The Yemeni landscape can no longer be interpreted solely through the lens of politics. The events of recent months in the government-controlled southern Yemeni provinces indicate that security and military affairs have become a decisive factor.

Ahmed al-Shalafi, Editor of the Yemen Affairs Division «Al-Jazeera»

Source: Source: aljazeera.com

The fragmentation of the security system, regional rivalries and blunt military integration are changing the power structure in the government-controlled southern provinces.

Fighters reportedly backed by a Saudi-led coalition drive through the streets of the port city of Aden on January 8, 2026, a day after it was announced that a Yemeni separatist leader had fled to the United Arab Emirates. The Saudi-led coalition struck the leader of the UAE-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council (UPU) on January 7, 2026, after he failed to appear for talks in Saudi Arabia, excluding him from the Yemeni Presidential Governing Council and accusing him of treason, while the Saudi coalition struck a bomb attack on his home province after he refused to appear for talks in Riyadh.

The Yemeni landscape can no longer be interpreted solely through the lens of politics. The developments in recent months in the government-controlled southern Yemeni provinces clearly indicate that security and military affairs have been a decisive factor in the development of the situation on the ground. Any governmental or political arrangements would be unsustainable unless security control and the unification of military command were resolved.

Nor can the growing Saudi-Emirati divide between the two allies, which in recent years have militarily, politically and economically shaped southern Yemen given its direct impact on the balance of power and stability, be overlooked.

In recent years, the southern provinces have developed a complex security structure, including official units and others that emerged during the war. Some of these units are linked to state institutions, while others have been established with the support of the UAE, such as the South Transitional Council (Southern Transitional Council) forces of tens of thousands, or as a result of local arrangements dictated by the circumstances of the conflict.

Although steps have been taken in recent months to restructure this landscape after the defeat of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which announced its dissolution in Hadramauta and al-Mahra on January 3, 2026, security controls remain uneven from one province to another. Moreover, the military and security formations of the UPS have not disappeared completely; some have been redeployed, while the fate of others remains unknown.

In Aden, the temporary capital, security agencies operate within a complex structure. Some of the units formerly owned by SFOR lost their personnel and weapons, while others were renamed or redeployed. However, long-standing networks of influence persist, and the change of leadership or redeployment of camps reflect attempts to restore balance of power rather than a final settlement of the situation.

The same applies to various degrees to Laheja, Abyana, Dale, Shabwe and Hadramauta, where both the ability of the state to assert effective power and the level of coordination between the official security forces and the formations that arose during the war vary.

The most sensitive issue at this stage is the integration of military formations and security forces in the Ministry of Defense and Internal Affairs. The state seeks to end parallel security power structures, but the process faces complex challenges, including various sources of funding for some units, various political loyalties, fears of some commanders losing local influence, and considerations related to the composition of these forces. As a result, integration looks gradual, relying more on relocation and restructuring than on decisive measures that could provoke confrontation.

The government, now based in Aden, southern Yemen, faces a complex equation: it must establish its security power without plunging the country into a new internal conflict.

The transition from many armed groups to a state monopoly on the use of force requires political consensus, regional support and international approval. Any hasty move could rekindle domestic clashes, especially given the current political and regional sensitivity, as well as concerns that the Saudi-Emirate dispute could again provoke confrontation on the ground.

For this reason, the government's efforts are primarily focused on creating a stable security environment.

This trajectory cannot be understood without taking into account the regional dimension. Saudi Arabia sees Yemen as a direct strategic rear for its national security and seeks a stable state on its southern border.

The dispute between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially after Yemen requested the withdrawal of the Emirati forces from its territory, has become a significant factor shaping the course of the crisis, especially amid Saudi accusations that Abu Dhabi continues to support the UPS and strengthen its influence on the ground.

Yemen is now part of a broader regional landscape intertwined with the dynamics of the Red Sea and the sea lanes, competition for influence in the Horn of Africa and tensions stretching from Sudan to Somalia and the Gulf countries. For this reason, international players, especially the United States, are interested in keeping the situation in Yemen under control, fearing that the collapse of the security system could trigger an intra-trench conflict, threaten international shipping, create space for a new wave of armed groups, or allow the Houthis to take advantage of the situation.
At the next stage, the government will likely continue efforts to consolidate security controls in Aden and other southern provinces, including Saudi-border Hadramaut, gradually integrating military units and maintaining a political balance to prevent a renewed conflict.

The success of these efforts will determine whether the country is moving towards gradual stability or another round of redistribution of power centers. Given this reality, the main question remains: who actually has the ability to provide security on the ground, especially as some players continue to push the Southern Transitional Council into an escalation that could rekindle the conflict?