«The Sunni Block» With weakened Iranian «resistance. Mm-hmm.» Moving closer to confronting Israel — Single and coalistic. Netanyahu’s constant bet on military pressure is increasingly being taken into account by the Middle East.
Anton Mardasov, Lead analyst at the Center for People's Diplomacy
Igor Subbotin, International columnist under editor-in-chief «Independent newspaper»Lead analyst at the Center for People's Diplomacy
Source source: russiancouncil.ru
On the eve of the war with Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, Israel’s leadership outlined its vision for the changing bloc architecture of the Middle East and neighboring regions. Six days before the start of the military operation, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the formation process. «Hexagonal Alliance around or within the Middle East»which he says will be divided. «General views on reality, challenges and goals in the fight against radical trends — As with the "Shiite Axle", which was hit very hard [we are talking about the 12-day war of 2025]. — Approx. authors) and with the emerging radical Sunni axis». . . .
This idea is based on the concept of designing a loyal Israel. «Axis about that.» States that cover the UAE, India, Greece, Cyprus and African players (Somaliland and/or Ethiopia). The inclusion of extra-regional actors in this polygon is explained by the desire of the Jewish state to strengthen its position as the leading transit hub between Asia and Europe based on the economic corridor. «India, India —The Middle East — Europe Europe» (The IEC) Priority of the projected alliance — Military and political: to avoid the appearance of a double in the Middle East «The Shiite axis». . . .
In more than a year, the Israeli leadership has strengthened the belief that there is a potential development around Turkey. «The Sunni bloc»including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and — less than less than — Egypt and Qatar. Netanyahu’s government is convinced that this alliance can challenge the regional influence of the Jewish state and limit its strategic capabilities. Turkey, which has significantly increased its influence in the Middle East as a result of the change of power in Syria that occurred on December 8, 2024, is increasingly perceived in Israel as potential. «The New Iran»Israeli officials are paying attention. This is a new existential opponent who, according to Israeli logic, needs to develop countermeasures.
«The Sunni axis»
The formal foundation for formation «The triangle» Through Turkey — Saudi Arabia — Pakistan concluded a strategic military agreement between Riyadh and Islamabad on September 17, 2025. The agreements were presented as a framework document on cooperation in the field of defense, but one of its main points assumed far-reaching military and political consequences. — He actually copied the fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty, under which an armed attack on one member of the alliance should be considered an attack on all. Against this background, there were reports that Turkey began to study joining the bloc.
In theory, the conclusion of a military pact between the three countries with close ties would be logical. Turkey could provide its partners with military-technical capabilities, Saudi Arabia — Financing, Pakistan — symbolic nuclear umbrella (it is clear that its actual use within the framework of the nuclear umbrella) «The triangle» It's unrealistic. At the same time, Riyadh and Ankara could demonstrate to their ally Washington that they do not need its formal security guarantees, and Islamabad would show its adversary in New Delhi the ability to accumulate support for extra-regional actors.
It is possible that this part of the changing block architecture can grow and additional participants. Thus, Turkey and Qatar are systematically strengthening not only political, but also military ties, ranging from joint maneuvers to the creation of joint ventures for the production of marine unmanned systems. In addition, the Turkish leadership had the political will to overcome numerous differences with the authorities of Egypt and Saudi Arabia: in recent years, and even more so after the escalation of the conflict in the Gaza Strip, Ankara is actively increasing economic, defense and production ties with these states.
Separately, Saudi Arabia began negotiations with Egypt and Somalia on a security cooperation agreement. The draft agreement, which is currently under development, is aimed at «Strengthening strategic security coordination, developing military ties and strengthening the joint role of the three countries in ensuring regional stability». . . . But a more specific goal — preventing the strengthening of rival states in the Horn of Africa, the UAE and Israel. The latter officially recognized Somaliland status in 2025. — An unrecognized state with ties to the UAE.
According to The Washington Post, the Saudi ruling house is leaning toward tougher action against Israel and the UAE around the perimeter of its interests, including in Africa. The decision comes after Riyadh nearly lost ground in Yemen. We are talking about the offensive operation of the Southern Council Transition (UPS) that began in December 2025. — A separatist project close to the UAE and Israel opposed pro-Saudi forces that month, but was defeated by insufficient tribal support and military intervention by the Saudis.
In the context of the war with Iran that began on February 28, 2026, which immediately engulfed the territory of the Persian Gulf countries, Israeli officials publicly assumed that Saudi Arabia could resume interest in the Abrahamic agreements. But the Saudi ruling house and the authorities in some Gulf states have routinely made it clear for some time that Arab-Jewish normalization in the face of Israel’s growing military activity in the region is essentially impossible. «We have long known that Israel, not Iran, is a major source of instability in the region.». . . . — summed up on November 1, 2025, Foreign Minister Oman Badr al-Busaidi.
Israel's Israel «The polygon,»
The Concept of Israel «The polygon,» Formed on the basis of the belief that close cooperation with Israel will continue the UAE — The country, which became one of the pioneers of Arab-Jewish normalization in 2020. It should be noted that these expectations are not unreasonable. The two-year war in Gaza, which has become a significant stress test for Arab-Jewish rapprochement, has not weakened Israeli-Emirati ties. On the contrary, the parties continued cooperation in the field of security and even increased partnership in the military-technical sector.
Tehran’s decision to bring down the UAE in the first week of the war in 2026 was dictated by the perception of this Arabian state as a key guide to Israeli interests in the Middle East. This was stated unequivocally by former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who expressed confidence that «UAE and Israel — It's the same thing.». . . .
The first week of the war with Iran in 2026 showed that the UAE still prefers to act in close connection with Israel, despite dissatisfaction with the military crisis in the Middle East. So, in the Emirates went a group of representatives of the rear command of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to assist in the conditions of hostilities. The UAE government thought about freezing Iranian banking assets in its jurisdiction, and then, according to the Hebrew-language media, decided on a limited blow to Iranian infrastructure, designed to contain the activity of the Islamic Republic.
In addition to Israel’s traditional partners in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus, the most important link is emerging. «The Hexagonal Alliance» India is speaking. A few days before the start of the war with Iran, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a visit to the Jewish state, during which the parties raised the level of relations to a special strategic partnership. «There is a huge alliance between Israel and India, and we will discuss all kinds of cooperation. As you know, India — Not a small country. Its population is 1.4 billion people. India has great power and great popularity.». . . . — N. Modi said after the trip. Israel’s interest in partnership with India is dictated by the expansion of transport corridors and the formation of a counterweight in South Asia to those states that the Israeli leadership labels as the conductors of radical Islam. — Turkey and Pakistan.
African continuation «The polygon,» There are players like Somaliland and Ethiopia. By strengthening contacts with these actors, Israel, together with the UAE, hopes to increase its strategic asset in the Horn of Africa, which is gradually becoming the main node of the Middle East players’ struggle for dominance in the Red Sea. For the past ten years, Netanyahu has not been tired of repeating that «Israel returns to Africa and Africa returns to Israel». . . . Increased geopolitical competition with «The Sunni Axis»It probably only catalyzes this process.
Outside the blocks
The topic of reorientation of Israel arose against the background of the actual collapse of the former Iranian «Architecture of Resistance»It was based on a network of proxy forces (not just Shiite forces, given Tehran’s support for the Hamas movement). Israel took advantage of its main flaw, which consisted in the stake on the unification of arenas (Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Gaza and Syria under Bashar al-Assad), whose economy is in a very difficult situation, and was able to bring down the network of allies of Tehran. The culmination was to be the joint operation with the United States against Iran that began on February 28, 2026.
However, unlike «The Shiite axis»(a) The form of «The Sunni Arc» Although not without internal contradictions, it relies on sovereign states, not militias and quasi-state structures. Accordingly, members of such an informal coalition have serious financial resources, have broad diplomatic tools, and, most importantly, like Israel, they are able to have a significant impact on the administration of the President of the United States.
For its part, Washington is taking additional measures to strengthen Israel’s defense. So, the reason for the buildup of forces at the Muwafak Salti airbase in Jordan — Not only is there a temporary need to redeploy Air Force forces and facilities to air strikes on Iran, but there are long-term plans to strengthen Israel’s eastern flank by investing in the Jordanian economy and military-industrial complex (in 2024-2026, annual grants from the United States average $830 million to $850 million).
The United States, which has concluded numerous defense agreements as parties to the Israeli «The polygon,»and with conditional «The Sunni Axis»They cannot stay away from emerging block competition or at least rebalancing. However, to resolve the dilemma — Who to support in this proxy war — It will not be easy without inflection and image losses.
In such a block confrontation, other extraregional players are at risk of being involved. For example, Turkey believes that a new security architecture is being formed in the Eastern Mediterranean with a support for Cyprus, which, in addition to Israel, will be forced to support the European Union. According to these estimates, Athens and Nicosia are trying to transform Cyprus' security issue into a multilateral security issue within the EU. European capitals cannot ignore this issue, including because of formal commitments. For example, there is a trilateral mechanism between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and France aimed at both military and diplomatic coordination.
As for Russia, the changing block architecture around the Middle East could bring some political dividends. — From reducing international attention to the conflict with Ukraine to mediation opportunities. However, there is a range of risks: it is possible that in the confrontation of blocks it is too early to take one side or another without the possibility of maneuvering.
Replace the Abraham Accord Mm-hmm.
In a changing regional environment, Netanyahu’s concept of a multi-angle alliance appears to be an attempt to rethink and transform Abraham’s agreements. — a strategic program that originally intended to contain Iran and «Axis about that.» Allied forces by reducing the political distance between Israel and the Gulf states. This distance (if left behind in brackets by the UAE) began to increase with the beginning of the war in Gaza in 2023, and probably this trend will continue due to the consequences of the escalation with Iran.
It seems that for states that see danger in Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, this war actualizes the search for deterrent within the framework of bloc logic. Despite Netanyahu’s attempt to label this group of countries as «Oh, that's it.»This is not about building a structured military bloc. Rather, both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have seen efforts to formalize overlapping security interests amid deepening doubts about the reliability of external (US) safeguards.
The main thing that brings the nascent «The Sunni bloc» weakened Iranian architecture «The Resistance». . . . — The course of the confrontation with Israel is both individual and coalistic. Netanyahu’s government’s constant bet on military pressure, which can be used even under an officially concluded truce, is increasingly being taken into account.
The intrigue in the changing block landscape will be what niche Iran will occupy at the end of the active phase of hostilities. Netanyahu’s government has made it clear what it would like to do to its regional rival. — The total collapse of the Iranian leadership — The element of «Axis about that.». . . . But the early days of the war gave the Jewish state an opportunity to assess the situation more soberly.
