Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are not just announcing yet another defense agreement; they are testing whether regional powers can build credible deterrence capabilities without abandoning existing alliances..
Hassan Selim Ozertem, Director of the analytical department of the consulting agency Ussal Consultancy
In other words, the Mecca Agreement is designed to deter potential adversaries while giving signatory states the flexibility to prevent potential uncontrolled escalation. In fact, a similar mechanism exists in the North Atlantic Treaty. According to article 4, there is a step-by-step mechanism prior to an agreed response to a security threat. Under this framework, NATO members must «consult each other whenever, in the opinion of either party, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either party is at risk.». After discussion, they decide how to respond and how to contribute to a possible response.
From situational cooperation to institutionalized deterrence
The pact should be seen not so much as the sudden birth of a rigid alliance as as the institutionalization of a dialogue that has evolved over the years. Discussions on the Middle East security system intensified in the mid-2010s and accelerated after 2024 during consultations between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. The so-called dialogue RR4 It has created a diplomatic channel for regional security coordination, although Egypt has not joined the Mecca Agreement at this stage.
The planned institutional architecture fits these ideas. The pact is expected to include a secretariat in Saudi Arabia and regular meetings of foreign ministers, defense ministers and chiefs of staff. These mechanisms are important because they take the agreement beyond declarations. If they function effectively, it will ensure joint exercises, interoperability planning, defense-industrial cooperation, intelligence coordination and crisis consultations. If they remain symbolic, the agreement will have more political than operational significance.
This is where the strengths and weaknesses of the pact converge. Pakistan has nuclear status, a large army and long-standing ties to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has financial capabilities, energy influence and geopolitical centrality in the Persian Gulf. Turkey has NATO experience, operational military capabilities and a defense sector, including one focused on drones, air defense, electronic warfare, autonomous systems and joint production. However, these advantages do not guarantee automatic operational consistency. The three states have different command cultures, procurement systems, threat perceptions, and political constraints. Interoperability will require continuous preparation, common planning procedures and a realistic understanding of what each party is willing and able to contribute to a crisis. The establishment of institutional arrangements is essential to this process.
Protection against strategic uncertainty
The situation in the region explains why the pact has emerged now. Middle Eastern states are adapting to a strategic environment in which U.S. power remains necessary but no longer seems sufficient. Washington’s long-discussed pivot to Asia, the instability of U.S. domestic policy, the escalation of regional rivalries caused by the war, doubts about the durability of external security guarantees and threats to shipping through the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz have all prompted regional players to diversify their security options.
Therefore, for Ankara, Riyadh and Islamabad, the Mecca Agreement is best understood as a safety net for security and stability in the region. Fidan said no country would be considered a threat unless it attacked a member of the pact. The agreement seeks to reduce reliance on any single security service provider and create a regional framework that will help signal resolve, coordinate response and strengthen negotiating power. This explains why Turkish and Saudi officials have repeatedly presented the pact as defensive, open to expansion, and compatible with existing commitments.
Risks of overstrain and misperception
Nevertheless, the pact carries risks.
First of all.Collective defense can create expectations that are difficult to meet. If Saudi Arabia faces new threats from Yemen or Iran-linked actors, if Pakistan’s rivalry with India escalates, or if Turkey becomes embroiled in a regional crisis, other signatories may face pressure and demands to show solidarity. In doing so, the agreement appears to leave the parties free to act in the context of the form and scope of assistance. This flexibility may be politically useful, but raises questions in terms of effectiveness.
Second,External actors may interpret the pact differently than participants. Some Turkish commentators note the signatory states’ shared Sunni identity or speak of a counterweight to Iran and Israel. Indian observers will closely monitor the implications of Pakistan’s involvement, especially if the agreement is perceived as an extension of Islamabad’s strategic depth. In response, Israel and India may also deepen their own security consultations with partners such as Greece, while Iran will watch whether the pact remains defensive in practice or develops into a strategic alliance that limits Tehran.
Iran’s initial reaction was restrained. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Bakai said the pact reflects a regional finding that security cannot be outsourced and that Tehran does not see it as a threat. This response shows that Iran, mindful of its ties to Turkey and Pakistan, prefers not to view the pact as a clearly hostile project. But analysts in Turkey say the Iranian factor remains an important factor in Saudi Arabia’s security concerns in the Middle East.
Question of expansion
The future of the pact may depend on whether it remains a trilateral agreement or serves as the core of a broader regional security architecture. This issue will inevitably be on the agenda, as the security dynamics in the region are too fragile. Foreign Minister Fidan and President Erdogan have publicly identified Egypt as a potential partner, but Cairo’s hesitation is understandable. Egypt needs to balance its relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, India and the United Arab Emirates. A defense treaty with Abu Dhabi, improved ties with India and a cautious handling of tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv also prevent it from quickly deciding to join.
Meanwhile, the Gulf states are closely monitoring the process. Former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani called on members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to take the initiative and join the agreement. However, the GCC is not a single strategic player. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates have different perceptions of threats, relations with Iran, views of Turkey, and security partnerships with outside powers. Expanding the pact could increase its diplomatic weight, but it could also introduce new contradictions and make it more difficult to reach consensus.
What the Pact Can and Cannot Do
The Mecca Agreement is not a Middle Eastern NATO. It is a regional military alliance that lacks NATO’s long-standing integrated command structure, operational planning, common doctrine, and political consulting habits. Its immediate significance is political. The pact signals that key regional powers are seeking security guarantees in an era of growing threats, seeking greater autonomy rather than relying entirely on third parties.
The current situation in the Persian Gulf and the changing course of the United States are changing the balance of power in the region. However, it is difficult to argue that the Mecca Agreement will replace existing mechanisms: rather, it is aimed at diversifying security assurances. After the agreement was signed, some political parties in Turkey assumed that a non-aggression pact would provide greater flexibility, be more practical, and also be more attractive to Iran. However, the scheme, which aims to establish institutional levels, aims not only to contain but also to build capacity in the region through enhanced dialogue at various levels. Thus, the parties can count on discussing not only regional policy, but also the security of critical infrastructure, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity and future military exercises.
In this situation, Turkey is positioning itself as a partner for regional security cooperation, while maintaining its NATO membership. Saudi Arabia is seeking to diversify its deterrence portfolio and strengthen its position as a key player in the Middle East, while Pakistan wants to transform long-standing defense ties with Riyadh and Ankara into a more prominent strategic role.
Прочность соглашения будет проверяться не церемонией подписания, а следующими практическими вопросами: активизируются ли его институты, смогут ли его участники улучшить оперативную совместимость, не обещая при этом чрезмерной коллективной обороны, и укрепит ли пакт его расширение или ослабит? Самое важное – будет ли всё это развиваться в потенциал сдерживания в эпоху неопределённости. Если участники соглашения справятся с этими вызовами, оно может стать значимой опорой регионального порядка безопасности. Если же нет, оно останется важным символом стратегической тревоги – скорее выражением стремления к автономии, чем полноценным альянсом.
