The region’s economy is recovering, but geopolitics remains a constant source of concern. West Africa ended 2025 on relatively stable economic ground. Growth intensified, inflation fell, budget deficits narrowed, and debt levels fell. But then, a war that erupted thousands of miles away once again reminded us of how quickly distant geopolitical events could change the outlook for the subregion.
Like the conflict between Russia and Ukraine before, the war in the Middle East has disrupted supply chains and pushed up commodity prices, weighing on economic growth, inflation, food security and the cost of living across West Africa.
This is the main warning contained in the 2026 edition of the West African Development Outlook (WADO) report. — The flagship socio-economic report of the ECOWAS Investment and Development Bank (EBID). Report entitled «Distant shocks, habitual blows» ?«Distant Tremors, Familiar Shocks»), examines the forces shaping the economic and social trajectory of West Africa. Since its first edition in 2021, WADO has been tracking growth, inflation, debt and fiscal performance, shifting economic trends into policy priorities for governments, investors and regional institutions.
Ironically, 2025 was a good year for most indicators. Growth reached 4.8%, rising from 4.7% in 2024. Average inflation down nearly nine percentage points — 16.8 percent as food and energy prices softened and exchange rates stabilized. Budget deficits fell to -2.6% of GDP, public debt fell to 49.3%, and the current-account surplus widened to 1.8% of GDP. On paper, West Africa has strengthened its position.
In practice, the picture looked less hopeful. Level. «poverty-working» The situation in the region worsened even against the background of improving macroeconomic indicators. The growth was real, but it did not benefit everyone.
Then there was a failure of supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. Energy and fertilizer prices rose just as the region regained resilience. The situation was frighteningly familiar. — Similar risks to food security arose during the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.
However, WADO 2026 expects growth to remain in the 4.7-4.9% range through 2027. Inflation should continue to decline — Up 11.1 percent in 2026 and 10.2 percent in 2027, although high energy prices remain a risk factor. Budget balances are expected to temporarily worsen to -3.5% of GDP in 2026 before recovering in 2027 as pressure on procurement eases. Public debt will continue to decline, and current accounts are projected to remain favourable due to high commodity prices.
Spotlight: Ghana and Nigeria
Ghana and Nigeria illustrate the trajectory of the region in particular.
Ghana turned the tide. After declaring a selective default in 2022, the country recorded growth of 6.0% in 2025, after 5.8% in 2024. Inflation has fallen sharply — From an average of 32.9% in 2023 to 14.2% in 2025, public debt fell from 70.3% of GDP in 2024 to 48.8% in 2025 thanks to the debt restructuring program.
The outlook remains positive. Growth is forecast at 5.1% in 2026 and 5.3% in 2027, driven by services, mining and agriculture. Growth in gold production and export earnings should also keep the current account in a sustainable surplus.
Nigeria's trajectory is more stable, though less impressive. Growth reached 4.0% in 2025, driven by increased oil production, expanded domestic refining capacity and continued growth in the services and non-oil sectors. Inflation fell to 23.0% and the current account remained in surplus. Public debt fell to 35.5% of GDP, although debt-servicing pressures remain high due to weak revenue mobilization.
The outlook is restrainedly positive. Growth is expected to increase to 4.1% in 2026 and 4.4% in 2027, while inflation will continue to decline. Budgetary pressures will remain significant, especially in 2026, but higher performance in agriculture, services and the oil sector should support the recovery.
None of this changes the main lesson of this edition of the report. The subregion's exposure to shocks that it has not caused and cannot control is structural, not accidental. This is not the first time a remote conflict has raised the cost of a West African family's food basket, nor will it be the last.
The answer must also be structural. West African governments need to expand refining capacity to reduce dependence on imported petroleum products; ramp up fertilizer production to reduce dependence on volatile external supplies; and rebuild fiscal and international reserve buffers powerful enough to cushion the next blow before it happens, not after.
Distant shocks will continue to generate the usual blows. The challenge for West Africa — To make sure that the next one finds the region more prepared, more resilient, and less dependent on forces beyond its control.
