Lizl Lou Vodran, Senior Advisor for the African Union at the International Crisis Group

Source: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-au-in-the-g20-another-voice-to-represent-african-interests-215120
Photo: www.ispionline.it

Accession of the African Union (AU) to «Group of twenty» The G20 marks an important step towards strengthening African representation in global economic governance. However, institutional barriers, coordination and divergence of national interests may limit the AU’s ability to influence debt, investment and reform decisions. The membership of the AU in the G20 gives the organization the opportunity to raise issues directly affecting the development of Africa, in discussions with leading economies of the world. In a period of unprecedented geopolitical change weakening multilateral cooperation around the world, it is increasingly urgent for 54 African countries to be heard in global forums.

The AU became a full member in 2023, responding to requests from its member states for greater representation in multilateral institutions and forums such as the G20. The AU’s accession was actively supported by India, the host country of the 2023 summit, as well as Brazil and South Africa. His first G20 summit was held in Brazil in November 2024. Moreover, the fact that South Africa is presiding this year provides the AU with a strong platform to declare its ambitions.

Focus on debt and sustainability

While approaches may vary, AU member states largely converge on some key priorities. Reforming the international financial system, addressing Africa's unsustainable debt burden and curbing illicit financial flows — Three issues that are high on their agenda. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African countries pay $163 billion annually for debt servicing, with many spending more on it than on health and education combined. The debt crisis has made it increasingly difficult for Africa to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Moreover, Africa can no longer rely on official development assistance from richer countries to fill the financial gap, as Western development assistance is shrinking, especially in light of its sharp decline by the US. African countries therefore understand that they should try to increase their domestic resources by improving income collection and curbing the illicit outflow of funds from the continent by improving tax administration and fighting corruption. They should also seek to change the negative connotations of the perception of Africa as a high-risk continent, making borrowing here much more expensive than elsewhere, and scaring away investors.

African countries do not all agree that it is the AU that should lead these efforts, given the large differences and different levels of development of countries. Africa’s largest economies often choose to address their issues on their own rather than through continental organizations.

Organizational capacity of AC

However, AS can help identify some of these important issues through its ability to gather participants. In early May, for example, the AU invited finance ministers and central bank governors in Togo for its first pan-African debt conference. After two days of discussions, he called for new relief measures for high-debt countries and reform of the G20's General Debt Restructuring Framework, which have not proven effective.

The AU also has the ability to standardize and distribute data. Ten years ago, the AU commissioned a report on illicit financial flows prepared by former South African President Tabo Mbeki. Mbeki and his team estimated that Africa loses up to $50 billion annually due to illegal flows. However, little has changed since then, and there is a significant lack of reliable data. For example, experts at the G20 event in Johannesburg on May 30, 2025, said that Africa loses up to $90 billion annually due to these flows, confirming the continent's inability to take control of the problem.

Meanwhile, the AU has taken steps to establish an African credit rating agency, despite some disagreements among African politicians. The AU leaders announced plans to establish the African Monetary Institute and the African Financial Stability Mechanism. However, these institutions are unlikely to improve the investment climate in Africa in the near future.

The AU has long called for reform of the international financial architecture, fair representation on the International Monetary Fund’s board of directors, and more transparent decision-making processes at international financial institutions. This was reaffirmed at the AU Heads of State summit in Addis Ababa in February and at various G20 meetings to discuss Africa's priorities since then.

Common African Positions

The AU faces a number of obstacles to fully using its G20 seat at this favourable moment. Institutional barriers prevented the organization from meaningfully participating in various meetings and working groups ahead of the leaders' summit in Johannesburg in November.

The AU is an intergovernmental organization and cannot make decisions on behalf of its members unless there is consensus around a common African position, which is difficult to achieve on the continent with 54 countries with highly different economies. However, the AU has adopted strategic plans such as its «Agenda 2063»which can serve as a guide for officials in formulating the demands and contributions of Africa.

Moreover, the AU has not yet debugged all its structures to ensure fair representation in forums such as the G20. Initially, it was agreed that the Chairman of the AC this year will represent the organization at the G20 Leaders Summit with the assistance of the Chairman of the AC Commission. In the report on the first year of the AU membership, Mauritania President Mohammed uld Ghazvani regretted that the arrangements for the leaders’ summit had been clarified shortly before the summit, and so then-CAS Chairman Musa Faki Mahamat did not travel to Brazil. South African hosts are expected to rectify this provision: both Angolan President Joan Lawrence and AU Commission Chairman Mahmoud Ali Yusuf will attend the Johannesburg summit in November.

After a broad debate, Member States decided that the AU Commissioner for Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry and Mineral Resources would serve as Sherpa in the G20, rather than the Minister of the country presiding over the Union this year. The debate over who should be the sherpa reflects the dilemma facing the AU member states: they need to accelerate and simplify AU participation to ensure continuity, but at the same time ensure equitable representation of all members and regions of the continent.

In addition, the post of economic development commissioner remained vacant for months this year as members failed to elect a replacement for Zambian Albert Muchange, whose term expired in February. The election took place on July 10, when foreign ministers elected Francisco Thachuup Belobé, a former minister from Equatorial Guinea.

To address some of these challenges, the AU Commission has established a coordination unit, but by July 2025 it has not yet been fully staffed. Critics from Addis Ababa say much of the AU's planning is based on how the EU institutionalizes its membership, which turns out to be ineffective as the AU does. — A much smaller organization with many overlapping priorities and little institutional capacity to replicate what the EU achieves through its permanent structures to work with the G20. As noted above, the AU also has no supranational EU status to speak on behalf of its members.

Headache of regional representation

The AU is also trying to make the most of the G20 working groups. In February this year, AU leaders considered reviewing the structure of their specialized technical committees (addressing issues such as trade, transport, energy, education, health and security) to improve participation in G20 working groups. If implemented, this would mean that in the future, one country will participate in G20 working groups dealing with thematic issues (Angola in 2025). While this change may streamline AU participation, some AU member states believe it erodes continent-wide support for G20 membership. It could also place a heavy burden on a country that may not be able to participate in so many G20 meetings and events.

However, it is the host country that decides which non-G20 members to invite to working groups and meetings of Sherpa tracks and finance ministers. This year, South Africa invited Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt, as well as four African regional economic communities, to the meetings. It also invited Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to specific working groups. At the same time, African think tanks and experts included AU officials and the AU Development Agency (ASDA-NEPAD) in their activities. The G20 African Expert Group, chaired by former South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, will also present the G20 with recommendations on financial issues, including the cost of capital, providing additional continental input to the G20 summit.

From the outset, South Africa recognized that it would be difficult to move the G20 on global economic governance within one year. At best, it can institutionalize a new priority, as has been done with the cost-of-capital commission. Collective pressure from South Africa and its AU allies could accelerate the achievement of its goals of promoting a fairer international system. At a time when competition between world powers threatens to erode the rules of international trade, countries are rightly skeptical about what can be achieved. In a very complex context marked by threats to multilateralism, the AU nevertheless has a responsibility to overcome its institutional challenges and make the most of its seat at the negotiating table.