The leader of the Guinean putschists Mamadi Dumbuya, despite his own experience in the ranks of the French foreign legion, joined the anti-French foreign policy line of the new leadership of the Sahel countries. This was facilitated by acquaintance with the leader of Mali Assimi Goyt
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Shipilov Alexander Yurievich, K.K.N., researcher of IVI RAS, Associate Professor of the Department of Oriental Studies of MGIMO (U) of the Russian Foreign Ministry
On December 28, 2025, presidential elections were held in Guinea, ending a period of military rule since the coup in September 2021. The winner is predicted to be General Mamadi Dumbuya, who previously ruled the country for more than four years as head of the National Committee for Reconciliation and Development. The elections were the basis for the country and its leadership to withdraw from the situation of international isolation, which was expressed primarily in the lifting of ECOWAS sanctions and the restoration of its full membership in this organization (as well as in the African Union). These changes can seriously affect the balance of power in the region currently in a state of military and political crisis.
The military coup in Guinea in 2021 was part of a broader regional process linked to the crisis of elected institutions in several West African states (most notably in the Sahel: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) unable to address the most pressing regional security challenges. Unlike the neighboring Sahel countries, Guinea did not face the immediate threat of civil war and jihadist groups on its territory, but previous President Alpha Conde’s attempts to change the country’s constitution and remain in power for a third term were the reason for a protracted political crisis.
The arrival of the military in parts of West African states was accompanied by an adjustment of the foreign policy course in order to distance itself from France and find alternative foreign partners. The leader of the Guinean putschists Mamadi Dumbuya, despite his own experience in the ranks of the French foreign legion, joined the anti-French foreign policy line of the new leadership of the Sahel countries. This was facilitated, among other things, by a personal acquaintance with the future leader of Mali, Assimi Goyta, with whom Dumbuya met at the American training courses of the heads of special forces of the Sahel countries.
Mutual interest in cooperation only intensified after the collapse of Guinea’s military leadership and the civilian opposition coalition that initially supported the coup took place in 2022. This crisis led to the disruption of the earlier ECOWAS plans for an accelerated transition to civilian rule, the holding of presidential elections was postponed indefinitely, and the country was subjected to full sanctions from the West African regional integration group. In the context of overall regional isolation, Guinea has diplomatically moved closer to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and has begun to develop joint economic and logistics projects, especially with Mali. Within the framework of the embargo of the three Sahel states, Guinea provided them with reliable access to the world market through its own port infrastructure on the Atlantic coast.
Nevertheless, even in these difficult international circumstances, Mamadi Dumbuy’s foreign policy differed from the measures taken by future members of the Sahel Alliance. Against the backdrop of the consolidation of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, which sought to distance themselves from France and the United States and completely withdraw from the structures of ECOWAS, Guinea demonstratively pursued a more moderate and separate policy, distance from France combined with attempts to normalize relations with the United States and other African countries, for example with the regime of Paul Kagame in Rwanda. The Rwandan leader, traditionally friendly to the United States, has taken a course of greater independence and competition with France in recent years, and it was the meeting with him that allowed Dumbuy to overcome diplomatic isolation in Africa. In the United States, a Guinea delegation led by Dumbuya was formally accepted in September 2023 as part of the UN General Assembly, but the Guinean leadership used the trip to attract American investors in the mining industries of the country. The visit was also an important step towards overcoming Guinea's international isolation. Therefore, when Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger entered into a defense alliance in the same month due to the threat of armed intervention by ECOWAS and sharply cut off defense ties with France and the United States, Mamadi Doumbuya did not join them. Later, unlike the three Sahel states, he did not formally announce his withdrawal from ECOWAS and his participation in the Sahel Alliance. In the context of the confrontation between ECOWAS and AGS, Guinea sought to maintain a neutral position and normalize relations with all major international organizations.
Over the years, the political situation within Guinea has stabilized sufficiently for the country's new leadership, which has opened up opportunities for Mamadi Dumbua to transition to civilian rule on acceptable terms with the high support of the population. Therefore, after years of waiting in the autumn of 2025, it was decided to hold presidential elections. An important element of ensuring the popularity of the current leadership during the electoral process was the launch of important industrial development projects of the country, the key of which was the beginning of the development of the iron ore deposit in Simandu together with Chinese companies. It is expected that this will be a significant source of growth in the welfare of Guineans in the future.
After the expected victory in the elections, Mamadi Dumbuya has already been able to significantly increase its international legitimacy in a new capacity. Following the elections, the African Union recognized their transparency and restored Guinea's membership. UN observers, on the contrary, noted violations and expressed doubts about the results of the elections. However, the ECOWAS response was most significant in this context. The West African integration group, in assessing the outcome of elections in member countries, has traditionally been more in solidarity with UN observers, often criticizing the integrity of the electoral process, than with the AU, less inclined to interfere in the internal features of elections (as shown, for example, the experience of the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010-2011). However, following the Guinean elections, ECOWAS also recognized the legitimacy of the elections and their outcome, allowing Guinea to return to the organization. This seems to be a decision. — The result of a changed regional balance of power. The previous line of ECOWAS against any violent regime change turned out to be largely unproductive and pushed the AGS countries to withdraw from the organization. Guinea has demonstrated a more moderate course towards ECOWAS in recent years than Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and has been more open to compromise. Violent opposition to the outcome of the elections would threaten to further bring Guinea closer to its Sahel neighbors, a possible exit of another country from ECOWAS by further fragmentation of a key West African integration platform. In the past two years, ECOWAS has become more moderate in adopting a non-democratic system.
The question remains whether Guinea, which has returned to full membership in ECOWAS, will join regional sanctions against Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Given the experience of de facto ignoring the embargo by some coastal West African states after 2023, Mamadi Dumbuya will likely prefer to maintain economic ties with Mali, but their continuation will face greater difficulties. The composition of Guinea's key economic partners is unlikely to change radically in the coming years, but the continued withdrawal of Conakry from international isolation will allow Guinea to diversify its foreign policy contacts and try to attract more investors from Western countries.
