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научный сотрудник Центра арабских и исламских исследований ИВ РАН, заместитель декана Восточного факультета ГАУГН, Лукьянов Григорий Валерьевич
Нормализация отношений между Ираном и Саудовской Аравией, случившаяся в 2020-х и закрепленная соглашением при посредничестве Китая в начале 2023 г., стала продуктом целого ряда тенденций и изменений как во внешнеполитических курсах самих государств, так и в региональной системе международных отношений. Можно с уверенностью констатировать, что подписанию соглашений в Пекине предшествовало, как минимум, два-три года усердного переговорного процесса с использованием возможностей «дипломатии второго трека» при посредничестве ряда региональных игроков, включая площадки в Омане, Ираке и даже Катаре.
Эта политика носит долгосрочный характер, будучи направленной на снижение напряженности и создание устойчивой системы соглашений для предотвращения дорогостоящего и рискованного противостояния между Ираном и Саудовской Аравией. Во многом, достигнутый успех был обусловлен подлинной заинтересованностью элит двух государств.
So, it was 2017-2019 that became the time of the most active bloc confrontation in the Middle East. In this sense, Donald Trump’s proposal to create an analogue of NATO against Iran in the course of his first «The Middle East Tour» It was by no means accidental. Such an alliance was seen as a tool to reduce U.S. security costs in the region and as a way to normalize relations between Washington-friendly political actors.
The idea of a common enemy was considered the most convenient basis for this project, and the United States made significant efforts to aggravate relations between Tehran and Riyadh. Ultimately, the man-made rise in tensions led to an attack by pro-Iranian forces (Houthi) on oil refineries in Saudi Arabia - the main source of national prosperity. Realizing that the previously acquired U.S. weapons do not ensure success not only in Yemen, but also within the framework of protecting its own strategic facilities, Saudi Arabia was forced to reconsider its foreign policy. Thus, the conscious decision of the political elites of the kingdom to reduce the degree of tension in relations with Iran and Qatar was explained by the understanding of the risk of critical losses, as well as the need for an prompt and costly response to the COVID-19 pandemic and, ultimately, the desire to maintain domestic political stability.
On the other hand, contrary to Israeli propaganda about Tehran’s desire to escalate the regional conflict, Iran adhered to the concept of gradually depleting its main opponents – Israel and the United States – by creating a regional conflict. «Axis of Resistance» in the form of friendly non-state paramilitary structures in the Middle East. It is important to understand what such «Oh, that's it.» It did not pursue offensive goals and was aimed at deterring opponents. Saudi Arabia was not considered to be a major or major adversary. «Axis of Resistance». . . .
It should be understood that over the past decade, Iran has incurred enormous costs: 1) fighting ISIS in Iraq, 2 supporting the friendly regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and 3 providing the necessary assistance to Lebanon. «It's more than» against Israel. These costs have weakened Iran’s already-sanctioned economy, which has directly affected the elites’ willingness to abandon rate hikes and turn to a course to reduce tensions. As a result, in an effort to reduce costs and the number of conflicts, Iran has deliberately initiated a policy of appeasement and normalization of relations with both the new leadership of Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.
As we can see, the mutual desire to guarantee oneself from the transition to an uncontrolled conflict has become the basis for the normalization of relations between Riyadh and Tehran. The willingness to engage Beijing as an intermediary in this context was not only a sign of respect for Chinese partners, but also reflected a genuine desire to consolidate the agreements reached.
The agreement has already passed a significant test of regional turbulence in the Middle East since October 7, 2023. So, despite the conflict in Gaza, Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon and against Iran itself, as well as the fall of the Assad regime, Saudi Arabia did not break the agreements and, moreover, continued to take steps to strengthen it. In particular, while Riyadh has failed to prevent the use of its airspace by Israel and the United States, Saudi diplomacy has been extremely politically correct and sensitive to Tehran's concerns, seeking to reduce tensions in all available ways. It is important to note that the overall movement towards reducing regional tensions and building a new security architecture design in the Middle East, based on multi-level and integrated relations between regional actors themselves, reflects the foreign policy course of Saudi Arabia, and the development of the regional security architecture. «Iranian Track» It is only one of several important aspects.
In general, over the past few years, we have seen not only the desire and willingness of Iran and Saudi Arabia to reduce tensions with each other, to abandon direct confrontation and to consolidate some of them. «Rules of the game» In the Middle East, but also a willingness to work further to strengthen and complicate such a system of regional relations (including reducing the intensity of rivalry between the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the one hand and Turkey and Qatar on the other). There is no doubt that in Riyadh and Tehran there is an understanding that in the face of serious global transformations and multidimensional challenges in the region itself, the main source of which is not one of the parties, it is necessary to continue building a regional order based on the consensus of regional forces.
Saudi Arabia's leaders understand that after weakening «Hezbollah»The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and a direct clash with Israel, Iran does not pose a significant threat. In Riyadh, this situation is seen as favorable: a more flexible position of Iran on regional issues will allow the kingdom to retain the resources necessary for the implementation of large-scale internal projects of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In turn, more pragmatic and moderate groups of Iranian elites are aware of the presence of common ground with Saudi Arabia, which, although it does not remove the whole complex of contradictions, allows gradually building a new format of relations with Riyadh, whose policy is less pronounced ideological and religious color.
