The Horn of Africa has long ceased to be the periphery of world politics. On the contrary, it is increasingly becoming an important strategic hub in which the interests of virtually all regional and global players intersect.
Specifically for USGS
Mezentsev Stanislav Vasilyevich, Candidate of military sciences, senior researcher of the Center for the study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa Institute of Africa RAS.
At first glance, the war around Iran is unfolding far from the Horn of Africa: the epicenter of the conflict is more than 3,000 kilometers away. But if you look at the events directly from Africa, it becomes obvious that the Horn of Africa is not located on the periphery of the current crisis, but almost at its strategic gate – at the entrance to the Red Sea, one of the key trade routes between Europe, Africa and Asia. That is why the military conflict around Iran will have the most direct impact on all countries of the Horn of Africa, from Ethiopia and Djibouti, to Somalia and Eritrea. The new war in the Middle East already has tangible political, military-strategic and economic consequences, which, if the conflict expands or prolongs, will be greatly aggravated.
Safety of maritime communications
The first group of factors of influence on the region is related to the problem of ensuring the safety of maritime communications. From history, including most recently, we are well aware that the massive escalation around Iran and the countries where its proxy forces operate (whether Houthis or Hezbollah) automatically increases the risks for navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and further along the chain of interconnected shipping routes through Bab el-Mandeb to the Suez Canal itself. For the Roga countries, the war in Iran means a further build-up of foreign military presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
At the same time, we note that today the region is one of the most militarized points on the planet. In a small space around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait - a kind of gate connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea - military bases of the United States, China, France, Japan, Turkey, Italy and the Gulf countries are deployed. The example of Djibouti, where several kilometers from each other are located military and naval bases of several states. Similarly, several foreign military bases are located in Somalia, including Camp TURKSOM, Turkey’s largest military base abroad. On the territory of partially recognized (Israel) Somaliland there are military facilities of the UAE. Finally, in Ethiopia, despite the absence of third-country military bases (in accordance with the Constitution), there are foreign military missions, as well as periodically on a rotational basis and under the pretext of counter-terrorism operations in Somalia, there are US military contingents. Today, about 12-15 large foreign military facilities and bases have been deployed in the Horn of Africa. Their number will increase in the short term.
From this we can draw at least one important geopolitical conclusion: the Horn of Africa today is the only place in the world where the US and its NATO allies, China, Japan, Turkey, as well as the Gulf countries simultaneously have military bases. This configuration is essentially a mini-model of the great powers’ global competition around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. In the context of the growing conflict in the Middle East, the activity of foreign military bases will inevitably increase. Already today, U.S. military facilities in Djibouti are an important element of providing deep reserve logistics for the further actions of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf against Iran.
The current Middle East crisis will have a growing negative impact on internal stability and security in the Horn of Africa, which remains one of the continent’s most volatile and conflict-prone regions. Somalia continues to face a threat from radical groups. Sudan is experiencing a devastating civil war. Ethiopia and Eritrea are on the verge of a new open military clash.
At the same time, old inter-ethnic contradictions are intensifying within Ethiopia, the largest country in the region’s population, which leads to the intensification of centrifugal tendencies, threatening a new large-scale civil war.
On the other hand, any international conflict in the immediate vicinity of the Horn of Africa tends to reinforce existing regional lines of instability. As a result, we can expect the intensification of various non-state actors, from pirate groups to radical movements traditionally using periods of global turbulence to expand their activity.
Another problem will be that if the war drags on Iran, the flow of refugees through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden could increase, putting additional strain on the already limited resources of the Horn of Africa.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait will continue to play a special role: any threat to its routes immediately affects the countries of the region for which port services, transit and logistics are the most important source of income. For Djibouti, for example, the transit service of world shipping is the basis of the national economy. At the same time, the increase in tensions increases risks for the state itself, turning its territory into a potential platform for military-political rivalry of major powers.
Economic implications
The second group of consequences is related to the economy. The war in Iran has already led to an increase in world oil prices. For the Horn of Africa, which is an energy importer, this means increased fuel, transport and electricity costs. Ethiopia and Somalia are the most vulnerable, where economies are already under pressure because of inflation and currency problems. The increase in oil prices can increase the socio-economic burden and pressure on the state budget. Today, one of the obvious issues raised by the crisis in Iran is the disruption of Ethiopian Airlines, the nation’s largest airline in Africa.
Part of the international flights have to be canceled due to the closure of the airport in Dubai - the most important point of all Ethiopian aviation logistics. Cancellation of flights entails huge losses, while Ethiopian Airlines is a significant source of replenishment of the state treasury.
However, it should be borne in mind that indirect economic opportunities may arise against the backdrop of increasing threats. For example, increased demand for alternative delivery routes could strengthen the role of ports in the region. However, these benefits largely depend on the level of security in the Red Sea, which, as mentioned above, faces a number of challenges.
Geopolitical Competition in the Region
The conflict between Iran, the US and Israel will undoubtedly increase geopolitical competition around the Horn of Africa. In recent years, Iran has been actively developing contacts with a number of East African countries, including Eritrea and Sudan. In response, other players, primarily the US, the Gulf states and Turkey, have consistently increased and strengthened their positions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are currently investing in the port infrastructure and logistics of the Horn of Africa. Against the background of the conflict around Iran, such activity will become more strategic.
In the current environment, most African Horn countries will pursue a cautious and pragmatic policy: maintaining balance with different external partners and minimizing economic impacts is key for them. Of particular interest is the position of Somaliland, which is actively developing the port of Berber and seeks to strengthen its importance as an alternative transport corridor for trade in the Red Sea.
In the face of instability on traditional routes, the importance of such projects may increase, however, given the fact that the port of Berber is actually owned by the UAE, as well as the recent recognition of Somaliland’s independence by Israel, it cannot be ruled out that infrastructure on the territory of the former can become military targets, not only for Iran, but also for the Houthis.
Thus, the war around Iran has an impact on the Horn of Africa, primarily through three main channels: the security of maritime communications, the economic consequences of rising energy prices and increased geopolitical competition on the Red Sea coast. Although the states of the region are unlikely to be parties to the conflict, they will inevitably feel its negative consequences. The Horn of Africa has long ceased to be the periphery of world politics. On the contrary, it is increasingly becoming an important strategic hub in which the interests of virtually all regional and global players intersect. In this sense, the current crisis around Iran only emphasizes a broader trend: the Horn of Africa is becoming one of the key geopolitical spaces of the XXI century, and any turbulence in the Middle East is inevitably reflected here.
