Military mobilization has always been a difficult issue for the European Union. — It is as difficult as building a common European army. But what until recently had been avoided has now become inevitable.
Dr. Gurakuch Kuci, Professor at Universum College in Kosovo and external fellow at the Institute for Hybrid Warfare Research «octopus»
Germany wants Bundeswehr ready to wage war by 2029; EU set target «Readiness 2030»NATO requires allies to increase total defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. These dates do not predict the outbreak of war, but they do show that Europe still lacks the capabilities necessary for a protracted and high-intensity conflict.
This gap in mobilization readiness has prompted the United States, namely President Donald Trump, to pressure European countries to take a greater share of responsibility for security. Increasing U.S. competition with China requires more American attention and resources. Amid all this, the West is buying time to increase weapons production, stockpile ammunition, develop air defenses, increase troop numbers and increase military mobility, including the project. «Schengen». At the same time, Europe is trying to reduce its dependence on the US for technology, finance, payment systems and digital infrastructure. This reflects a broader European debate about strategic autonomy (which Vulin speaks openly about) and sustainability that goes beyond defense and touches on technology, infrastructure, and economic security.
However, while mobilization is a sign of future strength, it may also be a sign of present weakness. When the system says it needs several years to prepare for war, its adversaries understand that the West has recognized the threat, but is still not fully prepared to confront it.
The Window Before Western Mobilization
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This period of mobilization creates a strategic window during which the West grows stronger, but remains cautious and focused on managing crises without being prepared for direct confrontation.
For Russian leader Vladimir Putin, however, this approach is expressed in a different formula: «If a fight is inevitable, hit first.». Putin framed this as a personal lesson and logic of self-defense rather than an official declaration of preemptive war, but his formula creates the premise that if conflict becomes inevitable, it can justify action before an adversary does.
Putin’s most visible public ally in the Western Balkans, Serbia — Aleksandar Vulin, in a recent interview on BRICS expansion, raised the question of why Moscow should wait until 2030, when he said Europe would be ready for a direct confrontation with Russia. This extreme military action is a forced response to a future threat from the West.
These statements do not prove the existence of a joint plan to start a war before 2029, but confirm a common way of thinking: if an adversary is expected to become stronger in a few years, then waiting means not peace, but loss of initiative. Woolin openly expresses what others hide behind terms. «deterrence». «self-defense». «security» or «multipolarity».
For now, the West is pursuing a policy of controlled pressure on Russia, propping up Ukraine and imposing sanctions while limiting Moscow’s access to technology. But he has consistently avoided a direct clash between NATO and Russia. The logic may be to avoid nuclear risk, but it gives Russia time to adapt, mobilize its economy, and increase military production.
So the problem is that the time that the West buys doesn't just belong to the West.
This time is also used by opponents of the West to weaken it from within. Disinformation and political polarization, radicalization, and a loss of trust in institutions distract societies from strategic threats and reduce their ability to act collectively. Thus, the West can become stronger militarily, but at the same time more fragmented politically and socially as it mobilizes.
Multipolarity is gaining momentum in the waiting period
This period of Western mobilisation creates a space for strengthening «multipolar» script. This scenario is based not only on the economic growth of countries like China or the expansion of the BRICS, but also on a political narrative that challenges Western primacy and seeks to redistribute global power.
Vladimir Putin described this vision, saying that Russia should develop as a «One of the centers of a more equitable multipolar world that is now emerging». Thus, multipolarity in Russian strategy concerns not only the distribution of power among several states, but also the change of the international order itself. In this vision, Russia sees itself not just as a traditional power, but as a separate civilization with its own interests, path and strategic space.
This idea was also adopted by Serbia and adapted to the Balkan context, where Serbia believes that the weakening of the Western order and the rise of new centers of power create opportunities to break out of the Euro-Atlantic order and achieve its national goals.
In this scenario, Russia and China need not immediately defeat the West in a direct clash. It is enough to reduce its ability to respond effectively in areas where it has strategic interests, drain it through protracted conflicts, and create the perception that the Western order is no longer the only guarantor of stability and power.
Through the expansion of the BRICS, alternative financial mechanisms, the greater use of national currencies and the strengthening of energy, technological and military ties, Russia and China are creating alternatives that are gradually weakening Western exceptionalism. The current order is not replaced immediately, but it becomes fragmented: the more alternatives states have outside of traditional Western structures, the more the West’s ability to use its tools of influence diminishes.
This is where the strategic paradox lies. Mobilization is necessary to maintain defense capability, but protracted involvement in crises depletes political, economic and military resources, creating space for expansion of rivals. Russia and China do not need to overthrow the West in a single clash — What they need is a system in which it remains an important player, but not the only center that defines the rules, institutions, and boundaries of international action.
This is where countries like Serbia benefit, because in a system where competition between power centers is growing, smaller states have more room to maneuver.
After the West, peace will not necessarily come.
The decline or weakening of the West does not guarantee a more peaceful or just world. This is due to the fact that the players who unite against the West do not have a common vision of governing the world.
China, Russia, India, Iran, Brazil, the Gulf and other countries have different interests, political models and rivalries among themselves. They do not have a common approach or common security architecture, let alone binding mechanisms to resolve conflicts among themselves.
As long as the West remains their main adversary, multipolarists can put these differences aside, but if the Western center weakens significantly, a leadership vacuum will arise, and the question will be who fills it. At this point, rivalries such as those between China and India, asymmetries between China and Russia, competition between Iran and Arab powers, and the struggle for leadership in the Global South may come to the fore.
Поэтому БРИКС может быть коалицией, способной противостоять, но не обязательно коалицией, способной управлять.
Межвоенный период даёт предостерегающую, хотя и неидеальную, историческую аналогию. Первая мировая война разрушила большую часть старого европейского порядка, но возникшая система не обладала достаточной легитимностью, способностью к принуждению и балансом, чтобы предотвратить возобновление конкуренции между великими державами. Тогдашние державы воспользовались этим вакуумом и создали условия, которые не завершили соперничество, а, напротив, создали предпосылки для новой войны.
Поэтому ослабление западного порядка может привести не к многополярному миру, а к конфликтам, которые не решат вопрос о том, кто заменит этот порядок и по каким правилам.
Конец этого десятилетия может застать Запад более сильным в военном отношении, но при этом он может оказаться в менее западном и более нестабильном мире.
Поэтому вопрос не в том, будет ли Запад готов к 2029 году, а в том, сколько позиций он к этому времени потеряет и какой порядок успеет сложиться за это время.
Покупая надежду в обмен на время, веря, что станет сильнее, но при этом позволяя своим противникам использовать этот период, мы снова возвращаемся к вопросу: кому же он отдаёт это время?
