For the Kurds throughout the region, the consequences were profound. The United States is no longer seen as a reliable partner or defender. This is likely to affect Kurdish communities across the region.

Camran Palani, PeaceRep Iraq at the Centre for Middle East Studies at the London School of Economics

Source: Source: aljazeera.com

The U.S. is increasingly raising suspicions among Kurdish communities and elites that are changing political calculations.

Last month, during fierce clashes between Kurdish forces and the Syrian army, the United States delivered a devastating message to the Syrian Kurds: their partnership with Washington. «It's expired.». . . . It wasn't just a statement of change in priorities - it was a clear signal that the US sided with Damascus and left the Kurds at their most vulnerable moment.

For the Kurds throughout the region, the consequences were profound. The United States is no longer perceived as a reliable partner or minority advocate. This development is likely to affect not only the Kurdish community in Syria, but also the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Iran.

Fears of re- marginalization in Syria

U.S. backing by Damascus under interim President Ahmed al-Shara paves the way for a centralized Syrian state – a device that Kurds across the region view with deep suspicion. Their wariness is rooted in bitter historical experience.

Centralized states in the Middle East have historically marginalized, excluded and assimilated Kurdish minorities. The prospect of such a system in Syria, supported by the United States, represents a fundamental divergence from the Kurdish aspirations for the future of the region.

The Assad regime’s approach to the Kurdish issue was based on systematic denial. The Kurds were not recognized as a separate collective group within the Syrian national fabric; the state banned the public use of the Kurdish language and Kurdish names. Many Kurds have been stripped of their citizenship.

Al-Shara’s presidential decree of January 16 promised some rights to the Kurds, and the agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of January 30 included limited recognition of collective Kurdish identity, including recognition of the Kurds. «Kurdish Kurds» Terminology, which was not visible in the political lexicon of Syria and government documents in the past.

This represents gradual gains, but they unfold within a transitional government structure that sets its ultimate goal of centralization. That is why the Syrian Kurds are suspicious of whether these promises will be kept in the future.

While there is consensus among most Kurdish groups that armed resistance at this stage is strategically impractical, any future engagement with the US will be perceived with distrust.

The possibility of renewing the Shia-Kurdish alliance in Iraq

After years of violent rivalry between Shia and Kurdish parties in Iraq, both groups are now watching developments in Syria and potential changes in Iran with a shared sense of threat and shared interests. If in 2003 their alliance was driven by a shared past – suffering under Saddam Hussein’s regime – today it is guided by a shared future shaped by fear of being pushed to the periphery in the region.

Both politically and popularly, Shia and Kurdish parties and communities have far more in common in recent weeks than in the past. This convergence is evident not only in the political calculations of elites, but also in the public moods in both communities.

For the first time in recent years, both Kurdish elites and ordinary Iraqi citizens are no longer enthusiastic about regime change in Iran — a position that would have been unthinkable just weeks ago.

In addition, last month, the Iraqi Shiite Coordination Alliance of Shiite political parties nominated Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister, the most influential position in the Iraqi government. Notably, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the dominant Kurdish political force, welcomed the nomination.

Al-Maliki’s support for the KDP was not only a response to anger over U.S. policy in Syria. It was also important in Iraqi and Kurdish domestic politics. This support is part of the ongoing rivalry between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for the Iraqi presidency, a position reserved for the Kurds. The KDP needs allies in Baghdad to ensure the election of its candidate, not the PUK candidate.

However, Washington may view the rapprochement between the KDP-led Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq and a government led by al-Maliki or a similar government in Baghdad as inconsistent with its interests in Iraq, especially its efforts to contain Iranian influence.

Before laying the blame, Washington should ask itself why the Kurds feel compelled to take such a position. The Kurdish position cannot be fully understood without taking into account US policy in Syria. From a Kurdish perspective, the US was not a neutral arbiter in Syria.

Peace Process in Turkey

Over the past year, many have believed that the sustainability of Turkey’s peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) depends on resolving the Kurdish issue in Syria and the fate of the SDF.

The fierce clashes between Damascus, backed by Ankara and Washington, and the SDF threatened to slam the door for talks. Notably, however, not all paths were closed.

Now it seems that these two issues are treated as separate dossier. Negotiations with the PKK are likely to continue within Turkey’s borders, and, crucially, PKK leaders have not turned their frustration over the weakening of the SDF into a final rejection of talks with Ankara.

This dynamic is supported by the fact that the SDF has not been fully disarmed, leaving some room for manoeuvre to continue the dialogue between Ankara and the PKK.

Iranian Kurds

The Iranian Kurds, though farther away from Syria, have also watched the events there and drawn their conclusions. The refusal of the SDF reveals the unpredictable nature of American support for minorities in the region.

In light of this, and given the continued US incitement against the Iranian regime, it is very revealing that the Iranian Kurds collectively and consciously chose not to be at the forefront of recent protests and not to allow themselves to be instrumentalized by Western media.

The Kurdish community in Iran is not enthusiastic about the potential return of Reza Pahlavi, who clearly enjoys Washington's support, and the restoration of the Shah's legacy, which was also repressive. Iranian opposition groups – many of them based in the West – have not offered a better perspective on the Kurdish issue. There is widespread concern that the current regime could simply be replaced by others without any guarantee of the rights of the Kurds.

Some Iraqi-based armed groups of Iranian Kurds have indeed attacked Iranian positions near the Iranian-Iraqi border. But the main Iranian Kurdish armed actors chose not to engage in direct conflict or escalate the situation militarily. Their calculations are based on uncertainty about the ultimate goal that Israel and the U.S. represent, and the reality that any escalation would trigger an Iranian response against Iraqi Kurds.

With each abandonment of its Kurdish allies, the U.S. is increasingly destroying the foundation of trust on which their local partnerships rest. Iraqi and Syrian Kurds have learned to live with American unpredictability, but this situation may not last forever. When it collapses, the implications for U.S. influence in the region could be profound.