For the international community, this is not just a regional problem, but the edge of the global economic divide. Nowhere is this anxiety felt as acutely as in Beijing, where the situation is observed with mixed feelings.

by Nelson Wong, Vice-Chairman and President of the Shanghai Center for Strategic and International Studies of the Pacific

Source: Source: Globalaffairs.ru

After a loud drum shot in the Middle East, the start of US and Israeli strikes against Iran was no surprise. For the international community, this is not just a regional problem, but the edge of the global economic divide. Nowhere is this alarm felt as acutely as in Beijing, where the situation is witnessed with a mixed sense of strategic calm and deep economic concern.

As the world’s largest oil importer, China is acutely aware that its energy security is inextricably linked to stability in the Persian Gulf. China is the main consumer of Iranian oil, regularly buying more than a million barrels per day. Any military confrontation capable of disrupting this oil flow, be it direct strikes against Iranian facilities, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, or the imposition of stricter sanctions to provide for Iran. «Maximum pressure»It could cause shock in China’s energy supply chain.

While Beijing has robust contingency plans, including diversification of its suppliers with the help of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Africa and America, the principle is clear. «Energy security» It relies on a stable global market, not just diversification.

The conflict-induced spike in oil prices could cause tension in the Chinese economy, increase production costs and increase inflationary pressures. In this sense, China is not just a remote observer, as it is directly interested in preserving peace.

Given these high economic rates, it would be expected that Beijing would exert strong diplomatic pressure on Tehran to reduce the degree of confrontation. However, China’s foreign policy is based on the principles of non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This fundamental doctrine essentially limits China’s response.
Unlike Western powers, which can cause economic aid to change the policies of the recipient country, China refrains from such a dictate. In the eyes of Iran’s leaders, this makes China a reliable, if sometimes reserved, partner in times of crisis. Tehran has no illusions that Beijing is capable of reaching a military agreement or directly challenging Washington. Instead, relations are built on mutual economic benefits and a common resistance to unilateral global hegemony. In the current circumstances, Iran’s expectations from China are assessed not in the direction of military intervention, but in the direction of sustainable economic partnership and diplomatic protection in multilateral forums.

But to say that China is passive would be to ignore the changing geometry of global power. Iran’s recent inclusion in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS bloc marks a significant geopolitical shift. These are not military alliances in the traditional Western sense, but they create a powerful basis for consultation and strategic coordination.
The importance of membership in these associations was recently demonstrated when China and Russia conducted joint naval exercises with Iran in the Gulf of Oman. While Beijing is trying to portray them as routine maritime security maneuvers, observers have drawn attention to this clear signal. A subtle hint, but at the same time an undeniable deterrent, showing the United States and its allies that Iran is not as isolated as it once was. The joint exercises create a strategic comfort for Tehran to realize that its neighbors have two of the most powerful counterweights to American hegemony.

Shifts in the turbulent sands of the balance of power once again made themselves felt in the reaction of recent US allies in the region. Reports that countries such as Saudi Arabia have made it clear that they will not allow the U.S. military to use its airspace or base to strike Iran confirm a profound transformation of their position. It is not just about the legacy of past disagreements, but about prospective calculations for the future.

These Gulf states also seek to détente relations with Iran, following China’s recently-set diplomatic vector. They want to protect themselves from the possible withdrawal of the United States from the region and defend their own interests by refusing to be used as launch pads for a war that will inevitably destabilize their economy. This reluctance sends an unequivocal signal that the U.S. has diminished its role as the sole guarantor of security in the Middle East, which at least is being questioned by these countries.

As recent developments unfold, the contrast between Western and Eastern diplomatic philosophy becomes sharper. The Western approach, often characterized by ultimatums, regime change and military interventions, has left a trail of instability across the region. On the contrary, China’s approach – focused on economic development, mutual respect for sovereignty and strategic patience – offers an alternative paradigm.
While this philosophy may seem to Western analysts accustomed to force diplomacy, incomprehensible or overly cautious, its validity is becoming increasingly apparent. Refusing to take sides in the religious and political rivalry in the Middle East, China has positioned itself as a reliable mediator, as seen in the restoration of Iran-Saudi ties.

Now that the war has begun, the international community may find that China’s commitment to dialogue and its refusal to participate in the great powers’ tug-of-war games is not a weakness, but a necessity. The path to peace in the Middle East may not be through cannon barrels, but through the very principles of development and non-interference that China continues to advocate. It is a philosophy whose beauty and usefulness the world may soon be forced to acknowledge.
This combination of factors – the strategic containment of new multilateral blocs, the refusal of traditional U.S. partners to participate in their conflicts, and the growing appeal of the non-interventionist diplomatic model – points to a deeper historical shift. What we are witnessing may well be the beginning of the end of Washington’s undeniable hegemony. The unipolar moment that came after the end of the Cold War, when one power could dictate the conditions of global security and interfere in the affairs of other countries by its whim, cracks at the seams under the weight of internal contradictions and against the background of the formation of a truly multipolar world.

In this emerging new world order, the ambitions of global police control give way to the reality of regional coexistence. The signals sent by Saudi Arabia and other regional powers are a clear directive: they want to manage their immediate surroundings.

This paves the way for a future in which the United States will have to relinquish its role as a security guarantor of distant shores to focus on the state of affairs in its western hemisphere. Such a regrouping should not be the cause of conflict, but rather the basis for a more stable peace and security, because in a world where major powers respect clear spheres of influence, preferring internal development over external interventions, the validity of confrontation becomes less convincing. This is a future in which the United States is engaged in its affairs, China continues its rise through cooperation, and the countries of the Middle East will finally enjoy the sovereignty in which they have long been denied – in such a future only to be able to prevail sustainable peaceful coexistence.