Over the past few years, a critical change in the state of the Taiwan issue has been the subject of public expert debate. We are witnessing perhaps the first real possibility of reunifying China diplomatically, while reuniting against its traditional adversary.
specifically for ISGS
Emil Etibar oglu BayramovAssistant to the Head of the International Affairs Committee of the State Duma
The significant deterioration of relations between the two banks of the Strait is accompanied by a new establishment of official relations between the island and the United States. This phenomenon has many dimensions and includes the resumption of official political relations between the United States and the Republic of China, the official recognition of the presence of American troops on the island and plans to increase them, as well as the establishment of mechanisms for permanent financial, military and international support for Taipei.
Systematic changes in China’s policy towards the island can be reduced to the following new constants:
1. China’s non-recognition of the existence of a median line (de facto border in the strait) since 2022.
2. Regular large-scale undeclared military exercises in the strait and a permanent PLA Air Force presence in the Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone on a daily basis since 2022.
3. In December 2025, the PLA of China during exercises «Justice Mission 2025» For the first time, she simulated a scenario of a complete encirclement of the island, including a possible military clash with the United States.
4. Increased activity opportunities in the gray area — A record increase in the number of patents in China for means of neutralizing underwater communications infrastructure.
It should be noted that only part of the above measures by the PRC in 1995-96 led to the latest crisis in the strait and the involvement of the US Indo-Pacific Command in countering the People’s Liberation Army of China in order to preserve the status quo in the region.
The evolution of the conflict clearly indicates a new phase of Chinese policy, which in 2021 prompted the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command to inform Congress that a military solution to the Taiwan issue is likely to begin within three to five years.
At the same time, the political problem of Taiwan is considered deliberately in terms of an interlocking spiral of escalation, but recognizing the huge role of political interaction and common goals of the mainland and the island, as manifested by the visit of the Chairman of the Kuomintang Party Zheng Liwen to the mainland.
The Kuomintang Party, which has firmly established the role of the leading opposition force in the Legislative Yuan, not only declares goals that are directly opposite to the program of the Democratic Progressive Party (supporters of the declaration of independence and its own separation from historical China), but also through dialogue with the PRC becomes a conductor of de-escalation in the Strait.
Despite attention to the military escalation in the strait, one of the most radical changes in the evolution of the conflict may be the new party program of the Kuomintang, which is becoming increasingly critical of the policy of the United States of America towards the island.
It should be noted separately that the new course of the Kuomintang, expressed in conditional support for the mainland and in doubt in the United States as the guarantor of security, is only one of the points of view within the party, but its supporters are expanding their influence.
Most of the agreements and compromises reached during the meetings of representatives of Chinese parties at various levels are reduced to the elimination of economic problems. «punishment» The administration of the island for steps towards escalation with China, while the Kuomintang acts as an instrument for stabilizing trade and financial relations with the mainland, which could be a harbinger of an electoral shift in local elections in Taiwan as early as 2026.
Based on the existing CPC-Komintang contacts, which have been carried out on a regular basis for many years, we can talk about accelerating economic diplomacy to strengthen the pro-Chinese Kuomintang faction, 30% of the island’s population has been involved in economic relations with the mainland for several decades. The PRC gave guarantees not only to protect Taiwan's market share on the mainland, but also pledged to take measures to facilitate the entry of small island enterprises to the mainland.
Taken together, all measures point to China’s unwillingness to engage in direct military conflict in the medium term, especially in the context of the following:
Representatives of the CCP and the Kuomintang agreed to cooperate in studying and disseminating information about the anti-Japanese resistance war. This paragraph expresses what really worries former enemies who have already united against the intervention of militarized Japan in the cause of unification of China.
In the context of China’s domestic discourse on Japanese atrocities, which will also now be broadcast to Taiwan through cinema (which was also agreed during the meeting), it can be concluded that the two parties have reached such a consensus on many issues that Japan’s growing military potential, hints of abandoning the foundations of nuclear non-proliferation, the gradual removal of legislative barriers from potential participation in aggressive wars can unite opponents for a third time in a single coalition.
The international dimension of the Sino-Japanese standoff is directly projected on an island where the DPP enjoys traditional Japanese support, acting as a force that has already acquired its own island identity with the help of Japan. Thus, the party balance on the island is a confrontation between Japan and China, where the United States traditionally acts as a mediator.
In this perspective, the Kuomintang will become increasingly oriented toward the CCP and China, facing hostile anti-Chinese attitudes from Japan’s right-wing forces.
The most important development of events is the full recognition of Zheng Liwen consensus in 1992, the former position of the Kuomintang functionaries was a different interpretation of the one-China principle, which gave diplomatic space for the Republic of China to refuse negotiations on unification with the PRC.
We are witnessing perhaps the first real possibility of reunifying China diplomatically, while reuniting against its traditional adversary.
