The Syrian army is undergoing a process of unification and professionalization, but the factional dynamics that have formed during the war still persist.
Oliver Mizzi, Journalist
At the end of 2024, the Syrian army, exhausted by 14 years of war and deprived of much of its potential, fell into slack when the state it served collapsed.
The forces that have held Assad in power for more than a decade, with the decisive backing of Russia and Iran, have been unable to stop the offensive, initially conceived as a limited operation to throw back the front lines but quickly escalated into a swift march on the capital. — Damascus.
After Assad’s ouster, Syria’s transitional government began rebuilding state institutions and the shattered country. The same goes for the Syrian army.
In the year and a half since then, a transitional government formed by the strongest rebel faction to lead the collapse of the Assad regime. — «Hayat Tahrir al-Sham» (HTS) — It attempted to unite numerous Syrian factions into a professional, institutionalized force.
Despite these efforts, however, Syria’s recent history has created a number of obstacles that complicate the government’s ability to form a coherent national military.
«Core» HTS in the new Syrian army
Like much of Syria’s original interim government, the formation of the Syrian armed forces has been centered around the core of the HTS, the most prominent representative of which is Murhaf Abu Qasra. — The former head of the military wing of HTS, and now the Minister of Defense of Syria.
Qussai Juhadar, a Syrian researcher, explained to The New Arab that this core was formed due to two phenomena within the HTS even before the fall of Assad: military discipline and institutionalization.
«For example, the number of violations against civilians in Idlib was very small compared to, say, Afrin, which was controlled by Turkey. «National Army»». — He said, adding that factions «National Army» They often fought each other.
«As an organization, «Hayat Tahrir al-Sham» had a military school; had specializations in artillery and tanks; communications/communications; military planning». — added Juhadar.
«It can therefore be said that «Hayat Tahrir al-Sham» became the core of the entire army».
Sixteen days after the fall of the Assad regime, the new government announced the dissolution of all rebel factions and their merger with the Ministry of Defense. — After a series of talks with rebel groups.
Unification and professionalization of the new army
On January 29, it was held «victory» It involved a multitude of rebel factions involved in the offensive against Assad and outlined key political positions, including the reconfirmation by all factions of their own dissolution in favor of the state.
It was then that the factions decided how they would integrate into the state. — The process that Juhadar called «slow-moving».
«They were accepted as factions, then assigned numbers, then placed over them commanders of brigades and divisions from among them. «Hayat Tahrir al-Sham»and then began to distribute specializations in military units. n». — He told The New Arab.
This, together with the gradual replacement of veterans by recruits, was aimed at homogenizing factions and moving away from the identities formed during the war.
Since then, the Syrian government has taken numerous steps to professionalize the army, including through international cooperation with neighboring Turkey, which in August 2025 signed a bilateral defense agreement to help train, equip and reform the new Syrian army.
This led a group of Syrian cadets to train in Turkey, and Saudi Arabia also accepted cadets for training.
International partnerships have allowed the Syrian military to coordinate with U.S. Central Command in the overall fight against the cells. «Islamic State» In May, Syria took part in Turkey’s biennial EFES multinational military exercise.
Like much of Syria’s original interim government, the country’s new military structure was built around the core of the HTS, drawing on the group’s discipline and institutional experience before Assad’s fall.
In March, al-Sharaa issued two presidential decrees establishing the Syrian University of Security Sciences and the National University of Defense Sciences. The latter brought together several military educational institutions, including the Higher Military Academy, aviation, naval and military schools, and the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology, among others.
The measure was aimed at further developing research and training programs for the Syrian officer corps, enabling specialization and the creation of higher educational trajectories.
However, Heder Haddur, a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center’s Malcolm Kerr Center, said the significance of the new academies had not yet been determined, citing a lack of information about their funding and curricula.
«They want a new Syrian army that is professional. But what is this army's doctrine, what is its training program? All this, frankly, is unclear.». — He told The New Arab.
«What might be interesting here — That's who's gonna teach them.». — The academy and the Syrian armed forces are likely to have international partnerships that will define their doctrinal focus.
He called Turkey among potential sources of influence on the Syrian doctrine — already a partner of the Syrian army, — Russia, Pakistan, the Gulf states and Jordan, noting that the country’s position on both Israel and Iran is also likely to be a determining factor in doctrinal issues.
Legacy of War: A Confederate Army with Local Identities
Amid ongoing efforts to institutionalize the army, Khaddur noted a number of key wartime phenomena that have reemerged, hampering efforts to turn disparate military factions into a unified national army.
«The Syrian military scene, if you look at it from the outside like me, — It's like a military confederation. That's what we're seeing right now.». — He said.
Khaddur explained that before the fall of Assad, Syrian servicemen routinely served outside their home areas, representing the nation and serving the state.
«The army must be national. The National Army needs officers serving outside their homes. And the opposite is happening here.».
This is because numerous Syrian armed factions, which were driven from across the country to the rebel-held northwest, have returned to their home areas after Assad’s fall and have taken root there, thereby acquiring a local dimension.
Analysts interviewed by The New Arab identified two major threats to Syria’s future: military fragmentation leading to separate zones of control, and concentration of power reproducing Assad-era practices.
«This is the only way to prevent collapse.». — Haddur said the fragility of the country’s position after Assad’s fall forced al-Sharaa to allow armed factions to return to their home areas rather than stationing them elsewhere in the country, representing the national army.
«The very dynamics of the returnees forced Sharaa to choose this approach.».
Integration of units «Syrian Democratic Forces» The SDF, which on Tuesday announced its dissolution into the structures of the Syrian state, also symbolizes this confederalism.
Although the process of integration is underway, and four brigades of the Syrian army are being created on the basis of the military wing of the SDF, these servicemen will be deployed in northeastern Syria, where the SDF previously operated.
«This is contrary to the logic of a centralized state.». — He said. «Instead of negotiating with the leaders of the SDF to keep them in their areas, it was necessary to negotiate with them to become part of the Syrian armed forces and serve elsewhere.».
Meanwhile, numerous foreign fighters in Syria are under the tight control of the Syrian military, according to Qussai Juhadar, who told The New Arab that, «Apparently, they are carefully moved and distributed so that they do not accumulate together with fighters from other factions.».
«There's not much information about them, partly because they didn't cause much trouble. I also think that this is done deliberately so as not to cause concern to European countries and the United States.».
Despite maintaining local identities, Juhadar noted that the integration process is going smoothly. «Even when disagreements arise, they are resolved through dialogue.». — He told The New Arab.
This includes the removal of the commanders of three former Turkish-backed units. «Syrian National Army» (SNA) on demand «Syrian Democratic Forces».
These commanders are under international sanctions for wartime human rights abuses and have participated in battles against the SDF.
However, while the factions remain united, the creation of a national institution is expected to take years. — Haddur cites the growing Syrian officer corps to show how slow the process will be.
«You need a military academy to graduate new officers, and if someone enrolled in a military academy at 18, it takes at least 10 years to become a mid-level officer.».
Looking ahead, Haddur expects the local identities of Syrian factions to only grow stronger. «Time is out of Shara's hands. — It's in the hands of factions, in the hands of local people.».
From Assad's legacy
Institutionalization and professionalization are key to Syria’s future stability.
Just after the fall of Assad, there were two outbreaks of violence. — One on the Syrian coast, the other in Suwayda — They were accompanied by sectarian massacres against Alawite and Druze civilians, in which units of the disparate Syrian army took part.
Government investigations have pinned blame on individual military personnel, citing a lack of institutional oversight, although a UN investigation has characterized both incidents as systematic.
Khaloud Helmi, a non-resident researcher at TIMEP, told The New Arab that in Syria «There is a widespread desire for an army that protects the country and its people, not the government.».
Она отметила, что люди хотят видеть профессиональную, политически нейтральную армию, подчинённую гражданским властям, отражающую многообразие сирийского общества и не вмешивающуюся в политику и не выполняющую функции внутренней службы безопасности.
«Прежде всего, сирийцы должны чувствовать себя в безопасности в присутствии военных, а не ощущать угрозу от них», — сказала Хельми.
Для этого сирийским вооружённым силам необходим прозрачный процесс проверки для отсева тех, кто совершал преступления против человечности, а также интеграция членов повстанческих фракций в качестве отдельных лиц, а не целых подразделений, профессиональное обучение нормам гуманитарного права и правовое обеспечение соблюдения этих стандартов при их нарушении.
Хельми также отметила, что объявление об объединении не означает автоматического существования единой армии, указав, что наряду с сохранением командиров могут сохраняться и финансовые сети, и идеологические привязанности.
Она выделила две серьёзные угрозы для будущего Сирии: военную фрагментацию, ведущую к формированию отдельных зон контроля, и концентрацию власти, воспроизводящую практики эпохи Асада.
«Реальным критерием реформы является то, могут ли сирийцы — независимо от их политических взглядов, этнической принадлежности, религии или региона — сталкиваться с военными без страха произвольного ареста, унижения, исчезновения или преследования».
