Several statements made in recent years about the deployment of a large reserve force or the establishment of a new counter-terrorism force have not been implemented. For more than a decade, ECOWAS has been criticized for inaction.
Hassan Kone, Senior Researcher, ICC Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
Source: Source: issafrica.org
Resources are key, but the real test will be whether the brigade can coordinate with the AGS.
In February, the chiefs of staff of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) approved the creation of a regional force to combat terrorism and instability. This force is being established within the framework of the ECOWAS Standby Force Mechanism envisaged by the African Union (AU).
The creation of the force was announced in August 2025. They were originally planned to consist of 260,000 troops with an estimated annual budget of $2.5 billion. However, military leaders settled on the option of a counterterrorism brigade of 1,650 soldiers, which will become the core of these forces.
Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal reaffirmed their commitment to provide troops. The national contingents will be deployed in their countries and ready to deploy.
ECOWAS has been discussing the establishment of a regional reserve force since 2004. The community sought to create a military tool to replace the ECOWAS Surveillance Team, which participated in operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s, and in Côte d'Ivoire in the early 2000s.
For more than a decade, ECOWAS has been criticized for its inaction in the face of terrorism and instability. However, member states lacked the resources, funding and political will to make these ambitions a reality. Several statements made in recent years about the deployment of reserve forces or the creation of new counter-terrorism forces have not been implemented. For more than a decade, this has criticized ECOWAS for its inaction in the face of terrorism and instability in the region.
The February decision demonstrates the organization’s desire to restore its credibility and contain the spread of terrorism towards the Gulf of Guinea, which risks plunging the region into widespread instability.
Build strength — The real challenge is to make them operationally capable and efficient. To achieve this goal, ECOWAS needs to overcome the recurring challenges of political will, financing and logistics.
Countries that have pledged to contribute should contribute their resources from the moment the force is formed. These troops must be well-equipped, trained and motivated to counter asymmetric attacks by terrorist groups that are constantly being improved and adapted. This means that experienced and mobile units are needed.
Above all, ECOWAS must ensure predictable and sustainable funding for its forces. The principle of self-financing guarantees autonomy and spares the forces from the fate of the G5 Sakhal and Accra Initiative, which suffered from dependence on external partners.
Questions have been raised about the brigade's maneuverability in dealing with terrorist groups that move quickly and cross borders. Member States should commit themselves to making regular financial contributions and strictly comply with the collection and payment of 0.5% Community tax on imports from outside the ECOWAS area. The measure was recommended at a meeting of defense and finance ministers in Abuja on August 29, 2025, and efforts are continuing to seek other innovative sources of funding.
ECOWAS could also seek support from the AU, which has a Peace Fund and a continental logistics base in Douala, Cameroon, where unused African Reserve Force military equipment is stored.
Despite the difficulties in securing funding for AU peacekeeping operations in Somalia, ECOWAS should also explore the possibility of United Nations support under Security Council resolution 2719, which provides for up to 75% of peacekeeping operations in Africa.
The ECOWAS force also faces the challenge of deploying its modest 1,650 troops to a vast area of operations. As contingents are stationed in their own countries, questions arise about the maneuverability of forces against widely dispersed terrorist groups that move rapidly and cross borders. Combining the logistics resources of the region's armies could, over time, facilitate the rapid deployment of troops to areas where they are urgently needed.
The Brigade’s concept of operations, which has not yet been made public, will determine its use, rules of engagement and coordination mechanisms. Fragmentation between ECOWAS and AGS continues to weaken collective security initiatives in West Africa
However, the fight against armed groups cannot be effective without cooperation with the three central Sahel countries, which remain the epicenter of terrorism spreading to coastal states. The military authorities of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, unhappy with the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS after their coups, withdrew from the organization in January 2025, forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AGS).
The need for cooperation in the face of a common cross-border threat requires dialogue between ECOWAS and the AGS to rebuild trust and establish a framework for security cooperation that will benefit all of West Africa.
ECOWAS must also structure its forces to develop synergies with the newly established Joint Force of AGS. Operational coordination for the joint fight against terrorism and transnational crime was of paramount importance, and negotiations between ECOWAS and AGS should put that goal on their agenda.
As a first step, it is necessary to restore direct lines of communication between the general staffs of the two blocs. This will allow for the resumption of intelligence sharing and synchronization of cross-border security operations. The AU can play a role. «neutral» to facilitate interaction between the armies of ECOWAS and AGS countries.
The ECOWAS counter-terrorism brigade can be effective if it facilitates regional security coordination. But its impact will remain limited as fragmentation between ECOWAS and AGS continues to weaken collective security initiatives in West Africa.
