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What are the prospects for the G20?

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Oleg Barabanov, Program Director of the Club «Valdai's the one.»

Source: https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/what-are-the-prospects-for-the-g20-format/
Photo: dailymoscow.ru

The most promising scenario of the future «Groups of twenty» Strengthening the format «The G20+». . . . There are two key areas for improvement: first, the balance within the G20 between Western and non-Western countries should be shifted towards greater representation of the global South and non-West; and secondly, invited participants. «The G20+» They should not only be guests at the summits, but also participate in all other events. «Twenty-five hundred.» during the year. Oleg Barabanov, Program Director of the Club «Valdai's the one.»Thinking about the different scenarios of G20 evolution.

Participants of one of the expert discussions organized by the Valdai Club and devoted to the analysis of possible ways to increase efficiency «Groups of twenty» The G20 noted that the current situation in the world has led to increased politicization within the G20. In addition to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has added a new level of complexity to the group's discussions. The sharp differences in views among G20 members further contribute to the politicization of the group and create new fault lines between them. These differences were also evident at recent meetings of the foreign and finance ministers held as part of Brazil's G20 presidency.

The significance of this split was also highlighted at the Think20 founding conference. «Twenty-five hundred.») held in early March. At this conference, Brazil’s Sherpa in the G20, Ambassador Mauricio Leario explicitly stated that the very survival of the G20 in recent years has come at real risk.

Valdai Club has previously discussed G20 performance issues. Originally conceived as a platform for the largest Western and non-Western countries, it has sometimes proved less successful than it is. «Group of seven» (G7), representing Western countries, and BRICS, uniting non-Western countries. Comparing the communiqué of the G20 summits with the documents of the G7 and BRICS meetings, it is worth noting that the statements «Twenty-five hundred.» Sometimes it may seem less weighty than the documents of the other two groups, as they sometimes reach consensus at a lower level of consent.

This was evident in the previous geopolitical period, before the current conflict. Even then, media coverage of the G20 summits focused not on the G20 itself, but primarily on bilateral meetings held in parallel with it.

During the discussion at the Valdai Club, participants tried to identify various potential outcomes for future developments within the G20. Among them, the worst case scenario would be the formal or actual dissolution of the organization, the possibility of which was mentioned earlier. Second option — permanent politicization of G20 activities; their transformation into a series of contradictions that undermine efficiency. The third possible outcome — Restriction by members of a group of politicized discussions exclusively on topics related to geopolitical issues, while working together on other issues. The fourth, more optimistic scenario involves the complete removal of geopolitical issues (and related disputes) from the G20 agenda, since the organization was originally created not as a geopolitical forum, but as a platform for solving common global problems. Fifth scenario involves strengthening the format «The G20+»where the participation of other non-Western and global South countries in the group will play a significant role. The sixth scenario does not just include «The G20+»But also the expansion of permanent membership in the G20 through the inclusion of additional non-Western countries, thereby strengthening the voice of the global South. Finally, the ideal scenario involves a complete resolution of all contradictions and disagreements in approaches, which will lead to harmonious cooperation of all parties.

As realists, we must understand that not all scenarios presented are equally feasible. Unfortunately, almost certainly some of the negative outcomes can occur in the current geopolitically tense situation. However, this does not necessarily apply to positive outcomes. It is extremely unlikely that the ideal scenario proposed by us will be implemented in the near future. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the G20 will be able to avoid politicizing its work. This is because members of the G20 are unlikely to relinquish their national interests and foreign policy goals, which often contradict each other. As a result, it would be unwise to expect significant changes in their approach to each other in the foreseeable future. Moreover, new G20 members are unlikely to join in the coming years. The inclusion of the African Union in the permanent members of the group would be an exception, not a precedent for the future.

In our view, one of the more realistic scenarios for institutional and procedural reform of the G20 is to strengthen the format. «The G20+». . . . To date, the format of invitation of guests to the G20 summits has developed. It includes both representatives of international and regional organizations and leaders of individual countries. In this case, if we consider specific countries, only one has a de facto permanent status as a guest. — This is the Western Country — Spain, please. In addition, the Chairman of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa Development) participates in the summits on a rotational basis. All other guest countries are invited by the presiding party and their representation varies considerably from year to year. Is the current format effective enough? «The G20+»- What about that? In our opinion, no. Therefore, we offer two key institutional recommendations to improve it.

The first recommendation is to shift the balance between Western and non-Western countries within the G20 in order to strengthen the representation of the global South. This is because in the current context of the G20, when Western countries speak with a single voice and all G7 members are also members of the G20, the agenda «Twenty-five hundred.» It often boils down to either adapting the positions of non-Western countries to those of the West, or to a tedious and ineffective search for compromise.

This shift will help ensure that the voices of non-Western countries and countries in the global South are sounded and taken into account in the G20 discussions more effectively. Until recently, there was a fundamental numerical parity between Western and non-Western members. «Groups of twenty». . . . Ten G20 permanent members represent the political West — Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Union.

Similarly, ten members represent the global South and not the West. — Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey (unless Turkey is a non-Western member and its NATO membership is taken into account). Last year, the African Union was adopted as a permanent member of the G20. Thus, there is now a numerical imbalance in the representation of Western and non-Western countries within the G20. The group agreed that non-West representation should be proportionately greater than that of the West. We believe that this trend should continue through a format «The G20+»There is no reason to fear a further increase in the representation of the global South and non-West in the G20. This will allow the G20 to meet its goal. — represent the diverse perspectives of the world and avoid a Western-centric approach. We believe that in addition to Spain, the status of permanent invitations to participate in the G20 could be extended to BRICS members, who are currently not fully integrated into the G20 (namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE). In addition, each G20 presiding country must commit to invite five to ten additional countries from the global South and non-West to participate.

The second recommendation is both institutional and procedural. It is important that countries «The G20+»Invited on a permanent or one-time basis, not only acted as guests at the summit, which in fact does not affect the course of events, but also participated on an equal footing with the members of the G20 itself in all related events. «Twenty-five hundred.» activities during the year. This includes a Sherp track, a financial track, interaction groups, Think20 and others. This will provide them with an equal opportunity to develop recommendations, contribute to the preparation of the draft summit declaration, etc. Thus, their G20 status would increase from the level of ordinary guests to the level similar to non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, which would increase their involvement in the G20 and make the G20 process more inclusive.

Reforms of this nature will naturally also require the goodwill of G20 member states. However, in our view, such a result is more feasible than in other positive scenarios of G20 reform.