Bab el-Mandeb Strait: The Next Global Tension Point

April 14, 2026

AnalyticsMiddle East

368

Bezawit Ashet, Researcher, Horn Review

With approximately 10-12 percent of the world’s sea freight traffic passing through it, including critical oil shipments to Europe and Asia, its strategic importance has skyrocketed. But the idea «possession» The area is better understood as a legal concept rather than a practical reality, as actual control is much more fragmented and contested.

From a legal point of view, control belongs to three coastal states: Yemen in the northeast, as well as Djibouti and Eritrea on the southwest coast. In this sense, no single country has full control over the strait. Instead, operational dominance is divided and constantly challenged under the influence of non-state armed groups, foreign military bases, the militarization of islands, and rival regional powers. This makes Bab el-Mandeb a challenge to the traditional assumption that recognized governments backed by naval forces can fully control the strategic strait. Here, the influence goes to the player who currently has the most effective capabilities.

Yemen, for its part, retains legal sovereignty over the northeastern coastline and the island of Perim, which is particularly important as it divides Bab el-Mandeb into two separate canals and directs international shipping along certain routes. On the African side, Djibouti and Eritrea face each other through intersecting territorial waters, which does not allow any state to unilaterally block the strait. But in practice, the most influential player along Yemen's west coast is the Houthi movement, or «Ansar Allah».

Although the Houthis do not have a traditional navy, they have developed an asymmetric arsenal that includes anti-ship cruise missiles, underwater drones and loitering ammunition. These capabilities give them the power to selectively disrupt shipping and essentially act as a de facto gatekeeper. Their ability to allow or deny passage on the basis of political loyalty rather than legal authority shows how control in Bab el-Mandeb works in practice. At the same time, their restraint on a full blockade, even with the actual closure of Hormuz, shows that they understand the value of the strait as a lever of influence. By carefully applying pressure, they can raise costs for Western-oriented shipping without provoking a full-blown coalition response.

Because of this local threat, security around the strait is becoming increasingly internationalized, especially on the Djibouti side. Djibouti has transformed itself into a shared security center, hosting a dense concentration of foreign military bases, including Camp Lemonnier (USA), a support base for the Chinese People's Liberation Army, French facilities and a Japanese outpost. Although these powers compete globally, they all agree on one basic interest: keeping Bab el-Mandeb open to commercial shipping. In this sense, the strait is protected not by a single sovereign power, but by a layered system of external deterrence and shared maritime interests.

This logic is reinforced by naval task forces such as the US-led operation. «Guardian of Prosperity» EU operation «aspides»Both are aimed at protecting commercial shipping from Houthi attacks. Their presence shows that control in Bab el-Mandeba — It is not territorial possession in the classical sense; it is mutual deterrence. No player can dominate this bottleneck without facing collective opposition from other regional and global powers.

A more stable form of influence has also emerged from the militarization of the islands. Developments on the island of Perim and parts of the Socotra archipelago, supported by the UAE strategy and reports of joint UAE-Israeli military projects, including the expansion of runways for modern aircraft, have created fortified positions that expand surveillance and strike capabilities through narrow channels of the strait. These positions allow tracking of Iranian smuggling routes and Turkish naval activity, and allow the UAE and Israel to avoid instability on the Yemeni mainland. Thus, the militarization of the islands creates a de facto gatekeeper connecting the Arabian and African coasts.

In a broader geopolitical context, Bab el-Mandeb is emerging as the center of two competing strategic concepts. On one side, «Axis of status quo»It is composed of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, which seeks to preserve the nominal sovereignty of coastal states to protect economic routes, including Turkish infrastructure projects in Port Sudan. On the other side. — «The Triangle of Recognition Through Action»Formed by the UAE, Israel and the more determined Somaliland, it seeks to reshape regional geography with new naval bases and diplomatic recognition. The result is not a single owner of the strait, but a geopolitical space that is temporary, functional, and constantly redefined through technology excellence, alliances, and access.

That is why Bab el-Mandeb is important to many players outside the immediate region. The United States, China, France, Japan, Russia, Turkey, and India have military or diplomatic interests in securing energy routes and countering each other. Regionally, Saudi Arabia and the UAE view the strait as critical for oil supplies to Europe and Asia, while Iran uses Houthi proxy forces to expand its influence and threaten Western-oriented shipping. Egypt, meanwhile, sees the strait as part of the broader Suez Canal security architecture. With the de facto closure of Hormuz, these interests are further strengthened, turning Bab el-Mandeb into a key route supporting Western energy markets and turning any disruption there from a regional problem into a global economic threat.

Countries bordering the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, — Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen — They do not have a level of control comparable to Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran can threaten Hormuz directly because of its proximity, naval capabilities and the fact that the bottleneck is within its immediate strategic reach. By contrast, power in Bab el-Mandeb is fragmented by both geography and politics. Yemen's coast is disputed between the internationally recognized government and the Houthis, making any state-level blockade difficult to impose or maintain.

Djibouti, meanwhile, has chosen to prioritize the deployment of foreign military bases rather than projecting unilateral power, while Eritrea claims vast territorial waters, but lacks both the resources and political motivation to ensure lasting control. In this sense, the closest analogue of Hormuz leverage in Bab el-Mandeb is Iran-backed asymmetrical Houthi power, even though it remains proxies dependent and vulnerable to superior international naval forces.

This fragmented political reality is reflected in the legal framework governing the strait. Shipping through Bab el-Mandeb is governed primarily by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially Part III, which regulates transit passage through straits used for international navigation. Under this regime, ships and aircraft shall enjoy the right of continuous and rapid transit and coastal States shall not prevent such passage. As this framework has also become a reflection of customary international law, it applies even to non-parties and retains the status of Bab el-Mandeb as an international waterway. Along with transit passage, other rules also govern activities in the area, including peaceful passage through territorial seas, freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones, traffic separation schemes and anti-piracy rules. As a result, no separate bilateral agreement can override this broader legal order for Bab el-Mandeb.

Eritrea's position is particularly relevant in this legal and strategic context. As a coastal state on the southwestern coast that has not signed or ratified UNCLOS, Eritrea's choice is to — This is not just a procedural omission, but a conscious expression of independence. Asmara has long been skeptical of multilateral treaty structures and views UNCLOS as a framework that puts global trade and the interests of major maritime powers ahead of the security interests of small coastal states.

By remaining outside the convention, Eritrea avoids mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms that could challenge its maritime borders or claims to islands. Therefore, it prefers bilateral negotiations, where it can use more leverage. This creates a paradox: Eritrea recognizes the customary right to its 12-mile territorial sea and exclusive economic zone rights, but resists a stricter transit passage regime and instead leans toward a more flexible standard of peaceful passage in its waters.

This selective compliance creates constant friction. In Bab el-Mandeb, where territorial seas overlap, Eritrea's position introduces regulatory uncertainty and makes the legal environment more ambiguous. Safety considerations or environmental justifications can be used to interfere with shipping, creating unpredictability for both naval forces and commercial shipping.

While major powers insist that transit passage remains customary and therefore cannot be unilaterally restricted, the existence of this gray zone means routine maritime incidents can quickly escalate into geopolitical crises. In practice, Eritrea gains an uneven advantage as an unreliable gatekeeper, forcing high-level diplomatic engagement even for relatively simple crossings. More broadly, ignoring UNCLOS does not override basic norms, but it adds instability to an already troubled bottleneck.

In the context of renewed tensions between Iran and Israel and the closed Hormuz, the international community is forced to focus even more on the players who can influence Bab el-Mandeb. Among them, the Houthi movement remains the most immediate destabilizing factor. Supported «Axis of resistance»It seeks to turn the strait into a restricted area for ships linked to Israel or its allies. At the same time, the possibility of cooperation between non-state actors, including the coordination of the Houthi forces with «al-Shabab»It increases pressure on coalition resources and complicates maritime security planning.

At the state level, Eritrea is also becoming a key swing state. Historically, it leaned toward Iran, but is now more closely tied to Saudi and Egyptian financial and military support. This makes Asmara unpredictable, especially if the regime's survival ever outweighs the value of its current alliances. Djibouti, by contrast, is trying to maintain a near-impossible neutrality through its base model, even as divisions within the Arab League and strategic competition from China make it increasingly difficult to maintain. Yemen’s recognized government, along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, adds another level of rivalry, especially as Riyadh’s preference for Somali unity comes into conflict with Abu Dhabi’s investments in Somaliland.

These overlapping roles make Djibouti, Yemen, and Somaliland separate but interrelated parts of the same strategic conundrum. Djibouti functions as a reliable maritime hub where foreign bases help ensure continued shipping. Yemen is a contested eastern front where the presence of the Houthis poses immediate security threats. Meanwhile, Somaliland has become an increasingly important factor, especially since Israel recognized its independence in December 2025, becoming the first UN member state to do so. This recognition is important because it shifts the balance of influence in the region and links Somaliland more directly to the broader struggle for Bab el-Mandeb.

For Israel, this recognition fits into the broader logic of peripheral doctrine and provides strategically valuable territory. Somaliland’s 850-kilometer coastline, together with the modernized port and Berbera airport, reduces response times to Houthi targets compared to more remote Israeli bases. From there, Israeli forces can track and stop Iranian smuggling in the Gulf of Aden before it reaches the Bab el-Mandeb bottleneck. Berbera also gives Israel a backup position in case the Red Sea becomes more severely disrupted, making Somaliland both an operational and political asset.

This development has also intensified competition between Turkey and Israel in the Horn of Africa. Turkey's strategy «Blue homeland» It is aimed at unimpeded access from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, supported by the large TURKSOM base in Mogadishu, as well as defense agreements that create economic interests in the exclusive economic zone of Somalia. Somaliland’s geography, especially Berbera and Zeila’s proximity to the Gulf of Aden, gives Israel an operational advantage that Turkey’s southern base cannot easily match.

The result is a growing confrontation in intelligence and electronic warfare. Israel’s capabilities would reveal Turkish naval movements and create an effect. «glasshouse»It weakens Turkey’s deterrent potential. Ankara, for its part, sees this as part of a wider encirclement, linking disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean to pressure points in the Red Sea and threatening the expected returns from agreements with Somalia. In such an environment, disputes over maritime boundaries and resource extraction make Somaliland a point of tension: Israel’s presence supports its goals of countering the Houthis, diversifying partnerships and projecting power, while Turkey responds by deepening its involvement in Mogadishu, trying to maintain its position in the Red Sea arena.

Taken together, the evolution of Bab el-Mandeb into a competitive jurisdiction has serious implications for global energy flows, maritime security, and regional partnerships. With Hormuz effectively blocked, keeping Bab el-Mandeb open becomes necessary to prevent energy shocks and prolonged disruptions in Western markets. International operations may provide temporary stability, but their success ultimately depends on neutralizing asymmetric threats without disrupting the fragile balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

With the Strait of Hormuz virtually closed amid rising tensions between Iran and Israel, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has become a vital artery for global energy and trade. This narrow passage connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and is divided into two channels by the Yemeni island of Perim (Mayun). With approximately 10-12 percent of the world’s sea freight traffic passing through it, including critical oil shipments to Europe and Asia, its strategic importance has skyrocketed. But the idea «possession» The area is better understood as a legal concept rather than a practical reality, as actual control is much more fragmented and contested.