Four months after January 3, the political process in Venezuela is beginning to take shape. The country is not going through a democratic transition. Instead, it is moving toward economic normalization without meaningful political conditions. — A strategy that Delcy Rodriguez's government pursues with marked tactical discipline.
Benigno Alarcon Desa, political analyst, researcher, former director of the Center for Governmental and Political Studies of the Catholic University Andres Belho in Caracas
A sequence of recent events points to a thoughtful plan, not improvisation: a new agreement with Chevron in the Orinoco oil belt; OFAC general licenses 56 and 57; Rodriguez's registration as a possible presidential candidate under the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), reported by some media outlets; the unilateral termination of the Amnesty Act with 473 political prisoners remaining in custody; and the seizure of control of the so-called branch. «Civilian authority» through the appointment of his allies Larry Devo as Attorney General and Egle Gonzalez Lobato as Ombudsman. These steps indicate an attempt not just to govern the country, but to consolidate power on new terms.
There was some resistance, too. Maria Corina Machado’s European meetings, which included talks in France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, confirmed that the opposition still enjoys key international support. The April 22 reception in Washington of Dinora Figuera, head of the 2015 National Assembly, by Michael Kozak, acting assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, shows that the Trump administration also continues to host opposition figures despite a positive relationship with Rodriguez. Figuera was a key legislative figure who helped interim President Juan Guaido try to remove former dictator Nicolas Maduro from power.
But neither of these efforts changes the main variable: whether economic normalization will be linked to real political conditions. Until that happened.
European leaders continue to talk about «peaceful democratic transition». Kozak mentioned «stable, orderly and consolidated transition». However, those language remained a diplomatic language, not a legal objective. Sanctions relief and economic easing were not clearly tied to verifiable electoral stages, institutional reforms, or the release of remaining political prisoners. This uncertainty may play into Rodriguez's hands.
New Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Appointment of John Barrett as U.S. Chargé d'affaires who succeeded Laura Dogu and his statement upon arrival in Caracas that he would continue to implement the Trump administration's three-phase plan — stabilization, recovery and transition, — It provides a useful basis for analysis. The problem is that stage three remains uncertain.
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright says election «will take place during the Trump presidency»They can take place at any time before January 2029. He also suggested that their organization would take at least nine to ten months from the start of coordinated work. At best, it would push the election to mid-2027, after the November midterm elections in the US.
By then, the domestic political balance in Washington could change significantly. The priority that the United States gives to Venezuela.
This is a variable that the opposition tends to underestimate: time works for the government. Every week that economic normalization moves forward without political conditions strengthens Rodriguez and weakens Washington’s leverage.
Recent appointments to «Civilian authority» They illustrate this idea. Devo defended the Venezuelan state for years before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Gonzalez Lobato was nominated by the sector of the so-called «non-radical opposition».
Their appointment serves two purposes. First, it helps protect the current governing coalition from a future electoral transition. A loyal attorney general reduces the likelihood that any investigation will affect an outgoing power structure. Second, and more importantly, it gives the government influence over the consequences of any negotiated transition. If change does come, institutions such as the attorney general’s office and the ombudsman’s office will determine who is investigated, what assets are returned, and how accountability is exercised.
Political prisoners
The same logic applies to the Amnesty Act. Rodriguez announced its termination on April 23, although the law does not contain an expiration clause. The measure has already accomplished its original goal of releasing 8,616 people, though Foro Penal claims only 186 of them were real political prisoners. The repeal of the law now retains the government’s remaining leverage and signals to opponents that selective repression remains an available tool.
Rodriguez also seems to be turning every step of economic normalization into a step toward his own political legitimation without Maduro.
Her registration with FARA as a presidential candidate officially formalizes what was previously only implied: she does not control the interim mechanism. It creates an election platform and seeks U.S. recognition.
At the same time, the regime’s internal logic continues to allow selective institutionalized repression as long as external costs remain low. Reports of abuse in El Rodeo I prison, repeated delays in the hearings in the case of Samantha Hernandez, who was 16 years old at the time of detention by officers of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM). The detention was denounced by human rights groups as arbitrary and its apparent purpose was to force the surrender of her brother, an exiled military officer and opposition figure. This case was referred to by the Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee Jorgen Vatne Frudnes during the presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2025.
Biggest risk
Cases such as this one and the continued detention of servicemen excluded from the amnesty, — All this points to a strategy to check the boundaries of what Washington allows, step by step.
So the biggest risk is not just the lack of transition. It consists in imitating it.
That could mean a non-competitive election in 2027, with Rodriguez already internationally recognized, the offices of the attorney general and the ombudsman loyal to the government, the electoral calendar set unilaterally and international pressure dried up over previous economic concessions. Such an outcome would be normalization without a genuine transition period.
To avoid this scenario, economic concessions must be linked to measurable policy criteria. Three urgent steps are needed: link future sanctions relief to the appointment of an independent electoral body and the full release of political prisoners; use Barrett’s arrival in Caracas to establish clear public terms for further engagement; and formally challenge the unilateral termination of the Amnesty Act until the window of opportunity for leverage is closed.
Rodriguez could still fail. But for now, she seems to understand what her opponents and foreign counterparts often overlook: in Venezuela, the transition process is determined not so much by speech as by a sequence of steps. And so far, she's been building that sequence successfully.
