The U.S. failure to control the consequences of a war with Iran is pushing regional powers toward deeper defense cooperation. Saudi Arabia and the Turkish fighter KAAN: a new challenge to Washington? Reports of Saudi interest in supporting the development and possible acquisition of Turkey’s fifth-generation KAAN fighter have raised concerns in Washington.
Hana Elshehabi, Fellow of the Foreign Policy Program of the Middle East Global Affairs Council
Source: Source: newarab.com
U.S. officials have expressed dissatisfaction with Riyadh’s exploration of alternative advanced aviation capabilities, particularly following a 2025 agreement to supply the kingdom with Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II, according to sources.
These processes have taken on new urgency after a war involving Israel, the United States and Iran that is changing regional security calculus. In an increasingly volatile environment, regional states are looking for suppliers that offer advanced technology, know-how transfer and local production opportunities.
U.S. push for greater burden-sharing among allies — Another factor is pushing regional powers toward alternative partnerships. In the end, however, it could cost America its dominance of regional arms markets.
Reassessing the Middle East’s Place in US Strategy
Along with calling for a reduction in the global military presence, the Trump administration has defined the Middle East as a region of diminished strategic importance.
The 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly states that turning the US into a net energy exporter reduces the region’s strategic importance. This shift, in turn, has prompted regional powers to diversify partners and procurement strategies.
For Saudi Arabia, this has resulted in increased cooperation with regional and external players such as Turkey and Pakistan. But this diversification effort is not aimed at severing relations with Washington, but at adapting to the new strategic reality.
Both Ankara and Islamabad maintain strong ties with the United States. The resumption of talks on Turkey’s possible return to the F-35 program underscores the strengthening of bilateral relations. Similarly, relations between Pakistan and the US have expanded significantly since President Trump’s re-election.
But the U.S. inability to control the regional fallout from a war with Iran could push regional states to seek security elsewhere.
«The U.S. prioritized the defense of Israel during the [Israeli-American-Iranian] war, and it will change the strategic outlook of the Gulf states.». — Barin Kayaoğlu, associate professor at the Institute of Regional Studies at Ankara University of Social Sciences, explained to The New Arab.
Riyadh Balancing: Between Washington and New Partners
Saudi Arabia’s diversification strategy is carefully calibrated to maintain security relations with Washington, while expanding partnerships. The announcement of a mutual defense agreement between the kingdom and Pakistan exemplifies this approach, reflecting Riyadh’s desire to implement burden-sharing in a changing regional environment.
However, diversification efforts face limitations when they run counter to U.S. interests. Saudi Arabia’s interest in acquiring the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 fighter jets has reportedly faced resistance, underscoring Washington’s opposition to integrating Chinese-origin systems into Gulf defenses. Riyadh’s procurement strategy thus depends on balancing diversification and «red-line» Washington.
«Washington does not seem to mind Riyadh’s participation in the KAAN project, provided that Saudi Arabia also acquires the F-35.». — Ragip Soylu, head of Turkey’s Middle East Eye bureau, told TNA.
Despite these contradictions, the United States remains the region’s preferred security partner due to decades of institutional integration, interoperability, and built-in defense infrastructure. However, the burden-sharing promoted by the US inevitably creates friction, as diversification can reduce Washington’s leverage over regional procurement decisions.
U.S. Dominance in Arms Markets Continues
Washington faces a complex strategic dilemma. On the one hand, «umbrella» U.S. security continues to be a defining feature of the Gulf security architecture. On the other hand, growing doubts about the reliability of the US as a guarantor, compounded by the heightened sense of insecurity caused by a war involving Israel, the US and Iran, as well as Washington’s pivot to the Western Hemisphere, have accelerated the strategies of hedging regional powers.
Riyadh’s study of Turkey’s fifth-generation fighter fully fits into this dynamic. In 2025, Washington tentatively agreed to sell the F-35 to Saudi Arabia, but the deal is complicated by significant restrictions. The main thing. — Concerns about maintaining Israel’s qualitative military superiority (QME), a commitment that any transfer of advanced American systems must preserve Israel’s military superiority in the region.
Thus, a potential sale of the F-35 to Saudi Arabia is likely to include aircraft with relatively limited capabilities and severe limitations on future modifications, reducing the recipient’s operational autonomy. Given these limitations, Riyadh is forced to look for partners offering access to cutting-edge capabilities with fewer restrictions.
Saudi Arabia's participation in the Turkish program «stealth»A fighter opens up opportunities for technology transfer and co-production, and full co-production will require a degree of flexibility and trust on both sides that seems to have yet to be achieved. Besides, «Turkey’s fighter program is progressing well, but is not yet ready to surpass American capabilities. Turkey will probably take five to ten years to match some of the US missile defense platforms.». — Soyle told TNA.
Alternatives and precedents
Even before showing interest in KAAN, Saudi Arabia was exploring the possibility of joining the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP). — The initiative to create a sixth-generation fighter under the leadership of Britain, Italy and Japan. It was reported that Japan opposed Riyadh’s participation, citing concerns about export controls. More recently, the UK has renewed calls for Saudi Arabia to participate in the consortium amid financial constraints and delays in developing the programme.
Riyadh is also mindful of complications that could delay or disrupt the sale of the F-35, despite preliminary agreements. In 2021, Abu Dhabi also struck a deal: The U.S. initially approved the sale of the F-35, but the agreement eventually collapsed due to Washington's concerns about Chinese technology in the UAE's networks, and then the Emirates' frustration with the process.
This precedent raises the appeal of alternatives that could contribute to the modernization of Saudi Arabia’s air force. Through the joint development and acquisition of KAAN, Ankara is offering Riyadh potential industrial participation, greater flexibility in technology transfer and less politically imposed operational constraints. It is also in line with the Kingdom’s ambitious goals. «Vision 2030»The goal is to localize 50% of military spending by 2030.
While the U.S. is increasingly open to limited technology transfer and support for local manufacturing, its partners are demanding more. In the short term, these developments pose no immediate threat, given Washington’s dominance of the regional arms market. Between 2021 and 2025, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that Saudi Arabia was the largest recipient of U.S. arms, accounting for 12% of all U.S. arms shipments.
The cost of curtailing presence
Washington should carefully weigh the strategic trade-offs laid down in its policy of greater burden-sharing. The kingdom’s drive for modernization, a growing national defense industrial base, and efforts to reduce strategic dependence on any single external supplier are steadily advancing its diversification program and expanding avenues for alternative security partnerships.
A war involving Israel, the U.S., and Iran is also likely to push regional tensions. «The two countries are focusing on strengthening their defense capabilities and expanding discussions on creating a regional security system involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and possibly Egypt.». — Ali Bakir, assistant professor of international relations, security and defense at Qatar University, told TNA.
These processes are underpinned by the growing deployment and apparent effectiveness of advanced non-Western systems in combat. For example, Pakistan’s use of Chinese J-10C fighter jets during the confrontation with India in May 2025 and the UAE’s use of South Korea’s Cheongung-II air defense system to intercept Iranian attacks underscore the operational viability of alternative platforms.
As these systems build up their combat experience, the appeal of tightly conditioned and restrictive U.S. arms supplies may diminish. Gradually, this space could be filled by deeper cooperation between regional defense modernization partners.
