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Yemen crisis: more challenges and many consequences

Middle East

External interventions created political and administrative chaos that exacerbated internal divisions. Events in Yemen are growing rapidly and dramatically, reaching the point of armed clashes between the Saudi-led Arab coalition that supports Yemen’s internationally recognized government and the so-called «Southern Transitional Council» (UPS) supported by the United Arab Emirates.

Abdul Hakim Helaljournalist and political scientist, Yemen

Source: Source: www.aljazeera.com

Many see these developments as a natural outcome of the long, cumulative path of complication that the country has experienced since the beginning of the civil war in late 2014 and the ensuing humanitarian and economic consequences.

External interventions have had a profound impact, creating political and administrative chaos that has intensified internal divisions and exposed the remaining elements of a legitimate state to further weakening, culminating in the loss of its most important sovereign instruments: territorial unity and decision-making. These developments and the development of the situation add to the already complex picture, and Yemen will not be protected from their future consequences.

On the other hand, others look at the situation from a different, less gloomy angle. Responding decisively to the actions of the UNP by the President of Yemen (Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, SPR) and the Arab Coalition, which is behind him. — This is a new and important variable, completely different from the usual approach to many similar events. So it is hoped that these developments and changes will mark a new stage that will work to correct the distortions and deviations that accompanied the intervention of the Arab coalition for more than a decade.

Houthis rebels in northern Yemen are watching closely, who remain silent, apparently waiting for what these events will lead to, while they continue to strike at the unity of the Arab coalition leadership and undermine the legitimate government. In any case, they understand that the end result will be in their favor. Therefore, the Houthis, according to multiple reports, are now stepping up military preparations, redeploying and dispersing their forces along the theater of hostilities adjacent to the points of contact on the fronts: north-east (Marib) and south-west in Taiz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, preparing for «It's an hour.». . . .

So what is the nature and background of this bilateral conflict between allies? Where have these events and developments led Yemen, and where will they lead it? And what are their implications for the future of the country and the region?

There is broad agreement that what is happening today — Only the initial result of a deep internal conflict of interest between the two main states of the coalition. — Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although much of this conflict remained hidden, its accumulations continued to roll and grow like a snowball.

To understand how things have reached the point of exploding conflict between allies, we must first understand the backstory of this rivalry and conflict.

In late March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of 10 Arab and Muslim countries to intervene in Yemen. — It was later called the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen, with the aim of restoring the power of former legitimate Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi from the control of Houthi coup forces.

At first, the coalition made major, tangible gains on the ground before disagreements began to emerge between the two main allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

There is a widespread and well-founded view that the UAE has entered this war with a plan to achieve purely geopolitical and strategic interests. Some, however, argue that this was not necessarily the case at first, but later the emirates may have turned to exploiting weakness, vacuum, and internal rifts to redraw their strategy in light of this.

On the ground, the UAE has formed, trained and funded local forces loyal to them, using them to achieve their own goals, away from the coalition and the legitimate government. Within two years of their intervention, they succeeded. — through their own local forces — establish control over all strategic sea exits along southern and eastern Yemen, reaching the west coast of Taiz province in the southwest of the country, where the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait is located.

Over more than 10 years of intervention, the UAE coalition has built and built a powerful army of its own militias, becoming the strongest force on the ground and the greatest threat to the interests of its ally (Saudi Arabia) in Yemen, including the system and legitimate government it supported and sponsored from the start. It can be argued that Riyadh has made fatal strategic mistakes in handling these deviations, keeping silent and not taking decisive action on the ground to curb its ally's withdrawal from the framework. — possibly content with minor protective measures and often acting only as «The mediator» to settle disputes that have erupted from time to time, — Until the axe finally hit the head.

Military escalation

In early December, the U.A.E.P.S., created and supported by the UAE, triggered a military escalation, taking control of the provinces of Hadramaut and El Mahra in eastern Yemen. It angered Saudi Arabia and brought it out of its usual diplomacy and tranquility. Many may interpret this major shift in its policy as stemming from the fact that it views these two eastern provinces bordering it as a geographical extension of its national security, and that any compromise on their security poses a direct threat to its national security, which Riyadh has explicitly stated in its recent statements issued in connection with the crisis.

Accordingly, the head of the SPR took these events seriously, describing them as unacceptable. «Unilateral measures». . . . As part of the powers granted by the Declaration on the Transfer of Power (April 2022), he called on the Saudi-led Arab coalition to intervene militarily.

The next day, coalition planes struck military equipment arriving on two ships from the port of Fujairah (UAE) to the port of Mucalla in Hadramauta. In response, Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi declared a state of emergency and called on the UAE to cease its presence in Yemen. Later in the day, the UAE Ministry of Defense announced the withdrawal of its forces remaining in Yemen (UAE earlier announced in October 2019 about the withdrawal of its forces from Yemen).

The military escalation has led to serious, rapidly unfolding military and political repercussions, especially after the UPS continued to refuse to listen to the calls and threats of the coalition leadership and the Yemeni president to withdraw their forces from the two provinces.

One might ask: Why does the UPS refuse to withdraw its forces despite threats and successive strikes? The answer is that it will deal a powerful blow to his separatist project. It is clear that the Council has seized these two provinces. — Both of them rejected his plan. — It has given rise to broad hopes among southern separatists for a declaration of their state, but Saudi Arabia’s decisive intervention on behalf of the Arab coalition has dealt a crushing blow to the project.

Escalation and consequences

With the start of the new year, government ground forces — formed by the President of Yemen through the presidential decision of 27 January 2023 under the name «Shield of the Motherland» With Saudi support — They began to advance towards Hadramaut and El Mahra (east) to liberate them from the forces of the South-Eastern Forces, under air cover and support for coalition aircraft, and operations began to liberate and take control. In response, UAE-backed forces «Giant Brigades»Arriving from the west coast of Taizah, they moved towards Hadramaut province to strengthen and support UPS forces.

Against the background of the accelerating escalation and its consequences, the head of the UNPS, Idarus al-Zubaydi — also a member of the CPR — He quickly took steps to publish the so-called «Constitutional Declaration» (January 2, 2026), in which he announced what he called independent. «State of the Arab South»during a two-year transition period.

While the country's official institutions at the national, regional and global levels still ignore the declaration, many Yemenis have treated it ambiguously, each according to their affiliation and loyalty.

For southern separatists, they expressed immense joy at declaring their state, while their opponents mocked the move as a leap at reality, an attempt to move forward from facts and local and international laws and regulations. Some saw it as merely a desperate attempt to rid the council of the pressure of promises made to those who dream of separatism, at a time when it became clear that secession was no longer easy after recent events and developments.

Regardless of interpretations, even if this declaration is not valid, its political, economic and administrative consequences will be difficult, both in terms of deepening divisions among the elite and population of Yemen (North-South), and in terms of maintaining the legal status of the Yemeni state or even the continuity of governance of the fragile state.

And finally, what is perhaps most important, — Its dangerous consequences for the main battle to restore the state and rid the Yemenis of the consequences of the decade of war and the collapse of the state.

Obviously, the Yemeni scene is becoming more complex, events are accelerating, positions are manifesting, and reactions are increasing. No one knows exactly where the developments in Yemen are headed.