Turkey’s regional policy is shaped by the goals of preserving space for maneuver, maintaining relations with rival actors, participating in diplomatic formats, and accumulating political and material influence to the extent that it is not left out of political bidding.
Nebahat Tanryverdi Yashar, Independent political analyst and researcher
The post-conflict order is generally understood as a collection of political institutions, security arrangements, and regional relations built around a new post-war balance. But while the political order is being renegotiated, conflicts have not yet been fully resolved: truces remain fragile, and competing centers of power continue to coexist. Today, in the Middle East and North Africa, these processes are increasingly overlapping.
On this basis, the successive visits of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan should be considered together. — Libya 11-12 August and then Egypt 13-14 August. Individually, these contacts could be attributed to bilateral diplomacy, but together they show how Turkey is trying to adapt to changing regional conditions.
Ankara seeks to turn the military, political and economic positions gained in the region over the past decade into a sustainable influence on future political settlements. This requires a different set of diplomatic tools than those used during the intense competition of the late 2010s. — early 2020s. Military presence, defense partnerships and hard power are still important, but they are complemented by the normalization of relations with former rivals, simultaneous contacts with rival actors, economic ties, and deepening strategic cooperation. — From the Defense Industry to Energy — Selective coordination among regional powers.
Libya: From split to search for integration
Libya — One of the best examples of this transformation. In 2019-2020, Turkey sided with the Tripoli-based and UN-recognized Government of National Accord led by Faiz al-Sarraj during the Libyan civil war, preventing the capture of the capital by Khalifa Haftar’s forces. This position made Ankara one of the most influential external actors in Western Libya and brought it significant acquisitions. — From military training and defense cooperation to economic ties and the 2019 Maritime Jurisdictional Zone Agreement.
But the split in Libya has also created a structural vulnerability for Turkey. Ankara’s strong ties with western Libya risked exclusion from the east, where the Haftar family, the House of Representatives, and associated military and economic institutions formed stable centers of power.
Since the autumn of 2020, Turkey has been developing relations with political and economic actors in eastern Libya. Diplomatic contacts were followed by the involvement of Turkish companies in reconstruction projects in the east of the country, and then deepened relations with the House of Representatives and the Haftar family. However, since the ceasefire in 2020, Libya has failed to build a sustainable political order. The country has entered a period when institutional divisions are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain and the search for a new power-sharing formula continues.
This search received a new impetus thanks to the initiative put forward by US Special Representative Massad Boulos. The initiative aims to bring together rival institutions of the east and west under a single interim executive to pave the way for elections. But the debate is not just about forming a new government. The management of oil revenues, the integration of security forces, the future of armed groups, the east-west balance of power, and how the already achieved positions of external actors will be preserved in the new order are also part of this bargaining.
The growing involvement of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Libyan dossier, along with Turkey, Qatar’s support for the process, and Pakistan’s proposal for a 36-month integration plan in the July press show that the Libyan issue is increasingly the subject of broader regional diplomacy.
Fidan’s Libyan program, like his previous contacts, demonstrates Ankara’s approach to this process. Within this framework, Fidan met in Tripoli with Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeiba, Chairman of the Presidential Council Mohammed al-Menfi, Chairman of the Supreme State Council (Senate) Mohammed Miftah Takala and representatives of law enforcement agencies. Fidan also visited the command of the Turkish Armed Forces Task Force (TSK) in Libya. He then traveled to Benghazi, where he met with Khalifa Haftar and Saddam Haftar, as well as with House President Akila Saleh and Head of the Development and Recovery Fund Belkasim Haftar.
This diplomatic traffic points to Turkey’s desire not just to adapt to the new order that could emerge in Libya, but to participate in its formation. Ankara's main target — To maintain current positions in western Libya, while not being left out if the power structures in the east are incorporated into the future political and security order.
Within this framework, Turkey’s three key priorities stand out: recognition by a possible new political structure of the continuity of the security and maritime jurisdictional zones agreements signed in 2019; preservation of Turkey’s place in the new security architecture if security forces are combined; and, finally, expansion of the economic role in the reconstruction process, primarily in the areas of energy, infrastructure and contracting.
The relationship with the Haftar family indicates — in the context of both the Libyan and regional policies of Turkey — More than just normalizing relations with a former opponent. Ankara is simultaneously trying to make its Libyan policy more resistant to various political scenarios. This policy also requires a delicate balance: in developing relations with the east, Ankara also needs to convince its partners in Tripoli that this rapprochement is aimed not at changing the axis, but at adapting to the changing political configuration.
Egypt: from normalization to regional coordination
That is why it is important that Fidan followed Libya to Egypt. One of the notable topics of the visit was the possible accession of Cairo to the Mecca Agreement on Joint Defense, formed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Fidan called Egypt «natural partner»Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatti said the issue was being considered by Egyptian institutions. However, the significance of the visit should not be limited to whether Egypt would join the mechanism.
More importantly, the Turkish-Egyptian normalization is moving from the phase of restoring bilateral relations to functional coordination on regional issues. This trend is confirmed by both the institutional and economic agenda of the visit. Fidan and Abdelatti discussed important issues in bilateral relations — From the second meeting of the Turkish-Egyptian Joint Planning and Free Trade Agreement Group to cooperation to strengthen transport links between the coastal states of Africa, — It also affected Libya, Gaza, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, the Horn of Africa and maritime security. Both countries stressed support for Libya’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, while Cairo reiterated its call for the unification of state institutions and the holding of simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections.
This pattern differs significantly from the regional policies of the past decade. Turkey and Egypt were among the main actors of the demarcation that arose after the «Arab spring»Libya has become one of the most militarized areas of this rivalry.
Today, although the interests of the two countries in Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean or other regional dossiers do not fully coincide, Ankara and Cairo are no longer shaping their policies primarily for the sake of mutual exclusion, but are looking for areas of coordination that allow both common and competing interests to be managed simultaneously. Therefore, the current relationship would not be enough to describe only the concept. «normalization». The emerging model relies more on selective regional coordination than on alliance. Shared interests on topics such as the absence of conflict in Libya, the preservation of state institutions in Sudan, countering the disintegration of Somalia or diplomacy on Gaza create areas where the two countries can act together despite divergent strategic priorities.
The search for a new regional order
These diplomatic contacts are also part of Turkey’s desire not to depend on any one actor, institution or center of power in future political settlements. This aspiration is closely linked to the broader transformation in the Middle East and North Africa. The region is not experiencing a linear transition from conflict to settlement. Political divisions continue in Libya, but institutional unification is being discussed. Sudan is at war, but regional actors are strengthening ties with institutions they expect to persist in the future. Turkey and Egypt are cooperating on diplomacy on Gaza, but broader regional differences remain. The membership, institutional depth and strategic scope of new security arrangements, such as the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, continue to be negotiated.
Turkey’s recent regional policy has been shaped by the goals of preserving room for maneuver, maintaining relations with rival actors, participating in several diplomatic formats simultaneously, and accumulating political and material influence sufficient to avoid being left out of future political bidding. Turkey’s priority now is not only to gain a favorable position in regional conflicts, but also to remain an indispensable actor in the political settlements that emerge from these conflicts.
