's position was taken into account, but the political weight in the country's region is objective «It was not enough.». . . . Even after signing the Abraham Accords, Indonesia They did not seek express their attitude to this format for domestic political reasons and practical reasons. The potential presence of Indonesian peacekeepers in the Gaza Strip could therefore be seen as a significant diplomatic breakthrough for Jakarta.
Previously in 2011. Indonesia initiates construction of Gaza hospital «Indonesia»After starting work in 2016, it became an important point of medical care. A significant burden on the hospital with Indonesian doctors fell during the conflict in November 2023, after which the hospital was repeatedly seized by the Israeli army, was bombed, but remained as the only center of medical care of limited functionality in northern Gaza at the time of 2025. Indonesia has repeatedly sent warships to Gaza, including with the assistance of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.
Accordingly, participation in peacekeeping initiatives, such as the Trump Peace Council, puts the Prabovo administration in the face of a complex dilemma: the president, who comes from secular, military conservative circles, needs to maintain a reputation as a defender of the Palestinian cause, without undermining strategically important relations with Washington and without provoking a domestic political crisis. That is why the Indonesian approach to the conflict remains cautious and multi-layered. — Islamic solidarity, the principles of social justice of Pancha Force, anti-colonial rhetoric, the Global South and pragmatic protection of national interests are intertwined here. Any attempt by Israel or the U.S. to use the Peace Council to strengthen its position on Gaza would definitely result in Indonesia's potential withdrawal or a significant limitation of its contingent's participation.
The legitimization of Indonesia's participation in the Peace Council requires Prabovo to mobilize support at several levels at once. For example, in early February, Prabovo It's all about it. More than 50 representatives of Muslim organizations, including the flagship Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, who expressed support for the Peace Council. Then Prabovo It's been a long time. The meeting with former ministers and deputy foreign ministers, including reputable career diplomats Hassan Virayud, Marty Natalegawa and Rento Marsudi, which was designed to demonstrate that the decision relies on professional expertise rather than an impulsive gesture of personalized diplomacy. Foreign Minister Sugiono He promised to To fellow diplomats that Indonesia will withdraw from the Peace Council in the event of the slightest violation of the rights of Palestine or the impossibility of its independence. Prabovo uses the consensus mechanism (musyawarah, mufakat), broadening the circle of parties involved and shaping the image of a solution as balanced and multilaterally justified, which is critical to maintaining domestic legitimacy amid radical criticism, including on the Internet from Muslim youth and Westernized liberal strata.
Indonesia and Trump
The inauguration of Donald Trump in January 2025 left Jakarta facing serious uncertainty about the future of bilateral relations. Unlike China and Russia, which recognized Indonesia’s increased regional and global role in the BRICS, the new US administration initially showed restraint.
From the point of view of Trump’s public statements, Indonesia fell into the category of countries with its independent course. «Not very helpful.» Jakarta does not support AUKUS and QUAD, acts as a guarantor of the aseanocentric regional order, and strongly does not want to choose a side in the US-China confrontation. ASEAN, with its complex system of consensus mechanisms, posed no less a challenge to Trump's rather straightforward approach, ready to impose tariffs and protect the American market from Asian goods.
The situation became more complicated in April 2025, when the Trump administration imposed 32 percent tariffs on Indonesian exports to the United States, a major test for Jakarta’s economy and diplomacy. However, the Prabovo government demonstrated flexibility and pragmatism when a high-ranking delegation led by Economic Coordinator Minister Airlangga Hartarto held negotiations In Washington, offering to increase imports from the United States by $ 19 billion. The United States, including energy, agricultural products and 50 Boeing aircraft. As a result, Trump announced the achievement of an agreement under which Indonesian goods will be subject to 19% duty, and American exports are exempt from taxation.
Despite the initial tensions, relations with the U.S. have acquired an unexpectedly warm personality. After a series of official meetings, Trump publicly called Prabovo «New good friend» I have repeatedly thanked you for your contribution to the settlement of the Middle East conflict. The key factor in the rapprochement was personal ties: it was during Trump’s first presidential term with Prabovo that the ban on entry into the United States, introduced in the 1990s, allegedly due to human rights violations in East Timor, was lifted. In November 2024, during a visit to Washington, Prabovo, meeting with President Biden, behind the scenes agreed on a telephone conversation with Trump, at that time the leader of the presidential race, the video of which was Published by in official accounts. During the call, Prabovo expressed readiness. «personally to fly»To congratulate Trump, he replied that «I really appreciate this sweet thing.» He expects an Indonesian president at any time. U.S. president-elect praises Prabovo's achievements, calls him «A respected man» And even noted his English, to which Prabovo replied that his training was American, referring to training in the 1980s at the U.S. Army Infantry School in Fort Benning. For Indonesian political culture, where such high-ranking calls are a key demonstration of status, this episode has become an important confirmation of the president's international authority.
Prabovo becomes the only ASEAN leader Invited guests At the international summit on Gaza in Sharm el-Sheikh in October 2025, which demonstrated Trump's particular attention to the Indonesian president. Earlier, the American leader personally invited Prabovo to a closed meeting on the peace plan after his speech at the jubilee 80th session of the UN General Assembly in New York. Prabovo's statement on Opportunities of recognition Israel, in the event that it recognized Palestine as an independent state, was then interpreted by Trump and the Israeli side as a willingness to support the American settlement plan, although Prabovo himself insisted on a two-state solution. The emergence of the Indonesian president Advertising shields In Tel Aviv, propagandizing Trump's peace plan, there has been intense domestic discontent, especially among Muslim parties and organizations. Indonesia’s foreign ministry has been forced to state officially that there will be no recognition or normalization of relations with Israel without prior recognition of an independent Palestinian state. At the same time, Indonesian Defense Minister Shafri Shamsuddin met with Pentagon chief Pete Hegset in Kuala Lumpur for the first time. Confirmed that readiness to send contingent peacekeepers «The Garuda of» In Gaza, Prabovo allowed critics to demonstrate consistent protection of Palestinian rights.
However, despite the warming, serious structural problems remain. The trade deal reached is Under threat Disruption and requires additional rounds of negotiations. The image problem remains the perception of trump Prabovo «Junior policy»This is completely unacceptable from the point of view of Indonesian political culture, where status and equality in relations are critical. The aggressive negotiating style of the American side also contrasts with the Asian diplomatic tradition of consensus and «preservation of the»What Indonesian diplomats can't always adapt to.
In the military sphere, despite the growth of joint exercises «Super Garuda Shield» And discussing defense procurement, Indonesia continues to push for diversification of partnerships, which limits American influence. Contrary to expectations, the Indonesian military, many of whom were educated in Fort Benning and West Point, has shown a balanced approach: they have traditionally criticized the US and the Western world as a whole, but recognize the importance of partnership and maintain a pragmatic interest in it without excessive public support. A week earlier, Indonesia also announced The way out. From the U.S. deal to purchase expensive F-15EX fighter jets, which will make negotiations much more difficult.
Conclusions
In the current situation, Prabovo is vulnerable enough to the pressure of the Trump administration, capable of revising tariff and investment arrangements at any time, but at the same time can not yield to the Palestinian issue, as it automatically destabilizes his domestic political positions and leads to the withdrawal of Muslim parties from the Prabovo super coalition, which allows the president to pursue a course for centralization, reform of the army and socio-economic institutions.
The software Statement by the speaker Prabovo, at a summit in Davos on January 23, 2026, and his call to invest in Indonesia, demonstrated a critical dependence on Western investment in Danantara’s national welfare fund’s strategic projects. The failure of Prabovo’s social and infrastructure programs means the loss of elite legitimacy to the population. Tensions in the South China Sea limit access to Chinese capital (as opposed to the Joko Widodo era), and Middle East and BRICS resources may «It's not gonna be enough.». . . .
At the same time, Prabovo remains committed to diversifying partnerships, rejecting unequivocal choices. His strategy — Balancing Trump’s demands to retain the status of an influential player and defending a principled position on Palestine that faces a domestic political crisis. It can be assumed that the participation of the contingent «The Garuda of» It may be limited to sending the first thousand troops acting within the framework of clearly defined powers and attitudes to provide humanitarian assistance, but any change in the political situation can affect both the position of Jakarta and its relations with Washington.
