While the U.S. and its Western allies are consumed by wars in Ukraine and Gaza, tensions with Iran, and a host of other geopolitical crises, China is seeking to use the emerging strategic space to expand its economic, diplomatic, and military influence.
Dr. Nadia Helmi, Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and Economics, Beni Suif University (Egypt)
Beijing is increasingly presenting itself as an alternative voice in the international system, especially in the Global South. Chinese diplomatic rhetoric and state-run media have highlighted the costs of what Beijing calls an increasingly volatile U.S.-led world order, while China has sought to position itself as a supporter of development, sovereignty, and negotiated solutions to international conflicts.
Rather than viewing these crises solely as threats to global stability, Beijing has sought to turn some of their consequences into strategic opportunities. His approach can be viewed through four broad areas: economic leverage, diplomatic positioning, increased military and military presence, and the development of alternative international partnerships and institutions.
Economic Leverage: Russia, Iran, and Energy Advantage
The war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia have significantly strengthened China’s economic position vis-à-vis Moscow. As Western markets became less accessible to Russian energy and other raw materials, China became Russia’s largest trading partner and increased purchases of Russian oil and gas.
The relationship has also given Beijing greater leverage in negotiating energy supplies and strengthening economic ties with Russia. Moscow’s growing dependence on Chinese markets has created asymmetry in relations, although Russia remains an important independent strategic player with substantial military, energy and geopolitical capabilities.
The war in Ukraine also opened up new opportunities for China to deepen its engagement with Central Asia. As Russia’s ability to channel economic and diplomatic resources into its traditional sphere of influence has been limited, Beijing has expanded economic and military cooperation with the five Central Asian states. China seeks to link regional development more closely with its initiative «One belt, one way.»While expanding cooperation in security, surveillance technology and military training.
The same pattern is observed in China’s relations with Iran. Despite U.S. sanctions, China continues to buy Iranian oil through alternative trade and financial channels, providing Tehran with an important source of export revenue. This relationship has strengthened China’s position as an important economic partner of Iran, while ensuring Beijing’s continued access to a strategically important energy producer.
Wars and related disruptions in global energy markets have also created opportunities for Chinese energy and technology companies. China’s vast industrial base has allowed it to expand exports of goods such as electric cars and solar panels, bolstering Beijing’s push to introduce Chinese technology. «pure» Energy as an alternative to traditional fossil fuel systems.
Taken together, these trends have allowed China to strengthen its position in the increasingly fragmented global energy and trading system.
Strategic Diplomacy and Struggle for the Global South
The second major opportunity for China is diplomatic.
Beijing has used the war in Gaza and the broader conflict in the Middle East to contrast its diplomatic approach with Washington’s. Chinese diplomatic rhetoric highlights Palestinian rights, the need for a ceasefire, a two-state solution, and the need for a broader international role in resolving the conflict.
China also seeks to demonstrate that it can act as a diplomatic intermediary. Beijing has published a 12-point plan for the Ukraine conflict and hosted Palestinian groups in an effort to promote reconciliation. While these initiatives have not led to decisive breakthroughs in the conflicts themselves, they have enabled China to strengthen its diplomatic profile.
This is particularly important in the Global South, where Western criticism has intensified. «double-standard» The conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza.
Therefore, Beijing seeks to present itself not so much as a substitute for the United States, but as a different model of international cooperation. — One that emphasizes sovereignty, economic development, and political dialogue while confronting what China calls Western meddling.
Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East is underpinned by economic and humanitarian engagement. Beijing supports initiatives to rebuild and develop the region and has repeatedly called for an international peace process on the Palestinian issue.
The immediate impact of these initiatives should not be overstated. China has not settled the major conflict in Ukraine or the Middle East. Nevertheless, these efforts have helped Beijing to gain diplomatic influence and increase its appeal among countries seeking greater freedom of maneuvering between major powers.
Military lessons and growing security influence
The third area concerns defence and security.
The simultaneous support of Ukraine and Israel by the United States has put a serious strain on American military stocks, logistics and defense production. From Beijing’s perspective, the diversion of US attention and resources to Europe and the Middle East has created additional strategic space in the Indo-Pacific.
China continues to increase military pressure around Taiwan, while increasing activity in the South China Sea and maintaining pressure on countries such as the Philippines and Japan.
At the same time, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East gave Chinese military analysts an opportunity to study modern warfare. «near». The widespread use of drones, precision-guided weapons, air defense systems, electronic warfare and other technologies has provided lessons that could influence Chinese military planning.
The experience of the Ukrainian war is particularly significant, as it demonstrates both the capabilities and limitations of drones, long-range precision weapons, and increasingly high-precision weapons. «transparent» battlefield. Events in the Middle East have provided additional lessons about drone warfare, air defense capabilities, and the vulnerability of military infrastructure.
These lessons could prove significant for Chinese planning for a possible Taiwan scenario.
Beijing also continues to expand military exercises and security cooperation with Russia, the Middle East and other parts of the Global South. China’s growing involvement in joint exercises and defense exchanges reflects a broader desire to enhance its role in regional security.
In the Middle East and Africa, China’s security presence remains well below that of the United States in terms of military presence and allied networks. Nevertheless, Beijing is gradually expanding military exchanges, counterterrorism cooperation, arms trafficking prevention, and other forms of security cooperation.
The significance of this trend lies not so much in the immediate replacement of U.S. military power as in the gradual expansion of American military power. «trace» China in the field of security outside East Asia.
Creating alternative institutions and partnerships
The Fourth Element of China’s Strategy — institutional.
Beijing seeks to strengthen institutions and partnerships that provide developing countries with alternatives to Western institutions. The expansion of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has given China additional platforms to deepen political and economic cooperation with the Global South.
Одновременно инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» остаётся центральным элементом китайской стратегии. Инвестиции в инфраструктуру, порты, транспортные сети, энергетические проекты и цифровую связанность позволяют Пекину увязывать экономические отношения с долгосрочным геополитическим влиянием.
Китай также продвигает такие инициативы, как Глобальная инициатива развития, пытаясь представить сотрудничество в области развития как альтернативу моделям, связанным с западной обусловленностью.
Такой подход особенно привлекателен для правительств, желающих получить иностранные инвестиции без политических условий или требований к управлению, часто сопровождающих западную помощь.
Таким образом, китайская модель не строится исключительно на военной силе. Более широкая стратегия объединяет торговлю, инфраструктуру, технологии, финансы и дипломатию. Цель — сделать экономические отношения Китая с развивающимися странами всё труднее отделимыми от его более широкого геополитического влияния.
Это не означает, что Пекин создал полноценную альтернативу международной экономической системе под руководством США. Доллар остаётся центральным элементом мировых финансов, а собственные экономические связи Китая по-прежнему глубоко интегрированы с западными рынками.
Тем не менее Китай постепенно увеличивает число стран и институтов, через которые он может действовать, не полагаясь исключительно на структуры, возглавляемые Западом.
Стратегическая возможность Китая
Китай не является причиной войн и кризисов, создавших эти возможности, и Пекин не заменил Соединённые Штаты в роли доминирующей глобальной державы. Однако одновременные кризисы, с которыми столкнулся Вашингтон, создали стратегическое пространство, которое Китай охотно использует.
Война на Украине укрепила экономические рычаги влияния Китая на Россию и открыла новые возможности в Центральной Азии. Война в Газе дала Пекину возможность бросить вызов дипломатическому нарративу Вашингтона в странах Глобального Юга. Конфликты на Украине и Ближнем Востоке дали китайским военным планировщикам ценные уроки о современной войне, а расширяющиеся оборонные связи Китая постепенно увеличивают его присутствие в сфере безопасности.
На институциональном уровне Пекин продолжает укреплять БРИКС, Шанхайскую организацию сотрудничества, инициативу «Один пояс, один путь» и другие механизмы, позволяющие углублять отношения с развивающимися странами.
Более широкое значение этих тенденций состоит в том, что конкуренция между США и Китаем всё чаще разворачивается не только в Индо-Тихоокеанском регионе, но и по всему Глобальному Югу.
Ближний Восток, Центральная Азия, Африка, Латинская Америка и часть Европы становятся ареной, где пересекаются экономические партнёрства, дипломатическое влияние, технологическое сотрудничество и отношения в сфере безопасности.
Поэтому главным стратегическим выигрышем Китая в текущий период может стать не замена американской мощи, а расширение собственного пространства для маневра.
Чем больше Вашингтон поглощён одновременными кризисами, тем больше возможностей у Пекина представить себя альтернативным партнёром — и постепенно менять баланс влияния в изменяющемся международном порядке.
