Famous Kazakh political scientist assesses the next large-scale protests in Iran

Dosim Satpayev candidate of political science

Source: Source: https://forbes.kz/articles/dosym-satpaev-chto-proishodit-v-irane-i-kak-eto-mozhet-povliyat-na-kazahstan-47db16

Specificity of the Iranian Way

In 2015, I visited Iran as a participant in an international conference where Hassan Khomeini also spoke. — grandson of the late Ayatollah. And then Hassan Khomeini built his speech on comparing the different types of revolutions that have taken place in the world in recent centuries. He recalled the French, American, and October Revolution of 1917 in the Russian Empire, as well as the coming to power of Mao Zedong. I came to the conclusion that the Iranian revolution of 1979 was the most bloodless and was held with the mass support of the people. Opponents of this view, however, may argue that several million Iranians have emigrated and are scattered around the world. Ironically, part of the Iranian opposition is now in France, where Khomeini once found refuge before his triumphant return to Iran, and another part of the opposition lives in the United States.

But two issues are becoming more and more relevant. First, has a new revolutionary situation arisen in Iran itself, when the upper classes can no longer do it, and the lower classes do not want it? Will there be a new change of power in the country, as it was in 1979, but under new slogans?

By the way, at the already mentioned conference, the former President of Iran Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani also spoke, who mentioned the significance of the 1979 revolution for the people. These speeches are a little reminiscent of the USSR with its sacralization. «The Great October Socialist Revolution»where they were «apostles» Lenin and his comrades. In Iran, the role of Ilyich was played by the late imam, Ayatollah Khomeini, whose cult in the country was actively supported, which puzzled the Sunni states, which even accused Iran of idolatry. This model may have helped Iran withstand strong external pressure and years of economic sanctions.

In Shiite Iran, since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a political scheme has been created where the cult of the personality of Ayatollah Khomeini was combined with the illusion of democracy, where one of the best educational systems in the Islamic world, which gave rise to active educated youth, coexisted with a rigid form of religious regulation. And all this for a long time boiled in the juice of parallel structures, where over the President, Parliament, army and intelligence agencies stood controllers in the face of the clergy and the clergy. «Guardians of the Islamic Revolution»They also had their own army and intelligence service.

But compared to today in the 80s of the last century, under Ayatollah Khomeini, all socio-economic problems were considered sacred sacrifice in the name of creating a strong and independent of Western influence Iran. Back then, the top and bottom were united by one goal: to create a new Iran and survive in a hostile environment. The cementing basis was theocratic rule, which made Shia an important part of the state ideology. And in the unfriendly environment of mostly Sunni states, this further united society and power in Iran. As the world experience and the history of mankind shows, if a society is consolidated on a religious basis with an admixture of a leader, then it is quite difficult to rock it. That is, Iran has long had a classical mobilization type of society. But now this model of society is in crisis.

The tops can't, the bottoms don't want.

It is striking that the number of protests and their scale in Iran has been increasing since 2009. Now there are already the fifth mass protests. And while three of the five protests started for economic reasons: rising prices, high inflation, and a broader economic crisis, the real reason is different. Specifically, — The growing separation of the ruling circles from the people, the growth of corruption and the decline in trust in the government as a whole. In Iran in 1979, the Iranian revolution was triggered by a set of similar factors: discontent with the authoritarian, corrupt regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and rising social inequality. A similar situation is happening again in Iran. In the country, corruption cases involving high-ranking officials and their relatives, who are suspected of profiting from sanctions, as they controlled import and export operations and stole proceeds from the sale of sanctioned oil, have caused a scandal. It is unlikely that such a situation could be imagined in the 80s of the last century.

But now there are many cracks between the government and society. One significant reason — It is a trap into which those systems fall. «The Iron Law of Oligarchy by Robert Michels». This law states that any organization (no matter what). — authoritarian or democratic power is inevitably transformed into the power of the ruling elite (oligarchy) because of the need for leadership, the complexity of governing the masses and the desire to preserve power. The larger the organization, the less democracy and the more oligarchic elements it has. There was no democracy in Iran in the beginning, but oligarchic elements associated with the government appeared, and with them appeared large-scale corruption of the ruling circles.

Iran has also fallen into an economic trap, spending hundreds of millions of dollars since 1979 to support its proxies in various countries, as well as a nuclear program to strengthen its geopolitical position in the region. That is, under the sanctions, even the revenues that the country received from the sale of oil were mainly for geopolitical purposes, rather than to improve the welfare of its population. And just over the past year, all this long-term colossal spending has gone down the tube after Iran lost its staunch ally in Syria, in the person of Bashar al-Assad, and also after the Lebanese government lost its ally in Syria. «Hezbollah»As a result of the Israeli strikes, it lost much of its senior leadership and was seriously weakened. In addition, the 12-day war with Israel in the summer of 2025 not only caused serious damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and other industrial facilities, but also seriously undermined Iranian military power. And all these geopolitical failures have been supplemented by the fall in oil prices, which is a serious blow to the country’s economy. So it’s no surprise that, when choosing between the country’s costly geopolitical ambitions and economic prosperity, many Iranians are choosing the latter.

Fall algorithm

The difference between the current protests and earlier ones is that shopkeepers and sellers in the markets began to participate in these protests to express their dissatisfaction with another sharp drop in the value of the Iranian rial and the rise in inflation to 40%. Then the rallies were traditionally joined by students who are stable participants in almost all protests. Since the 1979 revolution, there have been generations in Iran. At the same time, the current younger generation is now either demanding more freedoms and Iran’s exit from the state of permanent confrontation with the world, or relying on national patriotism, which began to blur religious identity in society. And it became a concern for the clergy.

So far, the regime has demonstrated resilience. The number of external and internal attacks on the system is increasing. At the same time, as world experience shows, the collapse of various authoritarian political regimes has its own algorithm. A domino effect can trigger any event. But the first knuckle of the domino begins to stagger when the ruling circles make two of the grossest mistakes. First, completely eliminate all channels for the release of a social couple, which accumulates and does not find a way out. Secondly, when the government loses the support not only of its supporters, but also of neutral citizens. Traditionally, support for the stability of any government does not come at the expense of loyal supporters. There are usually not many. Stability is ensured by neutrals, which are usually larger. They're not for power. But they are not against it, as they traditionally shun politics. They're in the border zone. And if the government observes certain rules of the game, then neutrals do not go into politics and do not participate in opposition movements, demonstrating loyalty, but not loyalty. This is enough for the government to maintain stability. Many neutrals are even willing to sacrifice some of their rights and freedoms in exchange for effective government, low levels of corruption and increased prosperity, concluding a contract with the authorities according to the formula. «Loyalty in exchange for efficiency». In Iran, such a contract has not worked for a long time.

That is, a crack in any political structure occurs when the number of neutrals begins to decline sharply as the inefficiency of public administration in various spheres grows. There is social fatigue from pseudo-reforms or their absence. At first, this creates social apathy, escapism, or brain drain, which the authorities do not perceive as a problem. But over time, the once loyal and unpoliticized part of society first goes into a hidden protest, a quiet opposition in their kitchen. Again, the authorities mistakenly perceive the public silence of the majority either as an endorsement of the policy pursued or as a sign of fear of saying something publicly.

But silence is not really a sign of consent. It conceals non-public protest, which sooner or later can disrupt the chain reaction in a nuclear reactor, as an uncontrolled rise in temperature begins due to the transformation of the former passivity of the majority into political activism. And the list of internal reasons for this is usually standard for many countries where it happened: high levels of corruption, lack of a sense of justice, negative selection, oligarchy that prevents competition, inefficient economic decisions that lead to a large number of socio-economic problems from rising poverty and unemployment to falling education and culture. The cause of a social explosion can be anything.

In Tunisia, the catalyst for political change was the self-immolation of trafficker Mohammed Bouazizi in protest against lawlessness by the police, and in Nepal the trigger was the blocking of social networks.
Is a Venezuelan scenario possible in Iran?

Iran has similarities to Venezuela. These are two oil-producing states that are under sanctions and in a state of economic crisis. The difference is that any destabilization of Iran would immediately have unpredictable consequences for the entire region, given Iran’s geopolitical position in the Middle East. Another difference from Venezuela may be that changing Iran’s leadership by force is far more difficult than Maduro’s. But it is hypothetically possible to do so if, as in the case of Venezuela, there are traitors surrounded by the country’s leadership. Maduro distrusted his entourage to such an extent that the Cubans played the role of his personal guard.

In Iran, power is based on «Guardians of the Islamic Revolution»They are not just a power structure, but mostly fanatical supporters who are deeply committed to the principles of the Islamic Revolution. In addition, many countries, including Iran, are now scrutinizing the successful operation of US special forces to seize Maduro, identifying and analyzing their weaknesses. That is, the factor of surprise will not be the same as in the case of Venezuela.

And even if the US decides to launch a military operation against Iran through an attempt to seize the country’s leadership or destroy it, it will act together with Israel, including planning the direct elimination of all key representatives of the country’s leadership through targeted rocket attacks, as was already worked out during the elimination of the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hossein Salami, as a result of the Israeli airstrike on Tehran in June 2025.

At the same time, the most important task for the United States and Israel will be to establish rapid control over Iran’s nuclear infrastructure so that some of its elements do not fall into the wrong hands. Although, most likely, a more profitable and less dangerous option for the United States will be associated with a change in the leadership of the country as a result of domestic political events in Iran itself, when in the event of a successful revolution, it will be possible to bet on loyal forces. But here comes another question: «Who will represent these loyal forces?». The example of Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan has shown that this model does not work for a long time.

The domino effect

In the case of Iran, there are several key problems.
First, no one can guarantee long-term stability at home, especially since the United States cannot provide such a guarantee even over Venezuela.

Second, it is not a fact that a significant portion of the population will want to support a pro-American leadership that, in their opinion, will simply want to return to the colonial model of control, as it once was under the British Empire. Some may advocate the return to the country of Reza Kir Pahlavi, the eldest son of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The eldest son is now a monarchist-in-exile leader living in the United States. But again, his figure in Iran will not suit many. Especially clericals.

Third, as in Iraq after Saddam Hussein or in Libya after Muammar Gaddafi, the risk of the country splitting into opposing factions is high. The example of Iraq is quite clear, when part of the former Iraqi military of Saddam Hussein’s army played a significant role in the creation of ISIS, as their experience and skills were valuable to this organization. After all, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the collapse of the old army led to the transfer of some personnel to illegal armed groups. Iran and Iraq are also home to Iranian Kurdish opposition parties that have their own political plans for the country’s future. There are other groups operating in Iran, including Sunni jihadist organizations, as well as domestic opposition groups such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. «Organization of the Mujahideen of the Iranian People».

Fourth, the destabilization of Iran, as one of the major players in the global oil market, could lead to an increase in oil prices, which would be a disadvantageous scenario for Donald Trump, given that he advocates low oil prices, which, in his opinion, will help the American economy. In addition, there is a risk of attempts to set fire to oil and gas fields by supporters of the former government, as it was in Iraq.

Fifth, as in the case of Venezuela, the change of power in Iran with the participation of the United States will be a new blow to the geopolitical positions of Russia and China, similar to Venezuela, where China risks losing billions of dollars, investments and access to Venezuelan oil. As with Venezuela, China accounts for 93% of Iran’s total oil exports. And destabilizing Iran would be a more painful blow for Beijing, as the share of Iranian oil imports to China is about 23-24% of total oil imports, much higher than the share of Venezuelan oil (4-6%).

But any long-term destabilization of the situation in Iran could have challenges for Kazakhstan. Iran is home to a small Kazakh diaspora of about 5,000 to 7,000 people, which will require Kazakhstan to ensure the safety of these people. Lockdown of the corridor «North-South» This will threaten transport and logistics routes. Instability could nullify Kazakhstan’s decades-long efforts to access Persian Gulf ports (Bender Abbas). The destabilization will also lead to the fact that the Kazakh airline will again have to change routes and bypass Iranian airspace, which will increase the time and cost of flights. It is also unprofitable for Kazakhstan to lose an important Iranian market for wheat and barley. Despite the sanctions, trade between the two countries grew last year. Geopolitical risks in the Caspian Sea region will also increase, especially if, for one reason or another, tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan increase. Unlike the small Kazakh diaspora, Azeris are Iran’s largest ethnic minority, living compactly in the country’s northwestern provinces. Their number is estimated at 25 to 35 million Azerbaijanis. And any strong destabilization in Iran could have negative humanitarian and social consequences, increasing migration flows and increasing the risk of ethnic conflict.

As for the short-term benefits of destabilizing Iran, Kazakhstan could benefit short-term from rising energy prices in the event of disruptions to Iranian oil supplies or an escalation of the conflict in the region. And the emergence of any problems with the supply of Iranian oil to the Chinese market may increase the attractiveness of Kazakhstan as an oil supplier to China. At present, the Athasu oil pipeline — Alashankou, which leads to China's Xinjiang, has a capacity of about 10 million tons per year, but is not used to full load. In 2025, only 1 million tons of Kazakh oil were exported to China through it. By the way, at the end of last year, due to the reduction of the export capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium after the attacks of Ukrainian drones, for the first time 50 thousand tons of oil from the Kashagan field were sent through the Atasu oil pipeline. — Alashankou. Oil was exported by the Chinese company CNPC (about 30 thousand tons) and the Japanese Inpex (about 20 thousand tons).

However, on the other hand, if the estimates of oil and gas experts are correct, then an excess of oil supply in the market is expected in 2026, especially if Venezuelan oil supplies increase, which may offset the effect of rising oil prices due to the situation in Iran. In turn, the rapid stabilization of the situation after the change of power in Iran and the lifting of sanctions on the supply of Iranian oil to the world market will lead to an even greater decline in oil prices, which again is extremely disadvantageous to Kazakhstan. But the rapid stabilization of the situation in Iran and the lifting or reduction of sanctions also opens up more economic opportunities for Kazakhstan for more active economic interaction with this country, as from the point of view of using the transport and logistics route. —Iran — Turkmenistan (Uzen) — Bereket — Gorgan), as well as the use of Iranian ports, and to enter the Iranian market with Kazakh products.